Complete Works. Hamilton Alexander
government, with the addition of the want of checks.
Perpetual effort in each member.
Influence of individuals in office to excite jealousy and clamor—State leaders.
Experience corresponds.
Grecian republics.
Demosthenes says—Athens seventy-three years—Lacedæmon twenty-seven—The bans after battle of Leuctra.
Phocians—consecrated ground—Philip, etc.
Germanic empire.
Charlemagne and his successors.
Diet—recesses.
Electors now seven, excluding others.
Swiss cantons.
Two diets.
Opposite alliances.
Berne—Lucerne.
To strengthen the Federal Government, powers too great must be given to a single hand.
League offensive and defensive, etc.
Particular governments must exert themselves, etc.
But liable to usual vicissi(tudes.)
Internal peace affected.
Proximity of situation—natural enemies.
Partial confederacies from unequal extent.
Power inspires ambition.
Weakness begets jealousy.
Western territory.
Objn.—Genius of republics pacific.
Answer. Jealousy of commerce as well as jealousy of power begets war.
Sparta—Athens—Thebes—Rome—Carthage—Venice—Hanseatic League.
England as many popular as royal wars.
Lewis the XIV.—Austria—Bourbons—William and Anne.
Wars depend upon trifling circumstances.
Where—Duchess of Marlborough's glove.
Foreign conquest.
Dismemberment—Poland.
Foreign influence.
Distractions set afloat vicious humors.
Standing armies by dissensions.
Domestic factions—Montesquieu.
Monarchy in Southern States.
Wars—destructive.
Loss of advantages.
Foreign nations would not respect our rights nor grant us reciprocity.
Would reduce us to a passive commerce.
Fisheries—navigation of the lakes—Mississippi—Fleet.
The General Government must, in this case, not only have a strong soul, but strong organs by which that soul is to operate.
Here I shall give my sentiments of the best form of government—not as a thing attainable by us, but as a model which we ought to approach as near as possible.
British constitution best form.
Aristotle—Cicero—Montesquieu—Neckar.
Society naturally divides itself into two political divisions—the few and the many, who have distinct interests.
If government in the hands of the few, they will tyrannize over the many.
If (in) the hands of the many, they will tyrannize over the few. It ought to be in the hands of both; and they should be separated.
This separation must be permanent.
Representation alone will not do.
Demagogues will generally prevail.
And if separated, they will need a mutual check.
This check is a monarch.
Each principle ought to exist in full force, or it will not answer its end.
The democracy must be derived immediately from the people.
The aristocracy ought to be entirely separated; their power should be permanent, and they should have the caritas liberorum.
They should be so circumstanced that they can have no interest in a change—as to have an effectual weight in the Constitution.
Their duration should be the earnest of wisdom and stability.
’T is essential there should be a permanent will in a community.
Vox populi, vox Dei.
Source of government—the unreasonableness of the people—separate interests—debtors and creditors, etc.
There ought to be a principle in government capable of resisting the popular current.
No periodical duration will come up to this.
This will always imply hopes and fears.
Creature and Creator.
Popular assemblies governed by a few individuals.
These individuals, seeing their dissolution approach, will sacrifice.
The principle of representation will influence.
The most popular branch will acquire an influence over the other.
The other may check in ordinary cases, in which there is no strong public passion; but it will not in cases where there is—the cases in which such a principle is most necessary.
One seventh will have only one year to serve.
One seventh_____________two years.
One seventh_____________three years.
One seventh_____________four years.
A majority will look to a dissolution in four years by instalments.
The monarch must have proportional strength. He ought to be hereditary, and to have so much power, that it will not be his interest to risk much to acquire more.
The advantage of a monarch is this—he is above corruption—he must always intend, in respect to foreign nations, the true interest and glory of the people.
Republics liable to foreign corruption and intrigue—Holland—Athens.
Effect of the British government.
A vigorous execution of the laws, and a vigorous defence of the people, will result.
Better chance for a good administration.
It is said a republican government does not admit a vigorous execution.
It is therefore bad; for the goodness of a government consists in a vigorous execution.
The principle chiefly intended to be established is this—that there must be a permanent will.
Gentlemen say we need to be rescued from the democracy. But what the means proposed?
A democratic Assembly is to be checked by a democratic Senate, and both these by a democratic chief magistrate.
The end will not be answered—the means will