The Negro in Chicago - A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot. Chicago Commission on Race Relations
rioting whites.
Fear by policemen of Negroes is also disclosed. George Crumm, white, 124 East Forty-sixth Street, informed the state's attorney's office that he was beaten by a Negro mob, got police assistance, and pointed out the rioters, but the police "didn't seem to want to interfere any."
On several occasions policemen left the scene of riots on questionable excuses while the rioting was in progress. Of the three mounted policemen at Thirty-fifth Street and Wabash Avenue who rushed to the spot where a mob was attacking Otterson, two accompanied the automobile of Otterson to the hospital. The mob was not quelled or dispersed. When the house of William O'Deneal, Negro, 4742 Wells Street, was attacked, the police took O'Deneal to the station and left the mob to sack and burn his house. At the killing of William Dozier, Negro, all three police officers who responded to notice of an attack by a white mob of 300 or more, left in the same patrol wagon. The names of witnesses were not taken. It was the custom for all to accompany the wagon, according to Officer McDonough.
Political "pull" exercised with the police on behalf of rioters has been indicated. It was noted that one of "Ragen's Colts" said an officer of the Stock Yards Station "tipped them off" to stay away from their club because Attorney General Brundage's office was out investigating them.
Indifference both to extreme lawlessness during the riot and to the procedure of the inquest marked the examination of Captain of Police Mullen before the coroner's jury. He was in command of twelve mounted men and between sixty-three and 100 men on foot at Thirty-fifth Street and Wabash Avenue when a clash between the police and a Negro mob occurred. While it appears to be the fact that he left just before the heavy firing to telephone from a saloon one block away, yet the building he was in was struck by bullets. The following excerpt from the inquest speaks for itself:
Q.: What time did the shooting take place at the building known as the Angelus Building? What time did that occur? Was there any shooting at that building?
Mullen: Not that I heard.
Q.: Had there been any shooting done there that evening around … before you left?
Mullen: Not to my knowledge.
Q.: When was the shooting done, and where were you?
Mullen: What do you mean shooting?
Three men were killed and many injured at Thirty-fifth Street and Wabash Avenue at this time. Firing broke out near-by almost immediately.
Q.: There were some shots fired at Thirty-fifth and State, Captain, at eight that night, right after the volley was fired, we have absolute evidence.
Mullen: Well, you may have, but I have not.
Yet Captain Mullen was in command of the police who killed two more men and inflicted other wounds when the Negroes ran before the police advance.
Militia.—The rapid growth of the riot both in violence and territorially created such alarm among the authorities and the public that the question of its control became a matter of paramount concern to the community. Before twenty-four hours had elapsed requests were made to the local authorities for the militia. The representations were based on insufficiency of police forces and were strongly urged before the chief of police.
Chief Garrity steadily refused to ask for troops, in spite of his repeated statement that the police force was insufficient. He gave as his reason the belief that inexperienced militiamen would add to the deaths and disorders. Mayor Thompson supported the chief's refusal until outside pressure compelled him to ask the governor for aid. On the other hand the chief deputy of police was quoted by State's Attorney Hoyne as having said at the outbreak of the riot that the police would not be able to handle the situation, and that troops were needed. In this he was supported by Mr. Hoyne. From observation of conditions on the first three days of the riot, the chief of staff of the troops, Colonel Ronayne, concluded that the police were insufficient in numbers, that no improvement was apparent in the general situation, and that therefore the troops were necessary. He saw no reason, however, for putting the city under martial law. Other military men were of the same opinion.
During all of this time Governor Lowden kept in close touch with the situation from his quarters at the Blackstone Hotel. When the riot appeared to be subsiding he started to keep an appointment out of town but, on hearing that there was a renewal of violence, returned to the city on a special train. When the request was made for the active co-operation of the troops he acted with promptness.
The troops themselves were clearly of high caliber. For the most part they were in home service during the war and were older men than are ordinarily found in militia organizations. They "usually came from the higher type of business men, men of affairs, men that knew how to think," as one of their commanding officers described them. They were all American-born.
NEGROES UNDER PROTECTION OF POLICE AND MILITIA BUYING PROVISIONS BROUGHT INTO THEIR NEIGHBORHOOD IN WAGONS
THE MILITIA AND NEGROES ON FRIENDLY TERMS
The militia discipline was of the best. Not a single case of breach of discipline was reported to the regimental commanders. No guardhouse was necessary during the riot, a remarkable commentary on troop conduct.
The militia had been given special drills in the suppression of riots and insurrections for a year and a half previous to this occasion, and were, in the estimation of their commanding officer, "probably better prepared for riot drill than any troops ever put on duty in the state."
The activities of the militia did not begin as early as many citizens wished. Though troops began to mobilize in the armories on Monday night, July 28, they were not called to actual duty on the streets until 10:30 P.m., Wednesday, July 30. When called to active duty they were distributed in the areas of conflict. Between 5,000 and 6,000 troops were called out. This number was made up entirely of white troops from the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Infantry, Illinois National Guard, and from the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Reserve Militia regiments of the militia. Colored troops who had composed the Eighth Regiment were not reorganized at that time, and therefore none participated.
Distribution of troops was determined not by the militia command but by the police, because the city was not under martial law, the civil authority being merely insufficient, not broken. The Third Infantry covered the territory from Thirty-first to Thirty-eighth streets and from State to Halsted streets; Eleventh Infantry from Thirty-ninth to Forty-seventh streets, and from State to Halsted streets; Tenth Infantry from Forty-eighth to Fifty-fifth streets (later extended to Sixty-third Street by details from the First Infantry), and from Cottage Grove to Stewart avenues. The First, Fourth, and Ninth Infantry were held in reserve. Detachments responded to calls from the chief of police in districts outside these areas. Headquarters for the commanding general and his chief of staff were in the Congress Hotel at the northern boundary of the riot zone.
The orders under which the militia operated did not have the authority of martial law. The purpose of the orders was to effect a thorough co-operation with the police only, and not to take over any duties other than the preservation of law and order. Except in this respect, civilian routine remained undisturbed. The method of co-operation put the commanding officer of a regiment in absolute control, within the limits above described, in his district. The police reduced their number to normal requirements by removing their reserves as soon as the militia moved in. The patrolmen then went about on ordinary duties in the districts. Persons arrested by the militia were turned over to the police.
Responsibility for the preservation of law and order rested on the regimental commanders. Careful instructions were given troops for preventing violence: they were to act as soldiers in a gentlemanly manner; they were furnished with arms to enable them to perform their duties; they were to use the arms only when necessary; they were to use bayonet and butt in preference to firing, but if the situation demanded shooting, they were not to hesitate to deliver an effective fire. Above all, the formation of mobs was to be prevented.
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