Cheap Postage. Joshua Leavitt
we shall be satisfied that it is now high time for a determined effort to satisfy the people of the United States with regard to the utility and practicability of cheap postage.
Prior to the year 1840 the postal systems of Great Britain and the United States were constructed on similar principles, and the rates of postage were nearly alike. Both were administered with a special view to the amount of money that could be realized from postage. In Great Britain, the surplus of receipts above the cost of administration was carried to the general treasury. In the United States, the surplus received in the North was employed in extending mail facilities to the scattered inhabitants of the South and West. In Great Britain, private mails and other facilities had kept the receipts stationary for twenty years, while the population of the country had increased thirty per cent., and the business and intelligence and wealth of the country in a much greater ratio. In the United States, there was a constant increase of postage, although by a less ratio than the increase of population, until the year 1843, when, through the establishment of private mails, the gross receipts actually fell off, and it became apparent that the old system had failed, and could never be reinvigorated so as to make the post-office support itself, without a change of system.
In Great Britain, the government, after full investigation, became satisfied that it was impossible to suppress the private mails except by under-bidding them, which they also ascertained that the government, by its facilities, could afford to do. They also became satisfied that no plan of partial reduction of postage could restore the energy of the system, but the only hope of ultimate success was in the immediate adoption of the lowest rate. And although the public debt presses so heavily as to put every administration to its utmost resources for revenue, they resolved to risk the whole net revenue then realized, equal to above a million and a half sterling, as the best thing that could be done. In the United States, the government, without extensive examination, resolved to do what the British government dared not attempt, that is, to put down the private mails by penal enactments. It also resolved to adopt a partial reduction of the rates of postage; and without regarding the mathematical demonstration of its futility, persevered in regarding distance as the basis of the rates of charge.
A few extracts from the Debates in Parliament, will show several of these points in a striking light:
The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Francis Baring, on first introducing the bill, July 5, 1839, declared his conviction that the loss of revenue at the outset would be “very considerable indeed.” He said the committee had considered that “two pence postage could be introduced without any loss to the revenue,” but he differed from them, and found “the whole of the authorities conclusively bearing in favor of [pg 006] a penny postage.” And he “conscientiously believed that the public ran less risk of loss in adopting it.” Referring to the petitions of the people, he said, “The mass of them present the most extraordinary combination I ever saw, of representations to one purpose, from all classes, unswayed by any political motive whatever, from persons of all shades of opinion, political and religious, and from the commercial and trading communities in all parts of the kingdom.”
Mr. Goulburn, then one of the leaders of the opposition, opposed so great a sacrifice of revenue, in the existing state of the country, but admitted that it would “ultimately increase the wealth and prosperity of the country.” And if the experiment was to be tried at all, “it would be best to make it to the extent proposed,” for “the whole evidence went to show that a postage of two pence would fail, but a penny might succeed.”
Mr. Wallace declared it “one of the greatest boons that could be conferred on the human race,” and he begged that, as “England had the honor of the invention,” they might not “lose the honor of being the first to execute” a plan, which he pronounced “essentially necessary to the comforts of the human race.”
Sir Robert Peel, then at the head of the opposition, found much fault with the financial plans of Mr. Baring, but he “would not say one word in disparagement of the plans of Mr. Hill;” and if he wanted popularity, “he would at once give way to the public feeling in favor of the great moral and social advantages” of the plan, “the great stimulus it would afford to industry and commercial enterprise,” and “the boon it presented to the lower classes.”
Mr. O'Connell thought it would be “one of the most valuable legislative reliefs that had ever been given to the people.” It was “impossible to exaggerate its benefits.” And even if it would not pay the expense of the post-office, he held that “government ought to make a sacrifice for the purpose of facilitating communication.”
July 12, the debate was resumed.
Mr. Poulette Thompson showed the impossibility of making a correct estimate of the loss of revenue that would accrue. One witness before the committee stated that there would be no deficiency; another said it would be small; while Lord Ashburton declared that it would amount to a sacrifice of the whole revenue of the post-office.
Mr. Warburton denied that the post-office had ever been regarded as a mere matter of revenue; the primary object of its institution was to contribute to the convenience of the people; its advantages ought to be accessible to the whole community, and not be made a matter of taxation at all.
Viscount Sandon, of the opposition, said he had long been of the opinion that the post-office was not a proper source of revenue, but it “ought to be employed in stimulating other sources of revenue.”
July 22, another discussion came on.
Sir Robert Peel admitted that “great social and commercial advantages will arise from the change, independent of financial considerations.”
August 5, the bill was taken up by the peers.
Viscount Melbourn, in opening the debate, dwelt upon the extraordinary extent of the contraband conveyance of letters, as the effect of high postage, and said this made it necessary to protect both the revenue and the morals of the people by so great a reduction. The means of evasion were so organized, and resort to them was so easy, and had even become a habit, that persons would, for a very small profit, follow the contraband trade of conveying letters. It was therefore clearly necessary to make the reduction to such an extent as would ensure the stopping of the contraband trade.
The Duke of Wellington admitted “the expediency, and indeed the necessity” of the proposed change. He thought Mr. Hill's plan “the one most likely to succeed.” He found fault with the financial plans of the administration, but for the sake of the reform of the post-office, he said, “I shall, although with great reluctance, vote for the bill, and I earnestly recommend your lordships to do the same.” His customary mode of expressing his opinions.
Lord Ashburton expected the cost of the department, under the new system, would amount to a million sterling, which must be made up out of several pence before you could touch one farthing of the present income of a million and six hundred pounds. There could be no doubt that the country at large would derive an immense benefit, the consumption of paper would be increased considerably, and it was most probable the number of letters would be at least doubled. It appeared to him a tax upon communication between distant parties was, of all taxes, the [pg 007] most objectionable. At one time he had been of the opinion that the uniform charge of postage should be two pence, but he found the mass of evidence so strongly in favor of one penny, that he concluded the ministers were right in coming down to that rate.
The Earl of Lichfield, Postmaster-General, said the leading idea of Mr. Rowland Hill's book seemed to be “the fancy that he had hit upon a scheme for recovering the two millions of revenue which he thought had been lost by the high rates of postage.” His own opinion was, that the recovery of the revenue was totally impossible. He therefore supported the measure on entirely different grounds from those on which Mr. Hill placed it. In neither house had it been brought forward on the ground that the revenue would be the gainer. He assented to it on the simple ground that THE DEMAND FOR IT WAS UNIVERSAL. So obnoxious was the tax upon letters, that he was entitled to say that “the people had declared their readiness to submit to any impost that might be substituted in its stead.”
The proof is thus complete, that the British system was actually adopted with sole reference to