YouTube War: Fighting in a World of Cameras in Every Cell Phone and Photoshop on Every Computer. Cori E. Dauber
synergistic effects is created, producing an entirely new environment from that of previous wars. Obviously the Internet is first among equals; a revolutionary information tool in and of itself, connecting the entire world in entirely new ways. It has been suggested that its impact is comparable to that of the first printing press.
The average citizen, meanwhile, has become empowered to film what he or she sees, to edit those images, and then to upload them for the entire world to see. It is an entire group of new technologies, all of which have become relatively mature at relatively the same time, which have together made for this new information environment, and terrorists and insurgents are capitalizing on this environment successfully. For our purposes, an information or communication technology becomes mature when it meets several criteria. First, it must be available off-the-shelf, that is to say it must be commercially available to the general public, not only to military and law enforcement communities or reviewers for consumer product columns. Second, it must be relatively affordable, something within reach of a decent percentage of the population, and not merely a toy of the super-rich. Third, and this is critical, it must be small enough to be easily portable. Fourth, it must be available in most of the world, and not just in the developed countries. In the last few years, which technologies have met these criteria? Cameras of increasing quality (even high-definition) have become cheaper and cheaper (and smaller and smaller) even in countries without dependable electricity. Laptop computers are similarly available worldwide, at lower and lower prices and higher and higher quality. And the software that permits images to be edited and manipulated is available worldwide, requiring no training beyond the instructions that come with the software itself. In fact, while software such as Movie Maker 3 is easily available around the world and easily mastered without special training, it is not really necessary to purchase even something that unsophisticated—someone with just a little computer savvy (and realistically these days that is quite a number of the world’s young people) can download free shareware at zero cost or, with a great deal of computer savvy, hack something for free that is not in the public domain. (Or they can acquire what they need from the nonterrorist hacker or criminal communities.6) The Internet alone is a powerful, even revolutionary, tool: the Internet, in combination with these other technologies, has the potential to be used as a weapon.
A benign example of what is made possible when these technologies come together was seen during (and in the immediate aftermath of) the tsunami of December 2004. Western reporters were not in place at the time, tsunamis not being predictable events, but there were people there with cameras, people who were able to capture the wave and the devastation that resulted, (sometimes simply by pointing their cameras over their shoulders as they ran), and to get their footage onto the Internet hours, if not days, before professional reporters were even able to get to the strike zone. Thus the first images the rest of the world saw—and therefore, to a great extent, the first the outside world really knew of what had happened—came from citizen journalists whose images were appropriated by the professional media, for the simple enough reason that they lacked any others. This process is described most eloquently in an essay posted—no surprise—on a web blog, one of the constantly growing number of websites maintained by individuals or groups where thoughts or opinions are posted to the web, and therefore to the entire world.
The Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004 illustrates how a physical event breaks into the worldwide public information system. On December 26, 2004, after a huge earthquake off the west coast of Sumatra was detected, some seismologists realized it could generate a tsunami that could ravage vast coastal areas. But this suspicion remained in an informational limbo. The Sumatran earthquake released more energy than hundreds of nuclear bombs, but this physical fact would not register on the world’s consciousness until it could be reported as a story.
The author continues:
When the tsunami crashed ashore there were no press
photographers waiting for it. It was the ordinary tourist with a digital cameras and an Internet connection—the blogger—who brought the first accounts of the monster to the world. Sheer weight of numbers ensured that the Internet-connected citizen was in the position to witness one of the most awesome natural events of the early 21st century. Within hours their digital pictures and video, sometimes shot over the shoulder as they were on the run, and first-person narratives had percolated upward through the larger Internet sites to
the mainstream media.7
Indeed, mainstream media outlets are attempting to capitalize on viewers’ desires to produce their own content. CBS News, as part of its coverage of the NCAA basketball tournament in 2007, encouraged fans to create short clips cheering their teams on—or taunting rivals—to be posted on a dedicated website linked to the one set up by the network for their own coverage of the tournament.8 And CNN co-sponsored two presidential debates during the 2008 cycle with YouTube, allowing viewers to submit questions to candidates in the form of video clips.9
A less benign example occurred within hours of the hanging of Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi government released the official video, but it was less than a day later before the bootleg appeared—a video that had been made with a cell phone camera and was then widely distributed internationally via the Internet and inside Iraq from cell phone to cell phone. While the traditional networks were still considering which images from the official video were appropriate to show on the air,10 any viewer with an Internet connection could easily view the entire hanging for themselves, by watching the bootleg.11
Terrorist Home Videos: The Power of the Image
Technology, however, and the rapidly improving ways making it possible to distribute and disseminate content, are nothing without the content itself. Today’s terrorist groups were ready to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by these new technologies when they came along because they had realized the power of imagery in propaganda (and the capacity of new media technologies to put imagery within their reach for propaganda purposes) some time ago.
Beginning with the Chechens fighting against the Russians in the early 1990s, one innovation in terrorist propaganda made possible by innovations in media technology was the filming of terrorist attacks by the terrorists themselves. The Chechens took the footage they accumulated and produced full length videos, a development that quickly spread throughout the jihadist movement.12 The logic that led the Chechens to this innovation is on a direct trajectory from the logic that first brought terrorism up-to-date for a world that included modern mass media (meaning, of course, television.) The Chechen leader, a Jordanian-born terrorist named Ibn al-Khattab, justified the filming of attacks in a way that paralleled—and extended—the thinking of the Algerians back in the 1950s. The Algerians’ “Directive Number Nine” argued that it was better to kill one man where the American press would hear of it than nine where no one would find out. What Khattab realized was that technology had finally put into the terrorists’ reach the ability to cut out the middleman—the Western reporter.
He felt that if they killed a few Russian soldiers in an ambush along a road, the impact of the strike was limited. However, if the operation was filmed and then shown to the Russian people, that impact was multiplied manifold. Following through on this logic, Khattab’s men regularly began filming roadside bombings, hostage takings, ambushes, rocket attacks, and other activities.13
Hezbollah, fighting to force Israel out of southern Lebanon, was in a somewhat different situation since, while their use of technology to film insurgent attacks for propaganda purposes was new and innovative, they had access to traditional broadcast venues for their footage—television networks, in other words, which were willing and eager to use their material. Thus they were able to combine the new with the old, as their use of television was anything but traditional, since their material was being shown by networks under the control of those sympathetic to the cause and looking for ways to maximize the footage’s impact, not seeking to use it in the service of objective journalism. Nonetheless, the precedent they set is still important to mention:
The visual media proved one of Hezbullah’s most effective weapons. Stills, videos, and films became so central to