Modern Atheism under its forms of Pantheism, Materialism, Secularism, Development, and Natural Laws. James Buchanan
forgotten; He hideth his face; He will never see it."—"Wherefore doth the wicked contemn God? he hath said in his heart, Thou wilt not require it;" And these words exhibit a graphic delineation, of that state of mind in which occasional thoughts of God are neutralized by habitual unbelief, and the warnings of conscience silenced by the denial of a supreme moral government. In like manner, when the apostle tells the Ephesian converts that at one time "they were without God in the world,"[12] and the Galatians, that "when they knew not God, they did service unto them which by nature are no gods;" when he further speaks of some as "lovers of pleasures more than lovers of God," as "having a form of godliness, but denying the power thereof," as "professing that they know God, but in works denying Him;"[13]—in all these statements we see the generic nature of that ungodliness which cleaves as an inveterate disease to our fallen nature, and which, whether it appears only in the form of practical unbelief and habitual forgetfulness, or assumes the more daring aspect of avowed infidelity, contains in it the essence of Atheism.
While such is its generic nature, we must further discriminate between its specific varieties; for it does not always wear the same aspect, or rest on the same grounds. It may be divided, first of all, into speculative and practical Atheism: the former implying a denial, or a doubt of the existence and government of God, either openly avowed or secretly cherished; while the latter is perfectly compatible with a nominal religious profession, and consists in the habitual forgetfulness of God and of the duties which arise out of His relation to us as His creatures and subjects. Speculative Atheism is comparatively rare; Practical Atheism is widely prevalent, and may be justly regarded as the grand parent sin, the universal characteristic of fallen humanity.[14] It is not Atheism in profession, it is Atheism in practice. Those who are chargeable with it may "profess that they know God, but in works they deny Him." As distinguished from theoretical or speculative Atheism, it is fitly termed ungodliness. It does not necessarily imply either the denial or the doubt of the existence or government of God, but consists mainly in the forgetfulness of His character and claims. Speculative Atheism always implies habitual ungodliness; but the latter may exist where the former has never been embraced, and has even been openly and sincerely disclaimed. Yet such is the connection between the two, that Speculative Atheism invariably presupposes and perpetuates practical ungodliness; and that the latter has also a tendency to produce the former, since the habitual disregard of God in the practical conduct of life indicates a state of mind in which men are peculiarly exposed to the seductions of infidelity and prone to yield to them, especially in seasons of revolutionary excitement or of prevailing epidemic unbelief. It would be wrong to rank every ungodly man among professed or even conscious Atheists, for he may never have denied or even doubted the existence and government of God; yet it were equally wrong to represent or treat him as a true believer, since he shows that, practically, "God is not in all his thoughts;" and hence the necessity of our first distinction between theoretical or speculative, and practical or habitual Atheism.
Speculative Atheism, again, is either dogmatic or skeptical. It is dogmatic, when it amounts to an affirmation, either that there is no God, or that the question of his existence is necessarily insoluble by the human faculties. Atheism has been distinguished from Anti-theism; and the former has been supposed to imply merely the non-recognition of God, while the latter asserts His non-existence. This distinction is founded on the difference between unbelief and disbelief;[15] and its validity is admitted in so far as it discriminates merely between dogmatic and skeptical Atheism. But Anti-theism is maintained, in the strictest sense of the term, where it is affirmed either that there is no God, or that the existence of the Supreme Being cannot in any circumstances become an object of human knowledge. In each of these forms, Atheism is dogmatic; it denies the existence of God, or it denies the possibility of His being known. But there is also a skeptical Atheism, which does not affirm absolutely either that there is no God, or that the knowledge of God is necessarily excluded by the limitations of human reason, but contents itself with saying, "non-liquet,"—i.e., with denying the sufficiency of the evidence. It answers every appeal to that evidence by saying that, however satisfactory it may be to the minds of some, it does not carry conviction to the minds of all, and that for this reason it may be justly regarded as doubtful or inconclusive. These two forms of Atheism—the Dogmatic and the Skeptical—are widely different from each other; they rest on distinct grounds, and they require, therefore, to be discussed separately, each on its own peculiar and independent merits. The Dogmatic Atheist feels no force in the arguments which are directed merely against his skeptical ally; for, strong in his own position and confident in his ability to maintain it, he is conscious of no speculative doubt, and affirms boldly what he unhesitatingly believes. The Skeptical Atheist, again, feels no force in the arguments which are directed against a Dogmatic System such as he utterly disclaims; he is equally unwilling to affirm either that there is, or that there is not, a God: he takes refuge in doubt, and refuses alike to affirm or to deny; his only plea is, the want or the weakness of evidence on either side. From this radical difference between the two forms of Speculative Atheism, there arises a necessity for discussing each of them on its own merits; and yet, although theoretically they may be easily distinguished, it will be found that practically they are often conjoined, since the same mind will often fluctuate between the two, and shift its ground by betaking itself alternately to the one or the other, according to the exigencies of the argument. Assail the Dogmatic Atheist with the unanswerable statement of John Foster, that it would require nothing less than Omniscience to warrant the denial of a God, and he will probably defer to it so far as to admit that he cannot prove his negative conclusion, but will add that he is not bound to do so, and that all that can be reasonably required of him is to show that the evidence adduced on the opposite side is insufficient to establish the Divine existence, or that the phenomena which supply that evidence may be as well, or more satisfactorily, explained in some other way. Assail, in like manner, the Skeptical Atheist with the self-evident truth that, even on his own principles, he is not entitled to assume or to act upon the assumption, that there is no God, since the result of his reasonings is doubt merely, and such doubt as implies that there may be a Creator, Governor, and Judge, he will probably defer to it so far as to admit that this is the only logical result of his system, but will add that, where there is no conclusive evidence on either side, there can be no moral obligation to a religious life, and no guilt in living "without God in the world." It will be found, too, that, distinct as these two forms of Speculative Atheism may appear to be, yet they have often been made to rest on a common ground, and the self-same arguments have been adduced in support of both. Thus the doctrine of Materialism, the theory of Development, and the system of Natural Laws, have all been applied by the Dogmatic Atheist to justify his denial of the existence and government of God, on the ground that all the phenomena of Nature may be accounted for without the supposition of a Supreme Mind; while the very same doctrines or theories have been also applied by the Skeptical Atheist to justify, not his denial, but his doubt, and to vindicate his verdict of "non-liquet" on the evidence adduced. And as the same arguments are often employed by both parties in support of their respective views, so they make use, for the most part, of the same objections in assailing the cause of Theism; insomuch that it would be impossible, and even were it possible it would be superfluous, to attempt a formal refutation of either, without discussing those more general principles which are applicable to both. For this reason, we propose to examine in the sequel the various theories which have been applied in support alike of Dogmatic and of Skeptical Atheism, so as to illustrate the grounds that are common to both, while we consider also the distinctive peculiarities of the two systems, and more particularly the grounds of Religious Skepticism.
Besides the radical distinction between Dogmatic and Skeptical Atheism, we must consider the difference between the four great leading systems which have been applied to account for the existing order of Nature, without the recognition of a living, intelligent, personal God. There are many specific varieties of Atheism; but, ultimately, they may be reduced to four classes. The first