Lord Lyons (Vol. 1&2). Thomas Wodehouse Legh Newton
a scandal and a reproach. I don't know very well what we can do, but I should like myself to refer the question of indemnity to an impartial arbiter.
When things are more advanced towards a termination, I think this might be done. It would be dangerous to do it at present, or even to hold out hopes of it. I will think further of it, and if I remain in the same mind, will submit the question to the Cabinet.
The Peterhoff and the Magicienne are now before the Law Officers. I will send you instructions about them next week. The seizures by Admiral Wilkes seem like a plan to embroil our two countries. He always protests that such is not his object, but his acts do not agree with his words.
I should like anything better than being obliged to take the part of the Confederates. But then President Lincoln must not be getting up war cries to help his declining popularity.
The two vessels alluded to had been captured on their way to Matamoros, in Mexican territory, and the British Government contended that the traffic to that place was legitimate, while the United States Government maintained, probably with justice, that the goods were intended for Texas. Matamoros, which was situated on the Rio Grande, separating Mexico from the United States, sprang into prominence in 1862 in consequence of the war, became the seat of a brisk trade, and provided one of the numerous difficulties arising out of the blockade, which had now been greatly extended owing to the rapid development of the Federal Navy.
As for Admiral Wilkes, the hero of the Trent, his arbitrary conduct was the subject of continual complaints; he showed marked discourtesy in connection with H.M.S. Barracouta, and upon one occasion a cruiser under his command went so far as to fire a shot across the bows of H.M.S. Cygnet, and as the long-suffering British Admiral Sir A. Milne observed, to fire a shot across the bows of a neutral ship of war when hove to, was going a step further in the already uncourteous proceedings of the American cruisers. Admiral Wilkes always disclaimed any intention of unfriendliness, but his proceedings were a fruitful source of irritation, and Lord Russell certainly conceived the impression that he and his official chief, Mr. Welles, were bent upon picking a quarrel with us.
Feeling between the two countries was not improved by the inopportune publication of a Blue Book. The Democrats, who had been faring badly, by some mysterious process of reasoning, came to the conclusion that the object was to destroy them and denounced Lord Russell for having lost them an election in Connecticut by his Machiavellian proceedings. They vented their indignation upon the Legation at Washington, and the position of the minister became more and more unpleasant, added to which his health again showed signs of giving way.
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Lord Lyons to Lord Russell.
Washington, April 13, 1863.
I have written as much as I have time and strength for officially. I have been unwell all the last week, but not seriously so. I think the state of things here, as far as peace with us is concerned, more alarming than it has been since the Trent affair. They are not a people who can be soothed by concessions, and they are a people who after any amount of bluster will give in if they think that their opponents are in earnest and are stronger than they. I would rather the quarrel came, if come it must, upon some better ground for us than the question of the ships fitted out for the Confederates. The great point to be gained, in my opinion, would be to prevent the ships sailing, without leading the people here to think that they had gained their point by threats. I am in trouble altogether, for the good will to me personally, which had miraculously survived so long, seems at last to have sunk altogether under the stroke of the last Blue Book.
It must have been peculiarly irritating, after all the efforts he had made, to find them neutralized by the clumsy action of the Home Government, but in his private correspondence there occur no expressions of resentment against those who had thus weakened his position, probably because his sense of discipline and loyalty to his official chiefs was so strong as to preclude anything in the nature of criticism. It is customary, before publishing Blue Books on Foreign Affairs, to consult both the Foreign Government concerned and the British representative accredited to it, but presumably in this case the usual practice was not observed.
In one direction, however, there was an improvement. The British Government tardily realizing the danger arising from the building of Confederate cruisers in England took steps to prevent it, and the situation was eased for the time being.
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Lord Lyons to Lord Russell.
Washington, April 24, 1863.
So far as I can judge in this short time the Americans have eagerly grasped at the intelligence of the endeavours to stop the Confederate vessels building in England, as a relief from their dread that they were really drifting into a war with us. I cannot yet say whether the exasperation is subsiding. I have not much fear that they will ever put a casus belli to us, but I do fear that they may force us to make demands upon them to which, however plainly just, party considerations may render it difficult for the administration to yield. I seem to be getting on pretty well again with Mr. Seward, but not with others since the Blue Book, and Mr. Seward cannot control the feelings or the actions of the other members of the administration either as regards England or her Representative here personally. However, for the moment, things certainly look more peaceful than they did a week ago. I mean peaceful towards us, for there are no symptoms of an approaching end of the civil war.
One danger at any rate was removed, at all events temporarily, for the American Government determined not to proceed with the issuing of the letters of marque. The chief danger, however, lay not so much in the exasperation caused by the Confederate ships as in the proceedings of the United States cruisers, and it was feared that a repetition of such seizures as those of the Peterhoff and Magicienne might rouse such a feeling of indignation in England that it might become necessary to put forward demands for redress which the Americans would be too angry to comply with. For some reason, too, the relations between the British Legation and the Navy Department (perhaps owing to Mr. Welles's anti-English proclivities), were much less satisfactory than was the case with the other Government offices, and whenever an American naval officer had been admittedly in the wrong, explanation, regret, or redress were generally postponed so long (as in the case of the Trent) that the United States Government found itself in the position of having either to make a marked concession to England, or to run the risk of refusing just demands. Lord Lyons's usual practice was to leave the door open for spontaneous action on their part up to the last moment, and to abstain from making anything like a demand or even an embarrassing observation for as long as possible; but his difficulties in dealing with such questions were increased by a quarrel between Mr. Seward and Mr. Welles. Mr. Seward, to do him justice, generally seems to have exercised a pacific influence, but party spirit ran so high, and the Democrats detested him so cordially, that even those who were known to be friendly towards England could not resist the temptation of denouncing his 'humiliating concessions to British arrogance' when they got the opportunity.
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Lord Lyons to Admiral Sir A. Milne.
Washington, May 11, 1863.
I have given Mr. Seward verbally a warning from H.M. Government that the impression which prevails in England that the United States are systematically endeavouring by fair means and by foul to stop our trade with Matamoros is producing very dangerous effects. Mr. Seward said that he should be able to give very satisfactory assurances on this head. I observed to him that I thought some decided practical steps were necessary to do away with this impression. I reminded him of his previous assurances and of his instructions to the Navy Department, and pointed out those instructions were apparently set at nought by the U.S. officers. I said that the great point was to make the subordinate officers feel the effects of the displeasure of the Government, when they violated neutral rights; that it was not likely the naval officers would pay much attention to the assurances given by the Government to Foreign Powers, and that it was not to be expected that they would pay much attention to formal instructions to themselves, if they found that they could practically violate them with impunity. The Government ought, I said, to remove its subordinates from situations