Organon. Aristotle
thing is, to say that he is animal. Moreover it is generic, whether one thing is in the same genus with another or in a different genus, since such a thing falls under the same method with genus, as having discussed that animal is the genus of man, and in like manner of ox, we shall reason that they are in the same genus; if, however, we should show that it is the genus of one of them, but not of the other, we shall reason that these are not in the same genus.
Accident, again, is that which is not any of these, neither definition, nor property, nor genus; yet it is present with a thing, and is that which may possibly be present with some one and the same thing and may not be present, as, to sit may be and may not be present with some one and the same thing, and in like manner whiteness, for there is nothing to prevent the same thing being at one time white and at another not white. Now of these definitions of accident, the second is the better; since when the first is stated, it is necessary in order to understand it, to know previously what definition genus and property are, but the second is self-sufficient for the knowledge per se of what the thing asserted is. To accident also let comparisons of things with each other belong, in whatever way they are derived from accident, as, whether the honourable or the advantageous be preferable, and whether a life of virtue or of enjoyment is the sweeter, and if there happens to be any other assertion similar to these, for in all things of this kind, the question arises as to which the predicate rather happens to belong. Still from these it is manifest that there is nothing to prevent accident sometimes, and with reference to something, becoming property, as to sit being accident, when some one alone sits, will then be a property, but one not sitting alone, it will be a property with reference to those who do not sit, so that nothing prevents accident from becoming property in a certain relation and at a certain time; simply, however, it will not be property.
Chapter 6
Nevertheless we must not forget that every thing which is referred to property, genus, and accident will also be adapted to definitions, for by showing that a thing is not present with that alone which is under definition, as in the case of property, or that what is given in the definition is not genus, or that some one of those things stated in the definition is not present, which may also be said in accident, we shall have subverted the definition; so that, on account of the reason given before, all those things which have been enumerated will after a certain manner be definitive. Nevertheless we must not on this account look for one method universal in all things, as neither is it easy to discover this, and if it were discovered it would be altogether obscure and useless to the proposed treatise. But a peculiar method being delivered as to each of the defined genera singly, the discussion of the proposition will be easy from those things which are appropriate to each. Wherefore, as we have before said, we must make a rough division, but of the rest we must join those which are especially appropriate to each, denominating them both definitive and generic. What, however, have been set forth have almost been adapted to each.
Chapter 7
We must first of all distinguish about "the same," in how many ways it is predicated; but "the same." to speak in general terms, may appear to be divided triply, since we are accustomed to denominate a thing the same, in number, or in species, or in genus; in number indeed when the names are many but the thing one, as a garment and a vestment, but in species when the things being many are without specific difference, as man with man, and horse with horse, for such things are said to be the same in species as are under the same species: in like manner also, those are the same in genus which are under the same genus, as horse with man. Nevertheless, it may seem indeed that water from the same fountain, being called the same, has a certain difference besides the modes enumerated, yet such a thing must be placed at least in the same arrangement with those, which are in some way or other said to be under one species, for all such things appear to be of a kindred nature and similar to each other, since all water is said to be the same in species with all water, because of the possession of a certain similarity; but water from the same fountain differs in nothing else except that the similarity is greater; wherefore we do not separate it from those which some way or other are said to be according to one species. Confessedly, however, that which is one in number, seems especially to be called the same, by all men; still we usually attribute this in many ways, most properly indeed and chiefly, when "same" is attributed in name or definition, as garment to a vestment, and animal pedestrian biped, to man; secondly, when (it is attributed) in property, as what is susceptible of science to man, and what naturally is carried upwards, to fire; thirdly, when from accident, as that which sits or is musical, to Socrates. For all these would signify one thing in number, and that what we have now said is true, a person may especially learn, from those who change appellations; for frequently when we desire to call some one who is sitting, by name, we change (the appellation), when he to whom we give the order, does not happen to understand, as if he would rather understand from accidents, and we desire him to call to us, the person who is sitting or discoursing, evidently considering it the same thing to signify by name and by accident. Let therefore "same" be triply divided, as we have said.
Chapter 8
That disputations are composed from the things mentioned before, and through these, and pertain to these, we have the first evidence through induction, since if any one considers each of the propositions and problems, it will appear to have originated either from definition, or from property, or from genus, or from accident. Another evidence however is by syllogism, for it is necessary that every thing which is predicated of a certain thing, should either reciprocate with that thing or not. And if indeed it reciprocates it will be definition or property, since if it signifies what a thing is, it is definition, but if it does not signify it, it is property, for this was property, viz. that which reciprocates indeed, but does not signify what a thing is. If however it does not reciprocate with the thing, it either is one of those which are predicated in the definition of the subject, or it is not, and if it is one of those predicated in the definition it would be genus or difference, since definition consists of genus and differences, but if it is not of those predicated in definition, it would be evidently accident, for that was said to be accident which is neither definition, nor genus, nor property, yet is present with a thing.
Chapter 9
We must next define the genera of the Categories, in which the above-named four (differences) are inherent. Now these are tea in number; what a thing is, quantity, quality, relation, where, when, position, possession, action, passion, for accident, and genus, and property, and definition will always be in one of these categories, since all propositions through these signify either what a thing is, or quality, or quantity, or some other category. Moreover, it is evident from these that he who signifies what a thing is, at one time signifies substance, at another quality, and at another some other category. For when man being proposed, he says that the thing proposed is man or animal, he says what it is, and signifies substance; but when white colour being proposed, he says that the thing proposed is white or colour, he says what it is, and signifies quality. So also, if when the magnitude of one cubit is proposed, he says that what is proposed is a cubit in size, he will say what it is, and will signify quantity, and so of the rest, for each of these, both if it be itself predicated of itself, and if genus (be predicated) of it, signifies what a thing is. When however (it is spoken) of another thing, it does not signify what it is, but quantity or quality, or some other category, so that the things about which and from which arguments (subsist), are