Oil, power and a sign of hope. Klaus Stieglitz
you have a gun, you can get your way. That is why one of the most important objectives of the CPA is to disband these “OAGs” (“other armed groups”), or to integrate them into the SPLA or the government’s army. To achieve this, a team of observers has been dispatched. It is being led by the USA’s military, and is supposed to ensure the protection of civilians. Sign of Hope is an NGO. As such, we are entitled to report our observations to this team. In fact, we frequently receive from our on-site contacts reports of armed gangs and of conflicts in South Darfur and points farther away in Southern Sudan.
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Our expedition in 2007 enabled us to prove that two militia were illegally stationed in Raga, notwithstanding the security arrangements forming part of the CPA, which had been ratified two years previously. We were able to speak to both militias’ commanders. Major Hassan Mohammed Abo commanded the Quot al Salam militia, which had stationed 3,750 troops in the city. Major Hamdan Ahmed al-Momim headed the Fursan militia, which had 1,320 soldiers.
Our contacts tell us during our expedition in 2008 that the Quot al-Salam militia has lived up to the CPA and has decamped. The Fursan militia is said, although three years have elapsed since the CPA, to still be in the city. In fact, it is supposed to have retained all of its arms. The only difference is that the original commander is no longer there. We have to verify this information.
The barracks that housed the Quot al-Salam militia in the previous year is empty. Except for the empty cartridges strewn all around the barracks’ sandy ground, there are no visible signs of the militia. Our trips through Raga also reveal no members of the militia. The Fursan are, however, still around. We confer with the current warlords. They are situated in the same headquarters in which we had spoken with the previous year’s commander. The militia’s emblem, a tin sign, is still posted on the building’s entryway. The commanders state that their army numbers 1,623 soldiers, of which 500 to 600 fighters are in Raga, where they are working as traders in the market or as herders. According to the commanders, all of the soldiers are fully-armed with G3 rifles and Kalashnikov assault rifles. These were purchased for the militia by the regime in Khartoum, which continues to pay them for their services, and to which they are loyal. For this reason, they are prepared to hand over their weapons only to representatives of the Khartoum regime. They would expect to be paid for such. The militia do not want to show us their guns, because they had done so for the UNMIS (United Nations Mission in Sudan), whose representatives had then taken photographs of them.
The militia’s heads refer to themselves as “Amir”. They tell us that they have heard that a large SPLA unit is making its way from Wau to Raga, so as to disarm the Fursan. They are not prepared to accept that. “We will not hand over our weapons to them. If they want to conduct talks with us, we are not going to say anything. If they want to, we will fight.” It is a danger-fraught conflict. Should the SPLA in fact let itself be drawn into fighting with the militia, the ones suffering will be, once more, the civilians.
In addition to the Fursan militia, there are other soldiers in Raga. Two regular battalions are stationed in the city, each manned by 350 soldiers. The battalions belong respectively to the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF)—the army of the Khartoum government and to the SPLA, which used to be the rebels’ armed forces. Together, these two battalions comprise a “Joint Integrated Unit” (JIU). This “merger” seems to be working out. We set up a meeting with the commander of the SAF (the Khartoum regime’s army). He tells us that the relationship between the two units is good, the fact that they were enemies until January 9, 2005 notwithstanding. He reports that the two commanders sometimes eat together. “There are no tensions between the soldiers of the JIU,” he states, “and if there are, it’s only when they are drunk.” The two battalions have formed a football team. It occasionally competes against other teams from Raga, the commander says. It is as if he wants to show us how normal daily life has already become, despite the decades of civil war. He is also worried about the problem posed by the Fursan, and by the facts that their presence and their being financed by the Khartoum regime represent grievous breaches of the peace agreements. The JIUs have, however, not been given the mandate to disarm the militia.
The successful refusal by the Fursan militia to let themselves be disarmed is an unmistakable indication that the state’s authority—and its legitimate monopoly upon force—is not respected in this part of Sudan. The peaceful departure of the militia would help stabilize the region. The Janjaweed mounted militia are still fighting in the Darfur region, and the situation there is accordingly dramatic. The Khartoum regime had equipped the Arab nomadic tribals in the region with modern armaments, and trained them in their use, so to enlist them in the fight against the African ethnic groups rebelling against the regime. These moves were motivated by the regime’s views that the Southern Sudanese’ demands for rights in and to their lands are unacceptable. The Janjaweed are doing more than fighting against armed rebels. They are oppressing the entire population—through the perpetration of mass murders, plundering and rape.17
Khartoum is completely closing its eyes to the countless cases of violations of human rights being committed upon ethnic groups not enjoying their favor. The regime is well aware of the traditional disrespect accorded by the Arabic nomad groups for the peoples of Southern Sudan. This is due to the latter’s having other religions and another skin color. It is also due to their being farmers. Khartoum is now ruthlessly exploiting this dislike, in order to pursue its interests. Darfur is home to Arab and African ethnic groups. The latter’s religion is a mix of Christianity and of animism. This tradition of coexistence is now to be shattered by the Arabs’ purging of the Africans and of their “wrong religions” and “wrong ethnic” ties. This “cleansing” is obviously supported by the regime. It puts an end to the conflict resolution mechanisms that the various ethnic groups had so successfully employed in the era prior to the creation of the nation of the Sudan.18 The regime in the north was able to sit back and relax, while the uncontrollable violence (or so it was made to seem) was being unleashed against the civilians in the south. To put the situation in a nutshell: the regime in Khartoum opened the hunting season upon these civilians.19
In the course of our talks in the refugee camp in Boro, we meet large number of eyewitnesses to the assaults carried out by the Sudanese army and by their paramilitary allies. A number of women from the village of Dafak report having been the objects of a bombardment carried out on May 12, 2007 by the Sudanese air force. This attack forced the women to flee.
A 25 year old woman and her four children have fled. They arrived at the camp only 25 days ago. They belong to the Meziriyah group, and lived in the village of Jokan, which is located in the county of Buram. Mariam and her family departed from their village on the night of the first Monday in the first week in January. She reports that her village was attacked in the night. “They came late in the evening. They were on foot and in cars. They shot most of the villagers, and then burned the village down. We had no one to help us. I took my children and ran away. The attackers shot at me.” We asked her if she could describe the attackers in more detail. She said that they wore green uniforms with insignia of rank, and, as well, dark blue caps. The particular targets of their attacks were the Zaghawa, a African ethnic group. The assault had robbed the woman of her 30 livestock and all of her stores of grain. Shortly after our interview with this woman, we were able to speak to her eight year old daughter. The child remembered running away at night, with her mother holding her hand. She also recalled hearing shots.
Several days subsequently, on January 18, 2008, the village of Malaaka, which is located in the vicinity of Rudom, was reportedly attacked. We learn of the assault from another young mother. She fled, along with her three children, from the village to the camp. The woman states that the Janjaweed had attacked the village in the early morning. As she says: “They came at three in the morning. I heard their shooting. I put one of my children on my back and one on my chest. I grabbed the hand of the third one. And we ran away.” The woman later learned of her brother’s having been shot in his chest.
Eyewitness accounts constitute important evidence. They will thus form part of the report that we will submit to the Human Rights Council of the United Nations on the ongoing violations of human rights by both the militia and by the Sudanese army.
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What is putting the salt in the region’s drinking water?