The Handbook of Solitude. Группа авторов
phenomena are considered healthy and universal. They constitute a significant part of time alone during infancy and toddlerhood, as well as a way of coping with the pain of loneliness even in childhood, as Winnicott (1958) claimed: “Patterns set in infancy may persist into childhood, so that the original soft object continues to be absolutely necessary at bed‐time or at time of loneliness or when a depressed mood threatens” (p. 232).
Transitional objects and transitional phenomena are the first manifestations of playing, shared playing, and creativity. With advancing age, they lose their meaning and become diffused in the whole cultural experience. While playing, in the presence of the mother and in time alone, children do things in time and space and experience a sense of control over the external world (see Coplan, Ooi, & Hipson, Chapter 8). Playing means joining as well as separating. The child experiences a connection of the inner with the outer, but at the same time he/she achieves a near‐withdrawal state (Winnicott, 1971), characterized by preoccupation and the sense of being lost without losing the identification with the mother object. The child is able to forget himself/herself in a formless, unintegrated state, because the mother has been able to leave him/her alone and because she is available “when remembered after being forgotten” (Winnicott, 1971, p. 48).
The person and cultural experience form a unit. Creative playing, in the first years of life, is the precursor of the capacity to draw from cultural heritage and to contribute to it. Interests in the inanimate world may be regarded as a type of object relations having an important self‐regulating function (Eagle, 1981). Winnicott (1971) aptly describes the potential space as “an infinite area of separation” (p. 108), which can be filled by playing, so that pain, in other words separation itself, can be dealt with effectively. In this line of thought, separation anxiety reflects a denial of separation, the incapacity to be alone. Winnicott (1958) described the case of an eight‐year‐old boy who compulsively used a string to join things together in an attempt to deny his fear of separation from his mother, after having experienced her depression and some real separations from her. However, if the familial environment facilitates life in this area of potentially limitless opportunities for creativity, separation gradually becomes a form of union of the individual with the past, the present, and the future of his/her culture.
Representations of Interactions That Have Been Generalized and the Evoked Companion
As described in the section on the solitary self, Stern (1985/2000) introduced a theory for the interpersonal world of the infant. In this theory he characterized ages two to six months as the most social period of life. During this time, the infant experiences a sense of core self and core relatedness, and organizes his/her experience of being‐with‐an‐other. This being‐with‐a‐self‐regulating‐other is the source of the representations of interactions that have been generalized (RIGs), which are mental representations of generalized episodes of lived encounter with other people. Episodic memory plays a central role here. Every time such a representation is activated, the infant has in mind an evoked companion, which may be regarded as a protection against loneliness. Evoked companions can be activated all throughout life. Stern (1985/2000) wrote: “[…] because of memory we are rarely alone, even (perhaps especially) during the first half‐year of life. The infant engages with real external partners some of the time and with evoked companions almost all the time. Development requires a constant, usually silent, dialogue between the two” (p. 118).
In this sense, solitude is often populated. The infant is alone for a while, playing with a toy which the mother has previously animated or personified. This toy has become a self‐regulating person‐thing, a real companion in aloneness. The self is solitary and simultaneously social, as the infant’s experience is “an I‐experience with an other” (Stern, 1985/2000, p. 115), and not a we or merger experience, whether the other is a real other or an evoked companion.2
Imaginary Companions, Fantasies, and Daydreaming
Escape into fantasies and daydreaming is a basic premise of classic psychoanalytic theory. They stem from unsatisfied wishes and their fabric is wish fulfillment and correction of reality (Freud, 1908/1959a). Life in fantasy is expected to be the infant’s and child’s way of being when alone and to serve important developmental functions. More specifically, a very frequent fantasy for toddlers and preschool‐aged children is the imaginary companion. This companion is an invisible person or animal created by the child who talks and plays with it for a considerable period of time, as if this companion were real. It can also be a real personified object (e.g., a doll). Among the various psychoanalytic interpretations of the developmental functions of this creation is the one that stresses its importance in the child’s struggle against loneliness (Bender & Vogel, 1941; Benson & Pryor, 1973; Nagera, 1969). Neglect and rejection of the child, shift of the mother’s attention to something else, as, for example, happens when a sibling is born, and lack of real playmates before the child starts school, are some common sources of loneliness and motives for the creation of an imaginary companion. A deficit in the child’s life, a more or less serious narcissistic trauma, is compensated by this fantasy. Following is the narrative of a ten‐year‐old boy, an only child, who had experienced the death of a sibling, abandonment by his father, and neglect by his mother (Bender & Vogel, 1941):
I was playing and one day it seemed I had a brother and a sister – John and Mary. They come when I am very lonely, not when I am playing with the boys. They are very much like me. My brother is 9 and my sister is 10. They are very pretty. They play with me and only talk about games and where I was. They would ask why I have been bad all the time. They say if I will be bad all the time and never good they won’t come again. They are a great comfort to me when I am all alone. (p. 59)
The imaginary companion is usually endowed with good qualities: he/she is kind, smart, strong, loveable, neat, obedient, and thus accepted by parents (Nagera, 1969). Through this creation, the child feels accepted and loved by parents during a period when infantile omnipotence subsides, the gradual loss of idealized parental images takes place, and mourning reactions appear. The imaginary companion can be viewed as a narcissistic guardian (Bach, 1971; Benson & Pryor, 1973), as a transitional self (Klein, 1985) for all children, independently of the course of their development, and as a means of alleviating common loneliness and benefiting from inevitable solitude.
In addition to the imaginary companion, three types of conscious fantasies and daydreams have been explicitly associated with loneliness and solitude: family romance, animal fantasies and the fantasy of having a twin. All of them are regarded as common themes of the pre‐latency and latency period (i.e., early, middle, and late childhood) and as arising from the child’s disappointment during the oedipal phase.
More specifically, family romance (Freud, 1909/1959b) is the child’s conscious belief that he/she is an adopted child or a stepchild, and that his/her real parents are nobler, stronger, and lovelier than those with whom he/she lives. It was Dorothy Burlingham (1945) who regarded family romance as motivated also by the wish to overcome loneliness emerging from the child’s disillusionment with parents and from his/her unconscious death wishes for them.
Animal fantasies usually reflect a denial of painful reality, as Anna Freud (1937) argued. The child creates an intimate connection with an imaginary animal companion, with the aim again to feel less lonely. The companions do not need words to understand each other. These animals provide the child with unconditional love, faith, and devotion (Burlingham, 1945).
In the fantasy of having a twin, the imaginary twin substitutes the lost love object, that is, parents, and “is meant to fulfill many of the daydreamer’s longings, above all to keep him from solitude and loneliness” (Burlingham, 1945, p. 208). A narcissistic trauma is at the root of this fantasy. By creating the twin, the child feels invincible, twice as big, strong, and smart, so that the sense of omnipotence is partly restored. Narcissism is hidden behind object love, loneliness is alleviated, and the capacity for beneficial aloneness