Battlefields. Michael Rayner

Battlefields - Michael Rayner


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which was to win the Battle of Austerlitz.

      Learning of the disaster at Ulm, Kutuzov, whose army had at last reached the River Inn, decided to withdraw eastward along the Danube. He was fortunate to cross unopposed to the north bank on 10 November, and then was narrowly denied an opportunity to destroy the French VIII Corps at Dürnstein. The French entered Vienna on 13 November, and successfully bluffed their way across the one remaining bridge to the north bank. A rearguard action by General Bagration ensured the smooth withdrawal of Kutuzov’s force and concentration of the allied armies in the area of Olmutz.

Illustration

       Following his successful counterattack against the Russian Imperial Guard, General Rapp, one of Napoleon’s aides-de-camp, presents his prisoners, among whom is the commander of the Tsar’s personal guard, Prince Repnin.

      Napoleon spent a few days at the Palace of Schönbrunn, just outside Vienna, where his quartermasters were helping themselves to the contents of the enormous arsenal, before heading north to join the advance guard on 17 November. Yet another arsenal fell into his hands when Brünn, or Brnõ, was captured on the 18th. The next few days were spent resting and re-organizing. Napoleon certainly realized the risk he was taking with a long line of communication requiring substantial detachments. Away to the northwest, the few of Archduke Ferdinand’s forces to escape from Ulm were being watched by the Corps of Marshal Bernadotte; and the city of Vienna was secured by the III Corps of Marshal Davout.

       MAIN CHARACTERS FEATURED

       OPPOSING NAPOLEON

      Alexander I, Tsar of Russia

      Francis II, Holy Roman Emperor and Emperor of Austria

      General Mikhail Illarionovitch Kutuzov

      General Mack, Baron Karl Mack von Leiberich

      General Peter Bagration

      Prince Repnin (Tsar’s personal guard)

      General Feodor Buxhöwden

      General Levin August Bennigsen

       GRANDE ARMÉE

      Marshal Jean Lannes (V Corps)

      Marshal Jean-Baptiste Jules Bernadotte (I Corps)

      Marshal Louis Nicolas Davout (III Corps)

      General Anne Jean Marie René Savary

      Marshal Nicolas-Jean de Dieu Soult (IV Corps)

      Marshal Joachim Murat (reserve cavalry)

      General Dominique Joseph René Vandamme

      General Louis Vincent St Hilaire

      General Nicolas Charles Oudinot (Grenadiers)

      General Legrand

      Marshal Jean-Baptiste Bessières (Imperial Guard)

      General Jean Rapp

Illustration

       Tsar Alexander I

Illustration

       Marshal Jean-Baptiste Bessières

       ALLIED MISJUDGEMENT

      The allied staff had also noted the risk Napoleon was running, concluding, wrongly, that the French were in an increasingly weak position. In fact, of course, Napoleon was planning the concentration necessary for the coming battle. To help assess the enemy strength he sent General Savary to the allied camp with the offer of negotiations. This reinforced the belief of the younger staff in French weakness, although the experienced Kutuzov advised further withdrawal, suggesting that Napoleon would not dare to extend his line of communication even more.

      The weather was foul and, unlike the French, whose men were well fed and enthusiastic, the Allies were suffering from the cold and lack of supplies. Having overruled Kutuzov’s advice, Alexander and Francis had no alternative but to advance, with a view to cutting Napoleon’s communication with Vienna. On 28 November Marshal Soult’s advance guard was attacked just east of the village of Austerlitz and, following Napoleon’s orders, fell back to a position west of the Goldbach (golden brook). This withdrawal finally convinced the inexperienced allied staff that the French were trying to avoid a battle, and the Tsar ordered the occupation of the high ground around the village of Pratzen. In fact, Napoleon’s preparations were going smoothly. The Santon hill was fortified with trenches and a battery of eight guns, and orders had been despatched to Bernadotte and Davout to join the rest of the army by forced marching. Appreciating the allied intention, Napoleon relied on Davout’s III Corps to hold the right at all costs.

      Allied staff work was very poor, resulting in a chaotic attempt to deploy during the night of 1 December. It is said that the allied commanders took a very casual attitude to the situation, only a few of them bothering to review the plan on the map. Written orders were despatched very late, some not arriving until after the battle began shortly before dawn on 2 December.

       NAPOLEON’S PLAN

      Napoleon’s initial appreciation was that the Allies would attack at Kobelnitz, but during the night the sounds of movements convinced him that they would actually go further south towards Telnitz and Sokolnitz. This suited him well for, provided Davout could frustrate their attempt to cut him off from Vienna, they would be encouraged to reinforce their left wing by withdrawing troops from the centre. The allied right, under General Bagration, would be held by the Santon position and the V Corps of Marshal Lannes, supported by Murat’s reserve cavalry and Bernadotte’s corps. Once the enemy centre was weakened, his main counterattack would be made by IV Corps in the centre, under Marshal Soult, with the divisions of St Hilaire and Vandamme. The Imperial Guard and Oudinot’s Grenadiers would form a strong reserve.

Illustration

       Napoleon met Emperor Francis II of Austria on 4 December and agreed an armistice, embodied in the harsh terms of the Treaty of Pressburg, which was signed on 26 December 1805.

      At first the allied attacks were successful at both Telnitz and Sokolnitz, but staff and command failures denied them consolidation and General Legrand’s division was able to hold the situation. A thick mist hid Soult’s other two divisions behind the Goldbach from allied observation. It was cold, but there was a slight thaw. Hail and rain had made the night miserable for everyone, further undermining allied morale. Sunrise, at 08:00, revealed large numbers of Russian troops moving southward across the centre of the battlefield. Napoleon asked Soult for his estimate of the time it would take for his men to reach the Pratzen feature. ‘Twenty minutes, Sire’, said the Marshal, ‘for my troops are hidden by the mist and smoke’.

      ‘Very well’, said the Emperor ‘we shall wait fifteen minutes’. About 09:00, ‘The Sun of Austerlitz’ at last burned through the mist. Half an hour later the French central attack was going well, with St Hilaire’s division on the Pratzen hill and Vandamme’s on the Vinohrady feature. The Russian Imperial Guard made a spirited cavalry counterattack, which might well have resulted in a major crisis for Napoleon – had they not advanced at the trot over much too great a distance, arriving winded when joining the battle. Marshal Bessières restored the position by sending General Rapp with two squadrons of Chasseurs and the Mamelukes of Napoleon’s guard. This famous engagement was later immortalized in the painting by Gerard, depicting Rapp, his sabre broken, reporting to the Emperor with his prisoners, including Prince Repnin, commander of the Tsar’s personal guard, together with its colour.


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