Post-War Identification. Torsten Kolind
to pursue the annexationist design and felt that in the long term an alliance with the Bosnian government was still the best way to realise their nationalist dreams. But it was clear from the start of the takeover of the HDZ-BiH by Mate Boban that the Muslim-Croat alliance was fragile: fighting broke out between Muslims and Croats at several places in Bosnia Herzegovina, and Croats started driving out Muslim inhabitants of villages under Croat control (Donia and Fine 1994: 250, Glenny 1996: 194, Cigar 1995: 125). For their part, the Muslims, who were desperately pursuing the goal of an autonomous unitary Bosnia Herzegovina, had no alternative but to form an alliance with the Bosnian Croats and uphold the best possible relation with Croatia. The Bosnian forces (of which the majority was Muslims) were illequipped and would have stood no chance if they were to face both the Serbs and the Croats. Furthermore, they depended on good relations with the HVO (Hrvatsko Vijeće Odbrane, the Croatian Defence Council, the army of the Bosnian Croats) in order to receive the illegal weapons supplies (illegal because of the international weapons embargo) coming through Croat-held territory, as well as food supplies to major Bosnian cities (Glenny 1996: 195, 228).
Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina, then, were officially war allies during 1992 and the beginning of 1993, and in Herzegovina Muslims fought in the ranks of the HVO against the Serbs. But in spring 1993, the latent Muslim-Croat conflict escalated into full-scale war. A prime reason was probably the international community’s Vance-Owen peace proposal, which, in addition to ratifying the carving up of Bosnia Herzegovina along ethnic lines, also allotted a proportionally large amount of territory to the Bosnian Croats. For the Bosnian Croats the Vance-Owen peace proposal was an incentive to consolidate their respective positions and assume full control of the area assigned to them under the plan, as well as to seize additional areas from the Bosnian government, including areas where Croatians were in a distinct minority (as in Stolac).
In many areas of Western Herzegovina the Bosnian Croats’ policy resulted in open fighting between Muslims and Croats. The Croats wanted to cleanse the territories ethnically and unite them with Croatia, while the Muslims wanted to keep the areas under the control of a multi-ethnic Bosnian state. Some of the fiercest fighting of the entire war broke out between Muslims and Croats in Mostar. And in areas south and south-west of Mostar (among them Stolac) the entire Muslim population, including former Muslim co-combatants, was disarmed and arrested, then placed in horrendous prison camps (logori) or expelled to territory held by the Bosnian army. At the same time the Croats and Muslims were still fighting together against the Serbs, in Sarajevo for instance.
A year later the fighting between the Muslims and Croats was stopped by the signing of the Washington agreement by both parties on 1 March 1994. It was a federation agreement, and though not respected as such – the Croats did not dismantle their newly created republic of Herceg-Bosna, and joint command of the two armies remained a fiction – it was a step towards stopping the war in Bosnia Herzegovina. The Dayton agreement, which officially put an end to almost four years of total destruction and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia Herzegovina, was signed on 21 November 1995. The agreement was not a formal division of Bosnia Herzegovina (see however Mertus 2000), but in reality the country has been ethnically divided ever since. The Serb Republic is controlled and mainly inhabited by Serbs, and the Federation (between Muslims and Croats) is itself divided in Croat and Muslim areas and jurisdictions. As a case in point, today the country has in reality three different armies.
Today Bosnia Herzegovina faces huge problems. One of the hardest to solve has to do with the repatriation of displaced people. Between 100,000 and 200.000 people died during the war, and more than 2 million out of a total pre-war population of 4.3 million were internal or external refugees after the war.2 So besides facing a completely ruined economy, a destroyed production apparatus, enormous unemployment, war traumas en masse, corruption and a general mood of despondency, the Bosnian people and Bosnian political system in cooperation with the Office of High Representatives (OHR) also have to solve the impossible puzzle of relocating people to their houses, houses which have in many cases been ruined or occupied. When the war was brought to an end, a pilot project facilitating inter-Federation returns in four towns was initiated. One of these was Stolac, where the Muslim and Serb populations were to be supported in returning. The return of the Muslim population to Stolac was met with resistance by the Croats, many of whom had fled to Stolac from central Bosnia during the war. These Croats feared for ‘their’ (the Muslims’) property as well as their newly won political power in town. And on the ideological level, the Croats worried about the decreasing prospects for realising the independent state of Herceg-Bosna. Of the four pilot projects, the Stolac project has been the most difficult one to realise,3 due to the immense obstruction from the Croats living in town. With this background in mind, I will now focus more closely on Stolac and offer some details.
The war in Stolac
The war started officially in April 1992, when Serbian forces occupied Stolac. But many people sadly recall an incident six months earlier, when a war memorial from World War Two commemorating fallen Partisans was blown up.4 The monument was located in front of the school. Today on the same spot the Croats have placed a bust of Ivan Musić, who was a leading Croat resister in the Herzegovinian revolt (1875-1878). The Serbian occupation of Stolac town did not meet any resistance. The Serbs set up their military camp outside town, but there was no fighting, and there was hardly any looting or killing as was the case in areas occupied by Serbs in eastern Bosnia during the same period. The occupation of Stolac had severe consequences though. Most of the Croatian population fled overnight, fearing the Serbian forces. The whole Serbian population of Stolac joined the Serbian army either compulsorily or voluntarily, and the Muslims secretly arranged a number of local defence units in order to protect their families if necessary. Some Stolac Croats have subsequently accused the Muslims of not having resisted the Serbian occupational force, but according to my informants resistance would have been suicidal, as the Muslims were too badly equipped to face what was the fourth largest army in Europe.5
Two months after the Serbian occupation, Croatian forces (the HVO and the HOS) conquered Stolac almost without a fight, and the Serbs withdrew to the mountains and hills east and southeast of Stolac.6 Many of the Muslims regarded the Croatian takeover as a relief. They hoped and thought things would improve, and many believed the Croats’ explicit statements about their desire for Muslim and Croatian coexistence, although on the other hand they also regarded the massive Croatian presence as a new occupation (vlast). Many Muslims from Stolac joined the forces of the Bosnian Croats (the HVO) because there were no units of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina (Armija BiH) in town: the closest was around Mostar, and service here would have meant separation from one’s family. Soon after the Serbian withdrawal, the Serbs started shelling Stolac, which caused several casualties, and fighting between HVO and the Serbs resumed.
The Muslims and Croats joined forces from June/July 1992 and for almost a year, though as mentioned above it was a marriage of convenience. There was sporadic fighting between Croat and Bosnian forces several places in Bosnia Herzegovina, though not in the Stolac area. Then in April 1993, the Croats started arresting leading Muslim intellectuals and local Muslim politicians in and around Stolac, as well as the few Muslims who held more responsible positions in the HVO. The arrests continued, and on the 1 July all adult Muslim men from Stolac were arrested, interrogated, beaten and driven to prison camps (logori). According to my sources the oldest person arrested was 90 years old, and the youngest 13. A few managed to escape through the mountains, and a few hid in the hills. According to my informants, the whole operation was carried out systematically by troops from the HVO and the HV (Hrvatska Vojska, the Croatian army).7 To the Stolac Muslims the mass arrest came as a surprise. Although they had had a feeling that something was going to happen, my informants had generally been