A Philosophical Commentary on These Words of the Gospel, Luke 14:23, “Compel Them to Come In, That My House May Be Full”. Pierre Bayle
not these three Articles, shou’d be fin’d in such a Sum? Or rather, wou’d any one think it just, that a King shou’d enjoin all his Subjects, under certain Penaltys, to love Books, Perfumes, Fish, certain Sauces, have blue Eyes, a brushy Beard, &c? Wou’d it not be down-right study’d Tyranny, to send Dragoons to live at discretion upon those who comply’d not with Edicts of this kind? It’s the grossest Stupidity then, or rather the most ridiculous Flattery, to <113> pretend, the Treatment the Reform’d met with was just, because they obey’d not a verbal Order, enjoining ’em, a little before the Billets were given out, to conform to the King’s Religion. For as to an Edict issu’d to this purpose, and authentickly notify’d, for my part, I know of none before the Dragoons were let loose upon one quarter of the Kingdom: and I have already observ’d, that the Edict of Revocation allow’d ’em a certain limited time to consider what to do; tho I know at the same time, ’twas one of the most grosly perfidious Cheats that e’er was put upon a People.
Since therefore, from the Subjects not conforming to the Sovereign’s Will, we are not universally to infer, that they justly suffer the Punishments with which he threaten’d the Delinquents; we ought to examine into the special Nature of the Laws disobey’d, when we wou’d discover, whether the Partys were justly expos’d to the Pillage and Discretion of the Soldiery. Now this Inquiry, if made, wou’d satisfy us, that the Laws, for the Non-observance of which it’s pretended, the French Protestants merited dragooning, are intrinsecally evil and unequitable; consequently the Punishments annex’d to ’em, and inflicted on those who obey’d ’em not, ipso facto and by their Nature unjust. This shift therefore will not serve to elude the force of my Argument, whereby I prove, that JESUS CHRIST cou’d not have enjoin’d Constraint; since this, as appears from the late Persecution in France, was impracticable without a Complication of Iniquity.
To shew in a few Words the Injustice of the verbal Declaration made the Protestants, that the King for the <114> future wou’d have but one Religion in his Kingdom, and that all who wou’d not conform to this his Pleasure, shou’d feel the Rigors of his Justice; to shew, I say, the Injustice of this Declaration, I might cite the Edict of Nants, and the many other solemn Promises to the same effect; but that these are only trifles in the Account of Kings: Solemn Assurances, Oaths, Edicts, are Makeshifts they must make use of on occasion, but brush thro ’em like so many Cobwebs, when once they have gain’d their point. I return to my primary and essential head of Argument.
All Law, enacted by a Person who has no right to enact it, and which exceeds his Power, is unjust; for, as Thomas Aquinas has it, To the end a Law be just, it’s requisite among other Conditions, That he who makes it have Authority so to do, and exceed not this Authority.52
Now so it is, that all Laws obliging to act against Conscience, are made by a Person, having no Authority to enact it, and who manifestly exceeds his Power.
Therefore every such Law is unjust.
To shew the truth of my second Proposition, I am only to say, that all the Power of Princes is deriv’d, either immediately from God, or else from Men, who enter into Society on certain Conditions.
If it be deriv’d from God, it’s plain, it can’t extend to the making Laws, which oblige the Subject to act against Conscience: for if so, it wou’d follow, that God cou’d confer a Power upon Man, of commanding to hate God; which is absurd, and necessarily impossible; the hatred <115> of God being an Act essentially wicked. If we examine this Matter ever so little, we shall find, that Conscience, with regard to each particular Man, is the Voice and Law of God in him, known and acknowledg’d as such by him, who carrys this Conscience about him: So that to violate this Conscience is essentially believing, that he violates the Law of God. Now to do any thing we esteem an Act of Disobedience to the Law of God, is essentially, either an Act of Hatred, or an Act of Contempt against God; and such an Act is essentially wicked, as all Mankind acknowledg. Commanding therefore to act against Conscience, and commanding to hate or contemn God, is one and the same thing; and consequently, God being uncapable of conferring a Power which shou’d enjoin the Hatred or Contempt of himself, it’s evident he cou’d not have confer’d a Power of commanding to act against Conscience.
For the same Reason it’s evident, that no Body of Men, who enter into Society, and deposite their Libertys in the hands of a Sovereign, ever meant to give him a Power over their Consciences; this were a Contradiction in terms: for unless we suppose the Partys to the original Contract errand Ideots or mad Men, we can’t think they shou’d ever entrust the Sovereign with a Power of enjoining ’em to hate God, or despise Laws, clearly and distinctly dictated to their Consciences, and engraven on the Tables of their Heart. And certain it is, that when any Body of Men engage for them and their Posterity to adhere to any particular Religion, they do this on a Supposition somewhat too lightly entertain’d, that they and their Posterity shall for ever <116> be under the Power of the same Conscience as guides ’em at present. For did they but reflect on the Changes which happen in the World, and on the different Sentiments which succeed one another in the human Mind, they ne’er wou’d engage farther than for Conscience in general, that is, promise for them and their Posterity, never to depart from that Religion they will deem best; but by no means confine their Covenant to this or that Article of Faith. For how are they sure, that what appears true to ’em to day, will appear so to themselves thirty Years hence, and much more to People of another Age? Such Engagements therefore are null and void in themselves, and exceed the Power of those who make ’em; no Man being able to engage himself for the future, much less others to believe what may not appear to ’em true. Princes therefore deriving no Power, either from God or Man, of enjoining their Subjects to act against Conscience; it’s plain, all Edicts publish’d by ’em to this effect, are null in themselves, a mere Abuse and Usurpation: and consequently, all Punishments appointed by virtue of ’em for Non-conformity, are unjust.
From hence I draw a new and demonstrative Argument against the literal Sense of the Parable; because, were this the genuin Sense, ’twou’d confer a Right upon Princes, of enacting Laws obliging their Subjects to the Profession of a Religion repugnant to the Lights of their Consciences; which were the same as giving Kings a Right of enacting Laws, enjoining the Hatred and Contempt of God. But as this were the most extravagant Impiety, it follows, that the words, Com-<117>pel ’em to come in, do not mean what is claim’d; because if they did, it wou’d above all be to Princes that they were address’d, to the end that they might first ordain severe Laws against all Differences in Religion, and afterwards inflict the Punishments appointed by these Laws.
I shall take another Opportunity to examine the Illusion they are under, who say, that Princes pretend not to enact Laws for making Men act against Conscience, but for recovering ’em from an erroneous Conscience by Threats and temporal Inflictions. But here I’l venture to affirm, that if they may justly do this, ’tis not by virtue of the Command in the Parable, but from Reasons of State, when it happens that any Sect is justly obnoxious, with regard to the publick Good: and in this case, if they believe their Disaffection proceeds from the Principles of their Religion, and find, that the proper and natural Methods of converting by friendly Conferences, by Books, and familiar Instructions, have no effect; they may very justly, if they conceive it expedient for the Peace of the State, oblige ’em to seek for Settlements elsewhere, and take their Goods and Familys fairly away with ’em. But to proceed as they did in France, where they wou’d neither suffer ’em to go out of the Kingdom, with or without their Substance, nor stay without the publick Exercise of their Religion, worshipping God after their own way in Chambers or Closets only; but reduce ’em to this Alternative, either of going openly to Mass, or being devour’d by Dragoons, and teaz’d to death by a thousand vexatious Devices: This, I say, is what can never be <118> justify’d, and what refines upon all the most extreme Violences we have any Accounts of.
I ask these Gentlemen, who tell us, that since the King of France only inflicts the Punishments he had fairly threatned on the Infringers of his Edicts, they ought not to tax him with Injustice, but own themselves guilty of Obstinacy and Disobedience to their lawful Prince; I ask ’em, I say, whether this ben’t maintaining, that Punishments are always justly inflicted, where the Party has disobey’d the Prince’s