A Treatise of the Laws of Nature. Richard Cumberland
opportunity to propose a new and distinctively scientific approach to questions of moral and political obligation. Cumberland’s achievement was to provide a much-needed defense of the natural jurisprudential project while laying important theoretical foundations for the work of such later writers as Clarke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson.2
Richard Cumberland (1632–1718)3
Cumberland was born in London, the son of a Salisbury Court tailor. He attended St. Paul’s School, and in June 1649, barely five months after the execution of Charles I, he entered Magdalene College, Cambridge. At Magdalene, Cumberland supplemented his regular studies with a rich diet of natural philosophy, developing the scientific knowledge that informs almost every page of the De Legibus. Cumberland’s interest in the new science was crucial to his natural law theory; the union of natural philosophy and natural theology created the basis for his science of morality and his logical demonstration of divine obligation.
Cumberland left Cambridge after receiving his master of arts in 1656, becoming rector of the small Northamptonshire parish of Brampton Ash in 1658. This rural posting might have marked the end of Cumberland’s significance, but in 1667 he became a client of, and possibly domestic chaplain to, Sir Orlando Bridgeman, formerly lord chief justice of the Common Pleas and now in 1667 newly appointed lord keeper of the Great Seal.4 An ex-Magdalene man himself, Bridgeman employed a number of Cumberland’s colleagues, including Cumberland’s friend Hezekiah Burton. It is likely that Burton’s recommendation secured Cumberland’s new and politically important patronage.
The connection with Bridgeman placed Cumberland at the center of English politics in the later 1660s and led directly to the publication of De Legibus Naturae. During this period, Bridgeman sponsored Hezekiah Burton and another of Cumberland’s friends, John Wilkins, in their attempts to construct a religious compromise with Presbyterian nonconformists. Although the negotiations ultimately failed, the discussion of the role of natural law in such a settlement formed the immediate political context to Cumberland’s work on the subject. In 1670, Bridgeman established the newly married Cumberland in comparatively affluent livings in Stamford, enabling him to complete De Legibus Naturae. Burton supervised the publication of the work, which was dedicated to Bridgeman. The book was published in the spring of 1672.
The same year would see Bridgeman resign in protest at Charles II’s decision to issue the Declaration of Indulgence, suspending the penal laws against Catholic and Protestant dissenters. Cumberland appears to have survived his patron’s fall, devoting himself to his parochial duties. In 1680 he proceeded to a doctorate at Cambridge University. His thesis maintained (against the Roman Catholic position) that St. Peter had no jurisdiction over the other apostles and (against the nonconformist position) that separation from the Anglican Church was schismatic.5 In the 1680s, Cumberland produced two works. The first was a pamphlet dedicated to his school friend Samuel Pepys, by this time president of the Royal Society, entitled An Essay Towards the Recovery of Jewish Measures and Weights (1686). The Essay, originally designed as an appendix to a new edition of the Bible, was widely respected for its scholarship. During the same time, Cumberland also produced Sanchoniatho’s Phoenician History in manuscript. This work claimed to find the sources of Roman Catholic idolatry in the Phoenician corruption of sacred history. The anti-Catholic bias of the work was such that, on the eve of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, Cumberland’s publisher felt that the manuscript was too inflammatory to be released. The book appeared posthumously, in 1720.
In the wake of the revolution, Cumberland was called upon to replace the nonjuring bishop of Peterborough, Thomas White.6 Cumberland was consecrated in July 1691, at age fifty-nine. From this time until his death, Cumberland administered his diocese diligently but with declining efficiency as old age took its toll. He attended the House of Lords regularly until 1716, a loyal Whig supporter of Archbishop Tenison. Intellectually, Cumberland busied himself with studies in ancient chronology. He died after suffering a stroke on October 9, 1718.7
De Legibus Naturae
De Legibus Naturae was a theoretical response to a range of issues that came together during the later 1660s. The immediate political circumstances were English debates over the toleration of religious dissent. Cumberland’s Latitudinarian friends sought to reach an accommodation with moderate nonconformists based upon an appeal to natural law ideas.8 If the nonconformists could accept that the magistrate had a natural right to regulate adiaphora (religious ritual not prescribed by Scripture), intractable theological disputes might be avoided, which would open the way for accommodation within the church. The negotiations failed, resulting in the rise of more strident demands from dissenters for a pluralist, toleration-based settlement. For some Latitudinarian Anglicans, notably Samuel Parker, such demands were unacceptable. For Parker, natural law required nonconformists to submit to the legal requirements imposed by the sovereign for the common good. Parker’s illiberal use of the natural law argument soon attracted accusations that he was following the arguments of Thomas Hobbes. Notoriously, Hobbes’s political theory had appeared to pay lip service to the obligations imposed by natural law, whereas in practice vesting all practical authority in the hands of an arbitrary and absolute sovereign. Although Parker and others attempted to demonstrate that they were not Hobbists, their attempt to justify extensive sovereign power appeared to undermine their avowed commitment to natural obligation. By the time Cumberland began to write De Legibus Naturae, there was a clear need to separate the Anglican use of the natural law argument from Hobbes’s account. Such a project required a decisive attack upon Hobbes’s subversive natural law theory, but it also provided an opportunity to demonstrate the character of the obligation to natural law. Cumberland sought to do both in De Legibus Naturae.
The question of moral obligation lies at the heart of Cumberland’s treatise, and it was a question that created profound difficulties for Protestant natural law theorists.9 Protestant thinkers were skeptical about Grotius’s appropriation of scholastic ideas. John Selden in particular was scathing about the Dutchman’s apparent assumption that conclusions of reason alone could have the force of law. A law was properly the command of a superior, in this case God. How, then, could it be shown naturally that the conclusions of reason or empirically observed norms were the will of God and thus properly obligatory laws? Hobbes made the same criticism: If the laws of nature are simply rational theorems, then they are not properly laws at all and need the command of a superior to give them obligatory force. Hobbes’s deeply skeptical answer was that providing such obligatory force was the role of the sovereign, a position that potentially ruled out the possibility of divine moral obligation altogether.
Cumberland accepted the force of this critique but rejected Hobbes’s destructive conclusion, turning instead to a solution in dicated by Selden. Selden preferred to sidestep the problem by arguing that God had spoken directly to Adam and Noah; the natural law precepts delivered were handed down within the rabbinical tradition. His second, rather underdeveloped, suggestion was that individuals might be capable of apprehending God’s will more directly, but he was understandably reluctant to develop a theory that blurred the distinction between reason and command. Like many readers of Selden, Cumberland was less convinced by the first solution, but he saw the potential in the second argument.10
Cumberland’s optimism about Selden’s hint derived from two related sources. The first was the revaluation of man’s rational capacity encouraged by such Cambridge thinkers as Benjamin Whichcote and Nathaniel Culverwell, both of whom sought an enhanced role for reason and empirical observation in Protestant natural law discourse.11 The second major influence was Cumberland’s conviction that science might offer a more effective means of demonstrating both the contents and the obligatory force of the law of nature. At a time when Hobbes’s work appeared to suggest that the appliance of science undermined rather than supported the idea of obligatory natural law, Cumberland’s De Legibus would recover a godly role for natural philosophy.12
To this end, Cumberland deployed the latest scientific evidence to reject Hobbes’s narrow emphasis upon self-preservation as the beginning and end of natural obligation. Cumberland used evidence from “the nature of things” to show that an awareness of self-preservation is merely the starting point in developing an awareness