A Treatise of the Laws of Nature. Richard Cumberland
and others (who deny’d there were any antecedent Causes, or Fatality, of Mens Actions, and affirmed, that the Motion, or Exertion, of the Mind was purely voluntary189) was only a Dispute about Words; each of them understanding the Word Cause in a different Sense. His Reasoning, which the Epicureans urg’d against Chrysippus, Cicero sets forth thus, viz.
“‘When they’ (the Epicureans) ‘had admitted, that there was no Motion without a Cause, they needed not’ (Carneades taught them) ‘grant, that all Events came to pass by antecedent Causes: For that there was no external and antecedent Cause of our Will; therefore the common Custom of saying, that any one will, or will not, do a Thing without a Cause, is an Abuse of Speech; for, when we say, without a Cause, we mean only, without an external and antecedent Cause, not without any Cause at all.—An external Cause is not requisite to the voluntary Motion of the Mind; for voluntary Motion, in the Nature of the Thing, is in our own Power and Choice; and that not without Cause; for the Cause of it is the Nature of the Mind itself.’190 Presently after he shews (which was the Point of the Dispute) what is truly and properly the Cause of a Thing, viz.
“‘That is the Cause, which effects that, of which it is the Cause; as a Wound causeth Death; ill Digestion, a Disease; Fire causeth Heat. Therefore Cause is not so to be understood, as if that which is antecedent merely to a Thing was the Cause of it; but that only is the Cause, which is the antecedent efficient Cause.’191
“Whence it is evident, as Cicero observes upon the matter, that they, who thought the voluntary Motions of the Mind were not affected by any Fatality;192 and Chrysippus, who held a Fate to belong even to human Actions, tho’ he allow’d them to be voluntary, and not effected by Necessity, really meant the same Thing; only those external Motives, which Chrysippus styl’d antecedent Causes and Fate (expressly declaring his meaning at the same time, that they were not the perfect and principal, i.e. efficient, Causes of Action) Carneades, and others, the Academicks, wou’d not allow to be properly Causes at all; insisting, that the efficient Cause, only, was the true Cause of Action; ‘and that in what Things soever the antecedent Causes were such, that it was not in our Power, that the Things should be otherwise, these Things were properly effected by Fate; but those Things, the effecting of which are in our own Power, are wholly exempt from Fate.’193 Understanding Fate, which they excluded from Mens Actions, in the Sense of a necessary impulsive Cause; whilst Chrysippus understood the Fate which he ascrib’d to them, in the Sense of a concurrent Cause, or Motive, of Action only: Which shew’d, there was no real Difference in their Opinions; and that both agreed, that Mens Actions were in their principal, perfect or efficient Cause truly voluntary.
“And hence we may observe, That when Plutarch charges Chrysippus with holding, ‘That not the least Thing, either rests, or moves, otherwise than according to the Appointment of God, whom he makes the same with Fate—and that he makes Fate (which he calls Necessity, &c.) an invincible and uncontroulable and immutable Cause;’194 He either mistakes, or strains Chrysippus’s Notion too far; or else Chrysippus is only speaking of the Fatality, or Necessity, of external Providential Events, and not of human Actions; from which Fatality, or Necessity, Plutarch himself implies, that he exempts them; owning that, with respect to Mens Actions, he (Chrysippus) ‘made Fate, not the perfect’ (i.e. the efficient, as hath been above observed from Cicero) ‘but only the precedent (i.e.) the concurrent Cause only.’
“Again; Cicero himself answers the Argument against Liberty, which is here made, in these Words; viz.
“‘Altho’ some are more inclin’d to some Things than others are, thro’ natural antecedent Causes, it does not thence follow, that there are natural antecedent (efficient) Causes of our Wills and Desires: For, if so, nothing would be in our own Power. But now we readily own, that to be acute, or dull, of strong, or of weak, Constitutions, is not in our Power: But he that thinks it thence follows, that even to sit, or to walk, is not Matter of Will and Choice, does not perceive the Tendency of that Consequence. For, altho’ there are antecedent Causes of Men’s being born with quick, or slow, Capacities, with robust, or infirm, Constitutions; Yet it does not follow, that our sitting and walking, and doing any Action, is determined and appointed by these Causes.’195 He adds presently;
“‘Vices’ (he means vicious Inclinations, as his preceding Instances shew) ‘may grow from natural Causes; but to extirpate and eradicate them, so as that he who hath these vicious Propensities may be wholly freed from them, is not in the Power of natural Causes, but is effected by the Will, by Study and Discipline.’196 Than which Reasoning nothing can be more truly and strongly offer’d.
“To the same Argument the learned Alexander Aphrodisius thus replies; ‘Those Things which proceed from a Cause, do not always proceed from an external Cause; on which account something is in our own Power, of which we ourselves are the proper Cause, and not any external Cause. Wherefore those Things which in this respect are without Cause, have yet a Cause from ourselves. For Man himself is the original and Cause of those Actions which are done by him, and this is properly to be a Man, to have a Principle of Action within himself, as it is the Property of a Globe to be roll’d down a steep Place. Wherefore other Things are impelled by external Causes, but Man is not; because it is essential to him, to have a Principle and Cause (of Action) within himself, so as not to be impell’d by exterior Causes. If we had one View in our judging about Actions, it might with Reason be said, that our Judgments about the same Things was always the same: But since it is not so, (for those Things we make choice of, we choose sometimes for the Goodness, sometimes for the Pleasure, sometimes for the Profit of them, and these do not produce the same Effects;) it happens, that we sometimes prefer the Motives to that which is good, before all others; again, at other times our Judgment leads us to prefer that which is pleasant, or profitable. For, as we seek for no other Cause, why the Earth is carried downward according to its Gravity, and why Animals act, as they do, by Appetite, than that each of these has, of itself, an efficient Cause derived from its Nature; so neither is there any other Cause to be sought of those different Actions, which we do at different Times, in different Circumstances, but only the Man himself. For this is to be a Man, namely, to be the Original and Cause of those Actions, which are done by him.’197
“To which, on the same Argument, I shall add the Opinions of the two most learned Christian Philosophers, Eusebius and Origen.
“Eusebius says; ‘Altho’ a thousand external fortuitous Obstacles oppose the Temper of our Bodies, and the voluntary Desires of our Minds, yet the freely-exerted Virtue of the Soul is able to withstand them all; demonstrating, that the Power, which we have within us, of choosing that which is good, is unmatchable and invincible.’198
“Origen’s Observation is as follows, viz.
“‘We confess (saith he) that many Things which are not in our Power, are Causes of many Things that are in our Power; without which, namely, those Things which are not in our Power, other Things, which are in our Power, would not be done. But those Things which are in our Power, and are done consequentially to antecedent Things, which are not in our Power, are done so as that, notwithstanding these antecedent Things, we might have done otherwise. But, if any one would have it, that our Free-will is wholly independent of every Thing in the World, so as that we do not choose to do some Things by reason of certain (precedent) Accidents, he forgets, that he is a Part of the World, and comprehended