A Treatise of the Laws of Nature. Richard Cumberland
and disposed to the contrary Virtues, (Generosity, Clemency, Modesty;) so amongst the Romans some Virtues are observ’d to have been Hereditary in certain Families in continued Succession, and great Vices, (Fury, Luxury, Libidinousness,) in others; “I am of Opinion” (saith Quintilian Declam. 260) “That the Morals of all are born with them, and the proper Virtues of every Nature.” Plato (in his Tenth of Laws) speaketh of a sort of good-natur’d Atheists, “who think that there are no Gods at all, yet are by Nature of a just Disposition, hating bad Men and Injustice, they will do no such Practices themselves, and those Men that are not just they shun, and love them that are just.” Altho’ Instances of Ferity and Barbarity are no Rarities amongst Men, yet a certain Goodness, Kindness, Benignity, and Tenderness, is part of our natural Constitution, and an effect of our bodily Temper, which so far prevaileth in the World of Mankind, that it commonly beareth the Name of Humanity, as Cruelty is call’d Inhumanity, and the Rod of Mansuetude, “the Rod of Men,” 2 Sam. 7. 14. As bodily Temper, so the kindly Instincts which are in Animal Nature, are Principles of laudable Practices. Such as natural Affection towards Children and near Kindred, Commiseration for the Afflicted, a natural Sympathy, Gratitude, and Kindness, for our Friends and Benefactors (remarkable in Dogs, Lions, and even Birds,) common Sociableness and Friendliness, particular Friendship, a Propension to please and oblige others, a natural Benignity and Generosity, desire of our own Welfare and Happiness, care of our Reputation, aversion from Infamy, Misery, and Death.
A Second Principle of laudable Practices is a Human-Social Disposition, (which is a goodness of Nature, and in great degree an innate Instinct in Man;) for all the Human-Social and Human-Moral Virtue and Duty, commonly call’d the Political and Ethical, is compriz’d in, and may be inferr’d from, this one Principle. For all political Virtue and Duty towards Mankind in general, towards our Country, all Civil-Social Charity and Justice, the common Offices of Humanity and Civil Neighbourhood, the oeconomical Duties, Duties of near Relations and of Friendship, belong to Man as Social, as Human-Social, and he is not Man without the Human-Morals. In this great Law, great Virtue and Duty, of Man’s being Human-Social, Civil-Social (not Anti-Social) is manifestly compriz’d “a Civil-Social kind of universal Benevolence to ourselves and all Mankind, which affecteth and endeavoureth the Good of the Publick, and is opposite to what is hurtful;” 271 from which Benevolence Universal (“Caritas humani Generis” Cicero calls it) all Mundan Political Virtue is deduceable. As it is also from another great Principle compriz’d in the Pagan Human-Social Disposition; “The Subordination and Relation of all Men, and lesser Societies of Men, to the great Body of Mankind, as of Parts to the Whole, and of Citizens to the Mundan City.”272 From these Principles both the Popular and Philosophick Pagans practis’d Civil Virtue, as the Bees do in some sort, that have political Order and Government amongst them: And this their Practice of political Virtue constituted and denominated a good and just Man of their Idea. One Antenor, who wrote the Cretan History, was nam’d Δέλτα (amongst the Cretans δέλτος signified Good,) διὰ τὸ ὰγαθὸς ἐἵ καὶ ϕιλόπολις, “because he was good and a lover of his City;273 To live well” (saith Plutarch) “is to live Sociably and Friendly, and Temperately and Justly.”274 The generality of the Pagans suppos’d, that the observance of their political Laws constituted them just Men.
A Third Principle of laudable Practices is a respect for Worth and Virtue, Honesty and Duty, Justice and Equity, Reason and Ingenuity, Civility, Decency, and Order; and a like respect for ourselves, our own Perfection and Felicity, without any regard to God, or Holiness. For, as there is a Human-Social Virtue, which is on this side the Holy-Social, so there is a regard for Worth and Virtue, Honesty, Reason, and Justice, which is on this side true Holiness and Godliness. The Pagans practis’d the Virtue which they teach, “fugiendae turpitudinis causa, to shun that which is base and shameful,”275 τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα because it was Just and Good, Virtuous, or Honest.”276 Their Maxim was “Honestum per se expetendum, that which is Virtuous, is Self-desirable”; and some of them have said, “A Feast is nothing else but the doing one’s Duty.”277 Out of regard to Decency and Order, they practis’d the small Morals, (that may well be defin’d, as the Stoicks define Modesty, the Science of decent Motion,) which are the opposites to Rudeness, Rusticity, and Impoliteness of Behaviour. And for their great Morals, (altho’ their practice of them was without any regard to God, or Holiness,) their Notions were so high and generous, that they profess’d a contempt of Life, and “to throw the Body into the Fire, when Reason, when Dignity, when Fidelity, requireth it,278 A virtuous Man will die for his Friends and Country, he will throw away his Money and Honours, and all the Goods that Men contest about ϖριποιούμρυος ἒαυτῳ τὸ καλὸν, acquiring, or preserving to himself that which is Beautiful in matter of Life and Practice.”279 Miltiades taught the Athenians, “to acknowledge no Lord but the Laws, and to be afraid of nothing more than that which is Evil and Unjust”;280 and of Themistocles the Orator saith, “That willingly he would not set any Thing before Virtue and his Duty.281 To be Virtuous is a great Accomplishment, and every Virtue is an Accomplishment.”282 The Philosophick Pagans, therefore, (at least the better sort of them,) betook themselves to the Study and Exercise of Virtue out of regard to their Perfection and Felicity, which they suppos’d to consist in their Virtue, which in many Instances was (in some respect) very laudable and imitable. Such was the Platonists disaffecting τὰ τνὶδϵ, the Things that are here, the not desiring or using them any farther, than so far as there is need; and the Stoicks γαςνρ κϵκολαμένη, restrain’d Belly, or narrow-bounded Appetite. The Pagans, both Popular and Philosophick, had also a regard to Self-approbation and the Tranquillity of their own Mind. “There is no greater Theatre” (saith Cicero283) “for Virtue, than our own Mind, approving and applauding.” They had also a Self-reverence, or regard to their own Dignity of Person.—Πάντων δὲ μάλις’ ἀιοχύνεο σαυτὸν, Above all others reverence thy-self.”284
A fourth Principle of laudable Practices is Religion on this side true Religion; for it was from a Principle of Religion, and out of regard to a Deity, that Heathens thought themselves oblig’d, to do nothing against their Consciences, but to keep them unspotted;285 that they look’d upon the Dictates of their practical Reason as Laws;286 that they had Hopes and Fears, Peace and Perplexity, Joys and Anxieties, from their Consciences,287 That they look’d upon themselves as bound to Innocence, to Gratitude, to keep Faith, to take care of their Children and Parents, to have a special Kindness for their near Kindred, to do the Offices of Humanity towards Mankind in general, and acts of Heroical Virtue for the publick Benefit;288 that they thought Men criminal and punishable, not only for Facts of Wickedness (such as Adultery, Theft, Homicide,) but for the Will of Evil-doing;289 that they shun’d the perpetration of Wickedness in secret, dreaded Perjury, rever’d an Oath;290 that they accounted Injustice towards Men, and all vicious Errors in Life and Practice, (which they called ἁμαρτνίματα, Sins,) nothing less than Impieties;291 that the Philosophick-Pagan Religionists thought themselves oblig’d to practise all the Virtues which were in their Institution, and to shun all the Vices;292 that they propos’d to themselves an Imitation of the Deity, and suppos’d, that nothing could be well done, “without having respect to the Things Divine”;293 and therefore (as some of themselves say) “they had an Eye to the Deity in every thing great and little”;294 and lastly, that they look’d upon themselves as bound to an intire Subjection to the Governor of the World, and to all the Branches of active and passive Obedience to him, real, or imaginary.295 The natural Man, therefore, in a considerable