A Treatise of the Laws of Nature. Richard Cumberland
In the first Chapter, the State of the Question is propos’d, and all the Laws of Nature are reduc’d to that one, of Benevolence towards all Rationals; and the Sanction of that Law is briefly deduc’d from the Consequences which attend such a Benevolence, at the Appointment of the Author of Nature. The Method is also shewn, by which, Conclusions, concerning the Consequences of universal Benevolence, and its several Branches, (such as a division of Things, and of human Services amongst all Men, Fidelity, Gratitude, Self-preservation, and the Care of our Off-spring,) may be reduc’d to some Analogy or Resemblance with those Propositions in the Mathesis Universalis, which contain the Result of Mathematical Computations. Hence is inferr’d, that the Truth of these Propositions, and their Impression on our Minds by the first Cause of all necessary Effects, do both become known to us by the same way of Reasoning. This is the Subject of the first ten Sections. In the 11th and 12th, it is prov’d, that Hobbes contradicts both the foregoing Conclusions, and himself; advancing atheistical Principles, and denying, that any Divine Laws, properly so call’d, may be learn’d, either from the Nature of Things, or from the Sacred Scriptures, unless a particular Revelation were made to each Person, that the sacred Writers were inspir’d. Thence to the end of § 15. is taken up in proving, That the Truth of our general Proposition is manifestly deduc’d from those Phaenomena of Nature, which are every where known, even to the Vulgar; and that Hobbes himself must acknowledge thus much, if he will be consistent with himself, is prov’d § 16. It is afterwards shewn, that from an accurate Knowledge of those natural Causes, whose Concurrence is necessary to produce certain Effects, or to preserve them when produc’d, we form distinct Ideas of Things Good and Evil, Profitable and Hurtful, and that too, not only to one, but many. It is prov’d, § 20. That those Philosophical Principles which are embrac’d by Mr. Hobbes himself, demonstrate, That all Motions of Bodies are capable of producing such Good or Evil. From the Knowledge of the finite Condition of all Creatures, by a like Reasoning, is deduc’d the Necessity of limiting the Uses of all Things whatsoever, as well as of human Services, to particular Persons for a certain Time; by means whereof, by the by, is deduc’d the Origin of Property and Dominion, to the end of § 23. In § 24. the chief Heads of the Laws of Nature are propos’d, and the Rank which they hold, with respect to one another, hinted at. The Method of deducing them all from the primary one, is pointed out. In § 26. is shewn, that the Observance of these Laws is always rewarded, and their Neglect always punish’d, at the Appointment of the first Cause, according to that Course of Nature, which he at first establish’d in his first forming the World, and by which he still continues to govern it: And that Hobbes himself does sometimes assert this, but sometimes denys it, in order to advance the Right of every Man to every Thing; which is the Foundation of his Politicks, and is confuted in §. 27. and to the end of the Chapter.
In the 2d Chapter is explain’d, what is understood by the Word Man, what by the Word Nature; and, in the 4th Section, are distinctly enumerated those Faculties of the human Mind, which fit Men, more than other Animals, to enter into Society with God, and the whole Body of Mankind. Right Reason is explain’d, from the 5th Section to the end of the 10th. The Usefulness of abstract Ideas, and of universal Propositions, § 11. and of our reflex Acts, in order to this End, is pointed out, § 12. Thence we proceed to the Consideration of the human Body; particularly, that in a Survey thereof there are proper Motives to persuade us to endeavour the common Good of Rationals, and our own in subordination to that; because, (1.) Our Bodies are by Nature Part of the System of the World, which perpetually depends upon the first Mover, and the Motions of all whose Parts have necessarily such a mutual Dependence upon one another, in a subordination of some to others, for the Preservation of the Whole, to § 16. (2.) They are Animals of the same kind with other Men, and therefore have their Appetites, which tend to Self-preservation, equally limited with those of other Men; which Appetites in them are therefore very consistent with a Permission to others of the same Species to preserve themselves, § 17. Moreover, the Likeness of those Images, by which Animals of the same kind are represented, disposes them to Affections, with respect to others of their own Species, like to those, by which they are inclin’d to their own Preservation, § 18. Further, the Love Animals bear to those of the same Species, is a pleasant Affection; the Exercise where of is therefore inseparably united with their Love of themselves, § 19. The same is likewise prov’d from their natural Propension to propagate their Species, and rear their Off-spring, § 20, 21. Hobbes’s Objections against this Argument, from other Animals associating themselves, are answer’d and retorted, § 22. Finally, the same is prov’d from those Circumstances which are peculiar to a human Body; such as are, 1. Some Particulars which assist the Fancy and Memory, and consequently, Prudence. Here is consider’d, that Man has a Brain, in proportion to his Bulk, much greater than other Animals; a greater Quantity, Purity, and Vigour, of Blood and Animal Spirits; and a longer Life. 2. Those Circumstances, which either enable Man better to regulate his Affections, such as the Plexus Nervosus, peculiar to Man; or make his Government of them more necessary to him, as the Pericardium’s being continued with the Diaphragm; and those other Causes, which expose him to greater Hazards than other Animals, in violent Passions, to the end of § 27. The Propension is observ’d to be greater in Man than in other Animals, towards propagating his Species, and rearing his Off-spring, § 28. Lastly, is consider’d the Aptness of the Disposition of the Parts in the whole Man for Society, especially in his Hands and Countenance; and that the Advantages of Society and convenient Subordination, and consequently of Government, may be deduc’d from the natural Union of the Mind with, and Dominion over, the Body.
In the 3d Chapter, §1. Natural Good is defin’d, and divided into Good, proper to one, and Good, common to many. Such Acts and Habits as promote the common natural Good of All, are enforc’d by Laws, and are call’d Morally Good, upon account of their Agreement with those Laws or moral Rules. §. 2. The Opinion of Mr. Hobbes, computing Good in the State of Nature,1 solely from the Sentiments of the Speaker, is laid open and confuted, as well from the Principles of Reason, as from his own Writings. It is shewn, that he does not only contradict others here, but himself also.
In the three first Sections of the fourth Chapter, Practical Rules are defin’d to be Practical Propositions, declaring the Consequences of human Actions; and it is shewn, that such Propositions, when they point out the proper and necessary Cause of the design’d Effect, do, without further Trouble, shew the sufficient and necessary means to obtain that End. The various Forms, to which those Propositions may be reduc’d, are compar’d with one another; among which that is preferr’d, which considers human Actions as Causes, and all things depending on them as certain Effects; and that the other Forms may be all finally reduc’d to this; all which is easily learn’d from Observation. In §4. this whole Matter is illustrated by a Comparison with Mathematical Practice.
In the 5th Chapter, §1. the Law of Nature is thus defin’d: It is a Proposition, whose Knowledge we come at by the Light of Nature, declaring those Actions which promote the publick Good; the Performance of which is naturally attended with Rewards, their Neglect with Punishments. The first Part points out the Precept, which is the principal end or effect of the Law; the latter Part the Sanction, which is the subordinate Effect of the Law. In §. 2. a Reason is assign’d, why the Law of Nature is here defin’d otherwise than by the Civilians. In