An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense. Francis Hutcheson
Desire is raised in us, directly by our volition or desiring it. That alone which raises in us from Self‐Love [18] the Desire of any Event, is an Opinion that that Event is the Means [18] of private Good. As soon as we form this Opinion, a Desire of the Event immediately arises: But if having the Desire or Affection be imagined the Means of private Good, and not the Existence of the Event desired, then from Self‐Love we should only desire or wish to have the Desire of that Event, and should not desire the Event itself, since the Event is not conceived as the Means of Good.
For instance, suppose GOD revealed to us that he would confer Happiness on us, if our Country were happy; then from Self‐Love we should have immediately the subordinate Desire of our Country’s Happiness, as the Means of our own. But were we assured that, whether our Country were happy or not, it should not affect our future Happiness; but that we should be rewarded, provided we desired the Happiness of our Country; our Self‐Love could never make us now desire the Happiness of our Country, since it is not now conceived as the Means of our Happiness, but is perfectly indifferent to it. The Means of our Happiness is the having a Desire of our Country’s Happiness; we should therefore from Self‐Love only wish to have this Desire.
[19] ’Tis true indeed in fact, that, because Benevolence is natural to us, a little Attention [19] to other Natures will raise in us good‐will towards them, whenever by any Opinions we are persuaded that there is no real Opposition of Interest. But had we no Affection distinct from Self‐Love, nothing could raise our Desire of the Happiness of others, but conceiving their Happiness as the Means of ours. An Opinion that our having kind Affections would be the Means of our private Happiness, would only make us desire to have those Affections. Now that Affections
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do not arise upon our wishing to have them, or our volition of raising them; as conceiving the Affections themselves to be the Means of private Good; is plain from this, that if they did thus arise, then a Bribe might raise any Desire toward any Event, or any Affection toward the most improper Object. We might be hired to love or hate any sort of Persons, to be angry, jealous, or compassionate, as we can be engaged into external Actions; which we all see to be absurd. Now those who alledg, that our Benevolence may arise from prospect of secular Advantage, Honour, Self‐Approbation, or future Rewards, must own, that these are either Motives only to external Actions, or Considerations, shewing, that having the Desire of the Happiness of others, would be the Means of private Good; [20] while the Event supposed to be desired, viz. the Happiness of others, is not [20] supposed the Means of any private Good. But the best Defenders of this part of the Scheme of Epicurus, acknowledge that “Desires are not raised by Volition.”
This Distinction Defended
3. “There are in Men Desires of the Happiness of others, when they do not conceive this Happiness as the Means of obtaining any sort of Happiness to themselves.” Self‐Approbation, or Rewards from the Deity, might be the Ends, for obtaining which we might possibly desire or will from Self‐Love, to raise in our selves kind Affections; but we could not from Self‐Love desire the Happiness of others, but as conceiving it the Means of our own. Now ’tis certain that sometimes we may have this subordinate Desire of the Happiness of others, conceived as the Means of our own; as suppose one had laid a Wager upon the Happiness of a Person of such Veracity, that he would own sincerely whether he were happy or not; when Men are Partners in Stock, and share in Profit or Loss; when one hopes to succeed to, or some way to share in the Prosperity of another; or if the DEITY had given such Threatnings, as they tell us Telamon gave his Sons when they went to War,17 that he would reward or punish one according as others were [21] happy or miserable: In such cases one might have this subordinate Desire [21] of another’s Happiness
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from Self‐Love. But as we are sure the DEITY has not given such Comminations, so we often are conscious of the Desire of the Happiness of others, without any such Conception of it as the Means of our own; and are sensible that this subordinate Desire is not that virtuous Affection which we approve. The virtuous Benevolence must be an ultimate Desire, which would subsist without view to private Good. Such ultimate publick Desires we often feel, without any subordinate Desire of the same Event, as the Means of private Good. The subordinate may sometimes, nay often does concur with the ultimate; and then indeed the whole Moment of these conspiring Desires may be greater than that of either alone: But the subordinate alone is not that Affection which we approve as virtuous.
Benevolence is not the Desire of the Pleasures of the publick Sense.
Art. IV. This will clear our way to answer the chief Difficulty: “May not our Benevolence be at least a Desire of the Happiness of others, as the Means of obtaining the Pleasures of the publick Sense, from the Contemplation of their Happiness? ” If it were so, it is very unaccountable that we should approve this subordinate Desire as virtuous, and yet not approve the like Desire upon a Wager, or other Considerations of Interest. [22] Both Desires proceed from Self‐Love in the same [22] manner: In the latter case the Desires might be extended to multitudes, if any one would wager so capriciously; and, by increasing the Sum wagered, the Motive of Interest might, with many Tempers, be made stronger than that from the Pleasures of the publick Sense.
Don’t we find that we often desire the Happiness of others without any such selfish Intention? How few have thought upon this part of our Constitution which we call a Publick Sense? Were it our only View, in Compassion to free our selves from the Pain of the publick Sense; should the Deity propose it to our Choice, either to obliterate all Ideas of the Person in Distress, but to continue him in Misery, or on the other hand to relieve him from it; should we not upon this Scheme be perfectly indifferent, and chuse the former as soon as the latter? Should the DEITY assure us that we should be immediately annihilated, so that we should be incapable of either Pleasure or Pain, but that it should depend upon our Choice at our very Exit, whether our Children, our
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Friends, or our Country should be happy or miserable; should we not upon this Scheme be intirely indifferent? Or, if we should even desire the [23] pleasant Thought of their Happiness, in our last Moment, would not this Desire be the faintest imaginable?
[23] ’Tis true, our Publick Sense might be as acute at our Exit as ever; as a Man’s Taste of Meat or Drink might be as lively the instant before his Dissolution as in any part of his Life. But would any Man have as strong Desires of the Means of obtaining these Pleasures, only with a View to himself, when he was to perish the next Moment? Is it supposable that any Desire of the Means of private Pleasure can be as strong when we only expect to enjoy it a Minute, as when we expect the Continuance of it for many Years? And yet, ’tis certain, any good Man would as strongly desire at his Exit the Happiness of others, as in any part of his Life. We do not therefore desire it as the Means of private Pleasure.
Should any alledge, that this Desire of the Happiness of others, after our Exit, is from some confused Association of Ideas; as a Miser, who loves no body, might desire an Increase of Wealth at his Death; or as any one may have an Aversion to have his Body dissected, or made a Prey to Dogs after Death: [24] let any honest Heart try if the deepest Reflection will break this Association (if there be any) which is supposed to raise the Desire. The closest Reflection would be found rather to strengthen it. [24] How would any Spectator like the Temper of one thus rendered indifferent to all others at his own Exit, so that he would not even open his Mouth to procure Happiness to Posterity? Would we esteem it refined Wisdom, or a Perfection of Mind, and not rather the vilest Perverseness? ’Tis plain then we feel this ultimate Desire of the Happiness of others to be a most natural Instinct, which we also expect in others, and not the Effect