The Whole Duty of Man, According to the Law of Nature. Samuel Pufendorf
after Harlots. Now if any one should undertake, in a set Discourse, to declaim against these things to him of the contrary Temper, the Child might very well enjoyn him Silence, and bid him inculcate them to any Body else, rather than to him, who takes no Delight or Pleasure in such Practices. From whence I look upon it as manifest, that the Law of Nature would have a quite different Face, if we were to consider Man, as he was in his Primitive State of Innocence.
And now since the Bounds and Limits of this Science, whereby it is distinguish’d from Moral Divinity, are so clearly set down, it ought at least to have the same Priviledges with other Sciences, as the Civil Law, Physick, Natural Philosophy, and the Mathematicks; wherein if any Unskilful Person presume to meddle, assuming to himself the Quality of a Censor, without any Authority, he may fairly have that objected to him, which was formerly done by *Apelles to Megabyzus, who undertook to talk at random about the Art of Painting; Pray, said he, be silent, lest the Boys laugh at you, who pretend to talk of Matters you do not understand.
Now, upon the whole, I am content to submit to the Judgment of Discreet and Intelligent Persons; but as for Ignorant and Spiteful Detractors, ’tis better to leave ’em to themselves, to be punish’d by their own Folly and Malice; since according to the Ancient Proverb, The Ethiopian cannot change his Skin.
Of Human Actions in general, the Principles of ’em, and how to be accounted for, or imputed
I. What Duty is.
What we mean here by the Word DUTY, is, That*Action of a Man, which is regularly order’d according to some prescrib’d Law, which he is oblig’d to obey. To the Understanding whereof it is necessary to premise somewhat, as well touching the Nature of a Human Action, as concerning Laws in general.
II. What a Human Action.
By a Human Action we mean not every Motion that proceeds from the Faculties of a Man; but such only as have their Original and Direction from those Faculties which God Almighty has endow’d Mankind withal, distinct from Brutes; that is, such as are undertaken by the Light of the Understanding, and the Choice of the Will.
III. Human Capacity. Knowing and Chusing L. N. N. l. 1. c. 1. §2 c. 3. §1.
For it is not only put in the Power of Man to know the various Things which appear in the World, to compare them one with another, and from thence to form to himself new Notions; but he is able to look forwards, and to consider what he is to do, and to carry himself to the Performance of it, and this to do after some certain Manner, and to some certain End; and then he can collect what will be the Consequence thereof. Beside, he can make a Judgment upon Things already done, whether they are done agreeably to their Rule. Not that all a Man’s Faculties do exert themselves continually, or after the same manner, but some of them are stir’d up in him by an internal Impulse; and when rais’d, are by the same regulated and guided. Neither beside has a Man the same Inclination to every Object; but some he Desires, and for others he has an Aversion: And often, though an Object of Action be before him, yet he suspends any Motion towards it; and when many Objects offer themselves, he chuses one and refuses the rest.
IV. Human Understanding. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 3.
As for that Faculty therefore of comprehending and judging of Things, which is called the Understanding; it must be taken for granted, first of all, *That every Man of a mature Age, and entire Sense, has so much Natural Light in him, as that, with necessary Care, and due Consideration, he may rightly comprehend, at least those general Precepts and Principles which are requisite in order to pass our Lives here honestly and quietly; and be able to judge that these are congruous to the Nature of Man. For if this, at least, be not admitted within the Bounds of the Forum Humanum, [or Civil Judicature] Men might pretend an invincible Ignorance for all their Miscarriages; *because no Man in foro humano can be condemn’d for having violated a Law which it was above his Capacity to comprehend.
V. What is meant by Conscience rightly inform’d, and what by Probable Conscience. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 3. §5.
The Understanding of Man, when it is rightly instructed concerning that which is to be done or omitted, and this so, as that he is able to give certain and undoubted Reasons for his Opinions, is wont to be call’d CONSCIENCE RIGHTLY INFORM’D: That is, govern’d by sure Principles, and settling its Resolutions conformably to the Laws. But when a Man has indeed entertain’d the true Opinion about what is to be done or not to be done, the Truth whereof yet he is not able to make good by Reasoning; but he either drew such his Notion from his Education, way of Living, Custom, or from the Authority of Persons wiser or better than himself; and no Reason appears to him that can persuade the contrary, this uses to be call’d Conscientia probabilis, CONSCIENCE grounded upon PROBABILITY. And by this the greatest part of Mankind are govern’d, it being the good Fortune of few to be able to enquire into, and to know, the Causes of Things.
VI. Conscience doubting. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 3. §8.
And yet it chances often, to some Men especially in singular Cases, that Arguments may be brought on both sides, and they not be Masters of sufficient Judgment to discern clearly which are the strongest and most weighty. And this is call’d a †DOUBTING CONSCIENCE. In which Case this is the Rule: As long as the Understanding is unsatisfied and in doubt, whether the thing to be done be good or evil, the doing of it is to be deferr’d. For to set about doing it before the Doubt is answer’d, implies a sinful Design, or at least a Neglect of the Law.
VII. Error, vincible and invincible. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 3. §11.
Men also oftentimes have wrong Apprehensions of the matter, and take that to be true which is false; and then they are said to be in an Error; and this is called Vincible Error, when a Man by applying due Attention and Diligence might have prevented his falling thereinto; and it’s said to be Invincible Error, when the Person, with the utmost Diligence and Care that is consistent with the common Rules of Life, could not have avoided it. But this sort of Error, at least, among those who give their Minds to improve the Light of Reason, and to lead their Lives regularly, happens not in the common Rules of living, but only in peculiar Matters. For the Precepts of the Law of Nature are plain; and that Legislator who makes positive Laws, both does and ought to take all possible Care, that they may be understood by those who are to give Obedience to them. So that this Sort of Error proceeds only from a supine Negligence. But in particular Affairs ’tis easie for some Error to be admitted, against the Will, and without any Fault of the Person, concerning the Object and other *Circumstances of the Action.
VIII. Of Ignorance, and the various Kinds of it. L. N. N. l. 1. c. 3. §10.
Where Knowledge simply is wanting as to the Thing performed or omitted, such Defect of Knowledge is call’d Ignorance.1
This Ignorance may be two Ways consider’d, either with respect to its Origin, or with respect to its Influence on the Action. With reference to this latter, Ignorance is of two Sorts, one being the Cause of the Thing ignorantly done, the other not; on which account the first of these is call’d Efficacious Ignorance, the other Concomitant.
EFFICACIOUS Ignorance is the Want of such Knowledge as, had it not been wanting, would have hindred the Action: Such was Abimelech’s Ignorance, Gen. XX. 4, 5. who, had he known Sarah to have been Abraham’s Wife, had never entertain’d any Thoughts of taking her to himself. Concomitant Ignorance is the Want of such Knowledge, as had it not been wanting, would not have hindred the Fact: As suppose a Man should kill his Enemy by a chance Blow, whom he would otherwise have kill’d, had he known him to have