Institutes of Divine Jurisprudence, with Selections from Foundations of the Law of Nature and Nations. Christian Thomasius
yet a good physician must be able to cure both the robust and the weak men on the basis of the same general principles, applied in different ways.
§51. Thus man differs from beasts in that he is rational. If only our intellect were powerful enough to have complete knowledge of itself a priori! Yet we are forced to inquire into the nature of reason in a roundabout way.
§52. The reason of man consists in thought. To think is to connect one term with another and one proposition with another. The latter is called reasoning. But we can only reason with words, which we either retain
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in our mind or utter aloud. Therefore, λόγος [speech], according to the Greeks, is either ἐνδιάθϵτος [uttered within] or προϕορικός [put forward/uttered aloud]. Words, however, as we shall see below, are imposed on things by humans living in the same society.
§53. Moreover, whatever the Cartesians say, infants do not think from the very first moment after birth, but are endowed only with an aptitude for thinking. Without the company of other humans this aptitude cannot be actualized. For the reports we read about humans brought up by wild beasts say that humans of this kind were almost identical to beasts, or that by living among the beasts this aptitude for thought was developed only to a very small degree.
§54. To summarize briefly: there is no reason without speech, there is no use for speech outside society, nor is reason active outside society. Thus we will not go wrong in saying that this aptitude, which exists in humans before the exercise of reason, is nothing other than an inclination to reason with other humans. Indeed, every aptitude tends toward an action as its end.
§55. Thus, when we call man rational, it is the same as if we say that he is social. Sociality, however, is a common inclination, infused into humanity by God, by the force of which he desires a happy and peaceful life with other humans. But why peaceful? Because in a state of turbulence we do not exercise our reason.
§56. This peaceful life, put into practice, is called society. The contrary of that, as the Peripatetics themselves confess, is conflict.
§57. But we prove our opinion a posteriori, because man outside society cannot be happy. I will not even mention here that great misery in which infants find themselves if they are destitute of human company. Even for adults life would be miserable if there were no other humans who would minister to their needs.
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§58. What then? I appeal to everybody’s own conscience: even if we pretend that someone enjoyed the kind of felicity the poets attribute to Psyche, yet, if he were deprived of all human society, would he not rather wish to live in human society and do without these delights of the senses?50
§59. And to be precise, there can be no pleasure of the senses outside of society. It would be prolix to try to prove this by induction here. We demand that you come up with a counterexample.
§60. Even misanthropes would be miserable without human society because they would have nothing to hate.
§61. Even those bookworms and those people who never consider themselves more alone than when they are not alone would be miserable without books. But where would they get their books from if there were no human society? Assume that all other humans would be annihilated; what use would books be if they cannot show others what displeases them in this or that author, etc.
§62. If you wanted to confirm our argument with evidence from the history of the state of innocence, we have divine testimony, which is greater than all prudence, even that of Solomon. Adam was very happy in general, but he lacked a companion. Divine wisdom pronounced that it was not good for man to be alone.
§63. Thus, the conclusion remains unshaken that the rational nature of man is identical to his social nature. And therefore what is understood by conformity with rational nature is conformity with the sociality of man.
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§64. We, therefore, declare that the sum of natural law is contained in this principle: “Do that which necessarily conforms to the social life of man and omit that which is contrary to it.”
§65. Thus, no doubt remains concerning the truth of this principle. Its adequacy is not only clear from the fact that all special precepts of natural law are to be derived from that source, but also from the fact that it does not depend on any precept of positive law.
§66. Its evidence finally is demonstrated as follows. First, if God had wanted man not to act according to his sociality, he would not have wanted him to be rational. An irrational human being, however, would be a contradiction in terms.
§67. Then the connection of conclusions with this first principle is also evident. For whenever I ask, for example, how homicide, thefts, etc., are contrary to sociality, I respond clearly that this is because they disturb the common peace of all humankind.
§68. Similarly, when I ask how, for example, the keeping of agreements necessarily conforms to sociality, the response is evident: because, if this were not preserved, this same peace would be disrupted.
§69. You see, at the same time, that an action necessarily conforming to sociality is one the omission of which disturbs the common peace of humanity, and that action which does not conform to sociality is one the performance of which disturbs the common peace of humanity. For this omission or performance would lead to war, a war of all against all, which could extinguish all of humankind.
§70. Yet there is no lack of arguments against the adequacy of our principle. Some believe that it is possible to derive rather different conclusions from this source. Thieves, for example, also act according to their society and its purpose. This objection questions the truth of our axiom at the same time.
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§71. But these theorists obviously confuse society with sociality. Society is rightly constituted only if it does not conflict with sociality.
§72. And so that you do not wonder how a society can conflict with sociality, since society is named after sociality, remember that there is no question that the reasoning of a thief conflicts with reasonableness.
§73. Several people believe, however, that only the duties of man toward other men can be deduced from our principle, but not the duties of man toward God, toward himself, and toward beasts.
§74. We readily admit this to be the case with respect to the duties of man toward God insofar as these refer to external worship. That, as we will soon show, is part of Christian jurisprudence, not natural law.
§75. Even if by duties toward God you mean a general obligation toward God, you will not be able to object to our argument because the command to obey God is not a precept of natural law but its presupposition. We have shown that this precept pertains to divine law in general.
§76. The duties of man toward himself, properly speaking, do not exist. Nobody can be under an obligation to himself and therefore cannot owe a duty to himself. The duties that carry this name are, in fact, duties either toward God or toward other humans, insofar as man is under an obligation to either of them with respect to himself. In the case of the former we will derive these duties from Scripture; in the case of the latter from sociality, in the appropriate place.51
§77. Finally, there are no duties of man toward beasts, just as there is no society of man with beasts, although the harsh treatment of beasts violates sociality or divine positive law, as we shall explain when there is a convenient occasion to do so.52
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§78. Thus far on the first principle of natural law. The first principle of divine positive law is this: “Do that which God revealed to you in Scripture you should do and omit the doing anything contrary.”53
§79. With regard to universal positive law in particular, we identify three requisites as far as the principles of knowledge are concerned. Two are held in common with any positive law; a third is specific to it: namely, (1) that Scripture