Natural Rights on the Threshold of the Scottish Enlightenment. Gershom Carmichael
the constitution of human nature is such that men can abuse all these prerogatives of their nature to hurt each other in a very effective manner, and are liable to attacks of provocation which incite them to do so. It follows from this that it is necessary for the safety of the human race that it be sociable, that is, that men readily unite with one another, and behave with due consideration not for self alone but also for others. And by this union, individuals, insofar as it is in them, may obtain and encourage mutual benevolence and mutual trust. These are the two hinges on which depends the willing performance of all those mutual duties which tend to the preservation of human life and the improvement of its advantages.
8. So, from the general precept of promoting the common good of the human race, this second subordinate precept is deduced: sociability is to be cultivated and preserved by every man, so far as in him lies; that is, social inclination and social life are to be encouraged and promoted by every man, so far as it is in his power, both in himself toward others, and in others toward himself, and in all men toward each other mutually.
9. By this train of reasoning, sociability is not subordinated to self-love. It is not necessary to consider here whether the objection which Titius5 makes against Pufendorf is right or wrong. For we do not say that each man ought to live sociably only because he cannot otherwise be secure. We say that because social life is necessary to the safety and preservation from harm of the human race as a whole, and every violation of it tends to its harm, therefore each man ought to do his part, so far as he can, to encourage and strengthen it.
10. Our method makes it unnecessary to give a lengthy argument for the divine authority of these precepts. For we have shown above that it pertains to the showing of love and veneration toward God that each man should try to benefit the human race so far as he can. And it is likewise convincingly shown that innocuous care for oneself and sociability make for the common good of the human race. And therefore it is quite evident that God requires both from men as a sign of due sentiment toward him and that he intends to reward performance of the relevant duties, or at least punish their neglect and violation. Moreover since we learn these things from the nature which God has made for man’s contemplation, by using the reason which He has also given us, it is clear that the same considerations by which we argued for the divine authority of natural law in general (p. 28) are abundantly evident in these general precepts, and consequently in all the derivations from them.
11. Furthermore, that there is a sanction to these precepts is proven not only by those general reasons by which, at pp. 21–24, we demonstrated that it is in a man’s highest interest to obey every precept derived from the Divine Law, but also because reason and daily experience confirm the special rewards which flow from the observation of these precepts and the penalties which naturally flow from their violation. It is unnecessary to point these out in the case of a man’s duties toward himself. As for the social duties which we do for others, they are naturally followed by serenity of mind and a healthy state of the body (which even apart from consideration of moral good, usually accompanies kindly and agreeable sentiments), benevolence to other men, and the security which frequently arises from it. The contrary actions are frequently succeeded by perpetual anxiety (which is accompanied by emotions which even undermine the health of the body), by contempt or hatred for other men, and by the innumerable dangers that arise from them. Consult Cicero, On Duties, book II, where he inculcates these points at length. And because these sentiments are connected by a kind of natural entailment with observation of or contempt for the law of sociability, they have the same status as rewards or punishments seeing that this natural connection itself was established by God, the author both of nature and of the natural law.
12. As the basis of the natural laws we place not one fundamental precept, as Pufendorf does, but three: that God is to be worshipped; that each man should pursue his own interest without harming others; and that sociability should be cultivated. To the first of these we refer the duties which are to be performed directly toward God; to the second those duties of man toward himself which do not conflict with the interest of any other person; and to the third, all the duties of a man toward other men, as well as such duties toward himself as a man should only do after he has fully satisfied the demands of sociability, as they are prejudicial to the claims of certain other men.
13. To understand the use and application of the precept on cultivating sociability more clearly, we think that one should take note of three points which define the limits of what should be done and what not done in cases in which men’s differing interests seem to prompt them to different courses.
14. In the first place we note that there are certain advantages or pleasures which men can get either from their own actions or from external objects or from the actions of other men, and which it is to the interest of human society to secure to them in certain circumstances, and which should not be obstructed, withdrawn, or intercepted, since they contribute to preserving and strengthening social inclination and social life among men. This is why these advantages and pleasures are fortified by the general precept of cultivating sociability, and become rights, either perfect or imperfect, according as they are necessary for preserving sociability or merely conduce to strengthening it.
15. Secondly, we note that these rights are equal for all in similar circumstances; hence, if they are given by nature, they belong to all men equally so far as they have not forfeited them; or if they are acquired by means of some human act, they can be acquired equally by all in similar circumstances, by means of similar acts.
16. Thirdly, we note that it is not contrary to the nature of social life but is essential for sustaining it, even in cases where men’s interests conflict, that each man should take a certain particular care of himself and his own, though subordinate to the cultivation of sociability. If this were not so, there would be massive general confusion, since most men would rely on someone else to help them, while idling their time away and neglecting to cultivate the resources which nature had given them. Hence, from the other point of view, it would follow that no one could have a firm expectation of anything from other people or count on their help in advancing his own claims.
17. We conclude, therefore, that the right cultivation of social life consists in each man protecting his own right with due consideration for every man’s right, perfect or imperfect, in accordance with the assumption of the natural equality which belongs to every other man. It follows that, in order to define the duty which is incumbent on each man with respect to other men, we cannot pursue a better course than to weigh carefully, in due order, the various rights which belong or may belong to individuals, to groups of men, or even to the human race as a whole, and the different foundations on which each rests. For it will be immediately evident what obligations correspond to each right.
18. In the appendix6 we have given a general idea of the method which we think should be followed in doing this; it is rather different from that of Pufendorf.
Worship of God the first law of nature7
It is clear from what we have said that Pufendorf’s method of deducing our duties toward God [i.e., indirectly from sociability] ought by no means to satisfy us. On the contrary, it is a prior and more evident principle that God is to be worshipped than that one should live sociably with men. This is particularly so since, as the distinguished author admits at section 10 of this chapter, for the precept on cultivating sociability to obtain the force of law, one must necessarily presuppose that there is a God, and that he rules all things by his Providence. And it is not true, as the author adds here, that reason alone can progress no further in religion than so far as it serves to promote the peace and sociability of this life. For even though the religion which effectively procures the salvation of souls originates in a particular divine revelation, yet reason itself teaches that in worshipping God and offering universal obedience to the divine laws, one must have before one’s eyes something more than the good things of the present life, especially if these good things are only regarded as flowing by a certain natural consequence from the performance of those duties. See pp. 22 and 24 and compare p. 30. [I.3.13.i]
Care of self the second law of nature
There