American Political Writing During the Founding Era: 1760–1805. Группа авторов
that die by such inconsideration. The least [19] thought might prevent many of these accidents. If no more than this remark is remembered, of this essay, I shall think all the rest, which gave occasion to it, well rewarded; and have the satisfaction of having been useful to the world.
But to proceed,—
I have observed elsewhere, that we can consider, or we can reject consideration; and that in both these we have liberty; altho’ by the latter, in the use of liberty, we act against the continuance of it, so as gradually to lose the capacity for it, by depravities which always take place in the neglect of it. Both the learned, and the unlearned, are faulty in consideration. In their inquiries, they have too many resting places; they are too apt to take up with the first appearances of truth, by which they frequently come short of it. On a cursory view, we should be at a loss to say which of these classes of men are most faulty. We have therefore to consider, that among the learned, as among the vulgar, there are the knowing, and the unknowing. That man, alone, is knowing, who has not only acquired a proper stock of ideas, but well digested his notions of things. Not the mere scholars, that have scamper’d through the fields of science for the vanity of a title, and university diploma, without any becoming improvement of mind, or substantial principles of knowledge; these are generally more disposed to avoid consideration, [20] than the illiterate; those they despise under the term of the prophanum vulgus. They have more important and injurious prejudices, with an additional obstinacy, and arrogant assurance, from the pride of vain and imaginary knowledge. The plain, the simple, and honestly well-meaning, are, if I may be allowed the expression, infinitely more free, than those whose self-affections are exalted by a mere formal education. Practical knowledge only is valuable; literature is but a mean for obtaining it, but often falls short of the end. Right knowledge is a moral principle, which, besides other things, qualifies for self-government, and so the enlargement of moral liberty; as literature without it tends to its destruction: We see the pride of literature and contempt of the sense of mankind in a Bolingbroke, Morgan, Coventry, Hume, Wolston, and others; who have made the most violent attacks upon all religion, both natural and revealed: These however suit only the grosser palates, who can swallow absurdity without any seasoning, besides a little elegance of language to recommend it; they are therefore much less dangerous to religion than another sort of writers who are little suspected; and of which there is a great number: These in a covert and insinuating way, with the specious cloak of moral principles, and refined notions of things, are unsuspectedly poisoning the minds of the people. Nothing [21] shows the depravity of mankind more than the zeal with which these writers endeavour to root out of the minds of their readers, those principles which have the best tendency for the happiness of mankind. They are prejudiced, and voluntarily continue so: They avoid a manly reflection and consideration, being apprehensive it would prove an interruption to their love of licence: Their fondness for this, has an effect upon them similar to that of the serpent’s enchantment of small animals, which is said to be done by a bewitching appearance round the serpent’s head, when his eyes are fixed on the creature; drawing it, by admiration, to still nearer views of the thing, till it is brought within his reach, so weaken’d that he becomes an easy prey.
It is not pretended that the most considerate can in all things find truth; but then they will be generally cautious of misleading others: And yet a strong ruling passion may without a steady watch, betray them into gross enormities. Thus ambition and an over-fondness for honor, as by high offices in church or state, or the being esteemed as persons of superiour talents, knowledge and abilities: Such persons if not sufficiently attach’d, and zealous for a particular party, will be apt to list on the side of a controversy where their most flattering hopes of distinction attract them. In this class [22] perhaps, we might place the Author of an Essay on the Principles of Morality. An Author, who had he written in favor of Liberty, with the same genius and capacity he has done against it, would have done himself honor; and sav’d one, unus’d to the pen, from attempting such an abstruse subject.
[23] PART II
Containing a few presumptive Proofs of Liberty.
The Author imagined it might not be amiss to subjoin to the foregoing theoretic thoughts, some moral probabilities of the reality of our freedom; which perhaps may prove more agreeable to some readers than the other more philosophic treatment. To these may be premised a few words concerning the ancient Fatalists, and the general belief of Liberty in the first ages.
It is acknowledged that universal consent is no infallible criterion of the truth. And yet it seems worth observing, that in all ages mankind have been invariable persuaded of the reality of Liberty; and this assurance continued till the Grecian Philosophers, by their blind way of inquiry, overlook’d and deny’d it: [24] However it was several ages before the doctrine of Necessity spread farther than themselves, even to the days of Epicurus. Epicurus erected an academy, and taught it to his disciples, and these propagated it: But what manner of reasoners he and they were, may be seen in Lucretius, who handed down his imaginations to posterity. After Epicurus, Liberty became more disputed; but was still believ’d by all that were not more or less taught to disbelieve their senses. Our modern Fatalists would reduce us to this, by confusing our minds with their abstract reasonings, which if they prove any thing, imply a great deal too much; particularly by the lengths they carry their power of motive. If we would have liberty, in their way of talk, we must be void of passions, appetites, desires and aversions; and be capable of willing differently, all circumstances the same. Unless our liberty be absolute, they will not allow it to be liberty. So that according to them, if a man’s property is limited, it is no property; if he is confin’d to his own house, or parcel of land, he has no liberty within his own walls; if he has not the strength of a giant, he has no strength at all: But besides this, their notion ends in ridiculous nonsense; as that only inanimate things can have liberty: A stone then, a stock, or the posts in the streets have it. A man certainly cannot, unless he is fast asleep, and does not so much as dream. [25] But enough of this; the particulars here intended follow.
The faculty of reason strongly implies Liberty. In the foregoing part, it was considered as the faculty in which it inher’d, as it was evidenced in the article of consideration. Here I take it in a different light, as a proof of its reality.
Reason in man is in lieu of instinctive direction. Man has but few instincts; and these only such as are for purposes prior to, or rather out of the province of reason; while more had been superfluous for a creature furnished with rational powers. Our frame is contriv’d, as every thing through universal nature is, with nothing wanting, nothing redundant. And our being endow’d with reason and understanding, instead of more instinctive powers, shows that we were ordain’d for self-direction, in conducting by the former: And in fact, we find that we determine frequently on action and conduct by consideration and reflection, without any instinctive impulse, further than self-love, which without the other, is blind in the human species.
Man is plainly form’d not only to provide as the sensitive hoarding species do, the necessaries of life, but to procure both them and the conveniences of life, to look beyond what sense and instinct can direct him, for this and other purposes; to take in by his understanding [26] large prospects; consider the effects and events of prosecuting excursions into them; and determining on the suitable conduct for his intentions. His understanding is accordingly analagous to a prospective glass, which furnishes views beyond what the eye unassisted could afford him; and which he is upon innumerable occasions, in wisdom and prudence oblig’d to make use of, or suffer for the neglect. This glass we may use, or refuse in supplying the mind with materials for conduct so peculiarly needful in the system of man, and no other ways provided for him: It is the mean, as before observed, by which he can occasionally change his mere animal motives, and whereby he is denominated free. Upon this occasion, I may be allowed to repeat, That our being naturally oblig’d to act in conformity to the judgments we procure by consideration, is no objection to our liberty; since this arises only in the consideration itself, which is prior to the judgment. The essence of our liberty consisting in that use of reason whereby we can occasionally turn our present determination into another channel.
In the next place the moral sense, or conscience, so universally found in our species, is a strong presumptive proof of liberty.
Every human creature has a sense of right and wrong, ought