An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. Francis Hutcheson

       Concerning some Powers of Perception, distinct from what is generally understood by Sensation.

      To make the following Observations understood, it may be necessary to premise some Definitions, and Observations, either universally acknowledg’d, or sufficiently prov’d by many Writers both ancient and modern, concerning our Perceptions called Sensations, and the Actions of the Mind consequent upon them.

      ||⁵Sensation.||

      Art. ||³I||. Those Ideas ||⁴which|| are rais’d in the Mind upon the presence of external Ob-[2]jects, and their acting upon our Bodys, are call’d Sensations. We find that the Mind in such Cases is passive, and has not Power directly to prevent the Perception or Idea, or to vary it at its Reception, as long as we continue our Bodys in a state fit to be acted upon by the external Object.

      Different Senses.

      II. When two Perceptions are entirely different from each other, or agree in nothing but the general Idea of Sensation, we call the Powers of receiving those different Perceptions, different Senses. Thus Seeing and Hearing denote the different Powers of receiving the Ideas of Colours and Sounds. And altho Colours have ||⁶vast|| Differences among themselves, as also have Sounds; yet there is a greater Agreement among the most opposite Colours, than between any Colour and a Sound: Hence we call all Colours Perceptions of the same Sense. All the several Senses seem to have their distinct Organs, except Feeling, which is in some degree diffus’d over the whole Body.

      The Mind how active.

      III. The Mind has a Power of compounding Ideas, ||⁷which|| were receiv’d separately; of comparing ||⁸their|| Objects by means of the Ideas, and of observing their Relations and Proportions; of enlarging and diminishing its Ideas at pleasure, or in any certain Ratio, or Degree; and of considering separately [3] each of the simple Ideas, which might perhaps have been impress’d jointly in the Sensation. This last Operation we commonly call Abstraction.

      Substances.

      IV. The Ideas of ||⁹Substances|| are compounded of the various simple Ideas jointly impress’d, when they presented themselves to our Senses. We define Substances only by enumerating these sensible Ideas: And such Definitions may ||¹⁰raise an Idea clear enough|| of the Substance in the Mind of one who never immediately perceiv’d the Substance; provided he has separately receiv’d by his Senses all the simple Ideas ||¹¹which|| are in the Composition of the complex one of the Substance defin’d: But if ||¹²there be any simple Ideas which he has not receiv’d, or if he wants any of the Senses necessary for the Perception of them, no Definition can raise any simple Idea which has not been before perceived by the Senses.||

      Education. Instruction.

      V.¹³ Hence it follows, “That when Instruction, Education, or Prejudice of any kind, raise any Desire or Aversion toward an Object, this Desire or Aversion must be founded upon an Opinion of some Perfection, or of some Deficiency in those Qualitys, for Perception of which we have the proper Senses.” Thus if Beauty be desir’d by one who has not the Sense of Sight, the Desire must be rais’d by some [4] apprehended Regularity of Figure, Sweetness of Voice, Smoothness, or Softness, or some other Quality perceivable by the other Senses, without relation to the Ideas of Colour.

      Pleasure. Pain.

      VI. Many of our sensitive Perceptions are pleasant, and many painful, immediately, and that without any knowledge of the Cause of this Pleasure or Pain, or how the Objects excite it, or are the Occasions of it; or without seeing to what further Advantage or Detriment the Use of such Objects might tend: Nor would the most accurate Knowledge of these things vary either the Pleasure or Pain of the Perception, however it might give a rational Pleasure distinct from the sensible; or might raise a distinct Joy, from ||¹⁴a|| prospect of further Advantage in the Object, or Aversion, from ||¹⁵an|| apprehension of Evil.

      Different Ideas.

      VII. The ||¹⁶simple|| Ideas rais’d in different Persons by the same Object, are probably ||¹⁷some way|| different, when they disagree in their Approbation or Dislike; and in the same Person, when his Fancy at one time differs from what it was at another. This will appear from reflecting on those Objects, to which we have now an Aversion, tho they were formerly agreeable: And we shall generally find that there is some accidental Conjunction of a disagreeable Idea, [5] which always recurs with the Object; as in those Wines ||¹⁸to|| which Men acquire an ||¹⁹Aversion||, after they have taken them in an Emetick Preparation: ||²⁰In this case|| we are conscious that the Idea is alter’d from what it was when that Wine was agreeable, by the Conjunction of the Ideas of Loathing and Sickness of Stomach. The like Change of Idea may be insensibly made by the Change of our Bodys, as we advance in Years, ||²¹or when we are accustomed to any Object,|| which may occasion an Indifference ||²²toward|| Meats we were fond of in our Childhood||^23a; and may make some Objects cease to raise the disagreeable Ideas, which they excited upon our first use of them. ||^24bMany of our simple Perceptions are disagreeable only thro the too great Intenseness of the Quality: thus moderate Light is agreeable, very strong Light may be painful; moderate Bitter may be pleasant, a higher Degree may be offensive. A Change in our Organs will necessarily occasion a Change in the Intenseness of the Perception at least; nay sometimes will occasion a quite contrary Perception: Thus a warm Hand shall feel that Water cold, which a cold hand ||^25cshall^c|| feel warm^ab||.

      We