Democracy, Liberty, and Property. Группа авторов
religion. Now I hold that religion is a matter exclusively between God and the individual; and “the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason or conviction; and thus, I repeat it, this right is in its nature an unalienable right, because it depends on the evidence as it strikes his mind; and consequently the result is what is his duty towards his Creator.” And therefore, as man owes supreme allegiance to God, as the Creator, and as the undivided governor of the universe, he cannot absolve himself, nor can others absolve him from this supreme allegiance; and hence, on entering into a social compact, the rights he gives up, and the powers he delegates must be tributary to, and in subordination to this high and first allegiance—and among the first enumeration of rights and duties in the present constitution of the Commonwealth, this principle is recognized: “It is the duty and the right of all men (says the constitution) to worship the Supreme Being, the great Creator and preserver of the universe, and none shall be molested or restrained for worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience, nor for his religious professions or sentiments.” This is reasonable, wise and just. In forming or revising the social compact, let us then take heed, that we do not insert or retain any principle, which by possible construction may interfere with, or abridge such sacred, such inestimable rights by an inquiry into opinions for which man is only accountable to his God. Social duties are between man and man. Religious duties are between God and the individual. While we are solicitous to “render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s”—take heed, I beseech you, that “you leave unto God, the things that are God’s.” Nor will the argument hold good that because during the forty years the test has been engrafted into and been in force under the present constitution, no extensive evils have presented themselves, and therefore it is inexpedient to expunge it from the constitution, lest it might be construed as an indirect abandonment of the cause of Christianity. On revising the constitution, every unnecessary point, even the most trivial, ought to be stricken out, and every possible evil guarded against. The American revolution fully recognizes this principle;—it was not the pressure of evils actually existing which induced the patriots of the revolution to resist the encroachments of Great Britain, but it was a dread of the consequences which they believed would result from submitting to the doctrines advanced by the mother country—hence, I repeat it, it is not from the multiplicity of cases which have occurred, whereby men of sterling integrity, pure morals and great strength of intellect may have been precluded from participating either in the advantages of office, or assisting in the public councils, but it is that by continuing this principle in the constitution you may preclude them… . I submit then the following positions, first, admitting the right, (which, however, I do not) of the citizens when forming a social compact to prescribe such terms as a majority may deem expedient and proper, yet I hold it to be unjust to introduce a principle into the compact which, while it provides that the individual shall afford his personal aid, and risk his life for the common defence and yield up all his property (if need be) for the maintenance of the government and its laws, yet virtually precludes him from participating in any of the advantages resulting from offices, or from any share in the administration of the government, because he differs on a subject with which society has but a doubtful right to interfere; although in point of morality and strength of intellect he shines as “a star of the first magnitude.” Secondly—I hold that this act of injustice toward the individual is neither politic nor expedient; first, because as before observed, it may deprive society of talent and moral excellence, which should always be secured and cherished as one of the best means of preserving the prosperity of the Commonwealth; and secondly, while it may thus exclude men possessing such useful and amiable qualification, yet it is no effectual safeguard whereby to keep out ambitious, unprincipled men from office, or a seat in the public councils. And, I moreover hold, that the cause of Christianity doth not require such a qualification to support it. This religion is founded on a rock and supported by a power which humanity cannot affect—it does not want the secular arm to defend it—its divine origin, and its own intrinsic merit, ever have been, and ever will be, its firmest support. What have the powers of the world to do with such a religion? Experience has demonstrated that when left to the umpire of reason and of argument, it has triumphed the most brilliantly over the attacks of infidelity. Inquisitions, test acts and fanaticism, with their gibbets—their racks—and their faggots, may produce martyrs and hypocrites, but such writers as Watson1 and Paley have displayed its true character by arguments, which have put infidelity in the entire back ground. And may I not add from experience that in those countries where there are religious tests, they have not been productive of any advantage; even in that nation from whom many of us derived our origin, and where, in addition to a test act, the most solemn of the Christian ordinances are obliged to be adhered to as an additional qualification for office—there is either an almost total evasion, or the compliance is often made under circumstances which, while it gives pain to many a serious Christian, excites mirth in the breast of every infidel. I also believe the qualifications of candidates ought to be confided to the electors, who generally take them from the neighborhood, and will therefore be the best judges of their moral and mental powers, and should it unfortunately happen that an unfit citizen has been introduced into office—the electors, so long as virtue, patriotism and Christianity predominate, will avail themselves of the frequency of elections to obtain a remedy by a change of character; and that the evil will be much sooner remedied than if it is left to be done through the crucible of a test act. I moreover think, that while the scriptures seem to reprobate the presumption of demanding, and the fallacy of trusting, to mere professions of faith, they plainly point to the policy of preferring a trust in moral worth and excellence… . In making the aforegoing observations, I hope it will not be considered as in any manner intending to weaken the cause of Christianity or of aiding the cause of infidelity. I make them because I verily believe, in forming or revising the social compact, we ought wholly to exclude every principle which by possible construction may interfere with the consciences of men, thereby leaving them and their religious opinions where alone they ought to be left, “to Him who searcheth the heart and knows our inmost thoughts.”2 Whether the individual has or has not formed a correct religious opinion is nothing to us, as civilians.
“For modes of faith, let graceless zealots fight,
His can’t be wrong whose life is in the right.”3
Indeed, sir, I think that so far from injuring of the Christian cause, I am aiding it—when doubting men are left to the freedom of their own wills, they will be the more apt to listen to the arguments in support of Christianity than when shackled by test acts, or any other interference of the civil government… . Believing then sir, as I verily do, that to retain any religious test, however liberal, is neither required for the safety of religion, nor for the safety of the Commonwealth; that it is unjust in principle—fallacious as to the effect to be produced—pernicious in its consequences—and an unwarrantable assumption of the unalienable rights of a citizen, and also that it is repugnant to one of the most essential moral precepts of Christianity which inculcates, “that whatsoever I would that men should do unto me, this I ought to do unto them”; I hope the principle to which I have alluded will be left out of the constitution, now that we are called to revise it… .
… MR. TUCKERMAN of Chelsea observed that he supposed the question now before the committee to be, whether the religious test in the constitution of 1780, shall be retained, or whether the resolutions now proposed by the select committee shall be adopted. He observed that, at the hazard of being accused of bigotry, and narrowness of mind, he must take the ground of defence of the constitution on this subject, as it now stands. He said that, in reflecting upon the test, he had not anticipated the suggestion of any doubt concerning the right, should this Convention have the disposition, to retain it. The constitution declares every man to be eligible to all the high offices of the State, on the condition of certain prescribed qualifications. Yet if there was any probability that any people of color would be elected to fill either of these offices, he presumed that no doubt would be felt, either as to the right, or the propriety, of their exclusion. There would, without doubt, be a provision in the constitution for their exclusion; or, it would be required, that these offices should be holden only by the white inhabitants of the Commonwealth. And if, as is without doubt a fact, ninety-nine out of a hundred of the people of this Commonwealth are in their faith