Selections from Three Works. Francisco Suárez
becomes easily evident through a process of induction, with respect both to natural law and to the positive divine laws. Neither is there any force in the objection that through these laws God frequently provides for the private welfare of this or that individual; as when through the law of penance He provides for the salvation of the sinner himself, and as in other cases. This objection, I repeat, has no force. For, in the first place, the good of private individuals (as I shall shortly point out in greater detail) forms a part of the common good, when the former is not of a nature to exclude the latter good; being rather such that it is a necessary requisite in individuals—by virtue of the law in question as it is applied to individuals—in order that the common good may result from this good enjoyed by private persons. Moreover, and in the second place, the divine laws relate principally to eternal bliss, which is in itself a common good, and which is striven after, essentially
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and for its own sake, by every individual without regard to any community other [than the eternal]. Wherefore, St. Thomas has said (Summa, Pt. I, qu. 23, art. 7 and qu. 98, art. 1) that the multiplication of human souls, even though it results only in a difference in their number, is not simply an incidental effect, but one that is sought for its own sake in view of the immortality of those souls and their capacity for happiness.
4. With respect to human laws, indeed, of whatsoever order, the reason [supporting the conclusion set forth in Section 2] may be inferred from the essential condition of law discussed in the preceding [chapter]. For just as laws are imposed upon a community, so should they be made principally for the good of that community, since otherwise, they would be inordinate. This is true because it would be contrary to every consideration of rectitude that the common good should be subordinated to the private good, or the whole accommodated to a part for the sake of the latter; and therefore, since law is made for a community, it should of its very nature be directed primarily to the good of the community.
Again, an excellent argument may be deduced in connexion with the ends [of law]. For ends should be in due proportion to acts, and to the original principles of and faculties pertaining to those acts; but law is the common rule of moral operations; consequently, the first principle of moral operations should also be the first principle of law; but their final end—that is to say, happiness—is the first principle of moral actions, since in moral matters the end to be attained is the principle of action, so that the final end is [also] the first principle of such acts; and the common good, or happiness of the state, is the final end of that state, in its own sphere; hence, this common good should be the first principle of [human] law; and therefore, law should exist for the sake of the common good. This reasoning is very nearly the same as the reasoning of St. Thomas (I.–II, qu. 90, art. 2); and it finds excellent illustration through the teachings of St. Augustine, where (On the City of God, Bk. XIX, chap. xvi) he infers from the due relationship of the part to the whole, and of one household to the state (of which, as he says, [the household] is the beginning or minute element), that domestic peace is related to civil peace. And he adds: ‘Thus it is that the paterfamilias ought to derive from the law of the state, those precepts by means of which he so governs his household that
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it accords with the civil peace.’ And therefore—so Augustine holds—it is far more obligatory that the laws of the state should serve the common peace and the good of the state.
5. Another reason is clearly to be derived from the origin of human law. For the governing power that resides in men flows either immediately from God, as in the case of spiritual power, or immediately from men themselves, as in the case of purely temporal power; but, in both instances, this power has been primarily given for the general good of the community; and therefore, that good should be held in view, in the process of lawmaking.
The truth of the minor premiss in so far as relates to the first statement, on spiritual power, is evident from the Scriptures: since it is for this very reason that Prelates are called shepherds (who should lay down their lives for their sheep), stewards (not masters), and ministers of God (not primary causes); consequently, they are bound to conform to the divine purpose, in the exercise of such power; but the principal purpose toward which God works, is the common good of men themselves; therefore His ministers also are bound to serve this end; and accordingly, the Scriptures rebuke with the utmost severity those persons who abuse that power for their private advantage. When, on the other hand, the power has been granted directly by men themselves, it is most evident that it has been granted not for the advantage of the prince but for the common good of those who have conferred it; and for this reason, kings are called the ministers of the state. It is to be noted that they are also the ministers of God, according to a passage in Romans (Chap. xiii [, vv. 4, 6]), and these words from the Book of Wisdom (Chap. vi [, v. 5]): ‘Because being ministers of his kingdom’, &c.… Therefore, they should use that power for the good of the state, from which and for the sake of which they have received it. Thus it is that Basil (Homily XII: On Proverbs, at the beginning [No. 2, near end]) has rightly said that a tyrant differs from a king in this respect, namely, that the former in his rule seeks after his own advantage, the latter, after the common advantage. Aristotle (Ethics, Bk. VIII, chap. x and Politics, Bk. III, chap. v [chap. vii, 1279 A B]) writes to the same effect; and St. Thomas (II.–II, qu. 42, art. 2, ad 3 and De Regimine Principum, Bk. III, chap. xi) agrees with this view.
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Now the first consequent is proved by the fact that one of the principal acts of the power in question is law. For law is (so to speak) an instrument by means of which the prince exercises a moral influence upon the state, in order that he may govern it; and therefore, law should serve the common good of that same state.
6. Objection. It may be objected, however, in opposition to the condition in question, that there are many laws which are ordered to the good of private individuals; as, for example, the laws made in behalf of wards, those in behalf of soldiers, and similar laws. Wherefore, in the Digest (I. i. 1 [, § 2]) and in the Institutes (I. i, § 4), a distinction is made between two kinds of laws: those which are ordered to the general good, or the welfare of the state; and, on the other hand, those which relate to the private good of individuals. Moreover, the Digest (I. iv. 1 [, § 2]) also contains the statement that certain laws are of a personal nature, with an effect that is limited to the individual for this reason, namely, that they are made solely for his benefit. This is especially evident in the case of privileges, to which the Decretum (Pt. I, dist. III, can. iii) refers as private laws since, assuredly, they are granted for the private advantage of the persons on whom they are conferred; therefore, not all laws are ordered to the common good.
From yet another standpoint, it would seem insufficient that laws should be directed to the common good. For frequently they redound to the harm and detriment of many persons; yet evil should not be done that good may result, nor should certain persons be enriched at the expense of other persons, according to a rule of the Sext (Bk. V, tit. XII, rule xlviii). The major premiss is clearly true when, as a first example, many kingdoms are subject to one and the same king; for a law which is useful to one kingdom often is harmful to another, and the same situation may occur within a single kingdom, among its different cities. Again, the law of prescription, in order that it may endow one person with ownership of a given possession, deprives the true owner of his possession. Frequently, too, that which seems advantageous to the community is onerous and troublesome to a great number of private persons; and indeed, the laws at times inflict evil directly upon certain individuals, as is the case with punitive laws.
7. The objection is answered. To the first part of this objection, the various authors make varying replies, as does Navarrus, above (On Ends,
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Nos. 28 and 29). In my opinion, however, the matter is clear and may easily be explained by the application of a double distinction.
The first [member of this distinction] relates to a twofold common good enjoyed by the state. One phase of this good is that which is of itself and primarily common, being subject not to the dominion of any private person but to that of the whole community, for whose use or enjoyment it is directly ordered. Examples of this form of good are temples or sacred things, magistracies, common pastures or meadows, and the like, mentioned in the