Principles of Equity. Henry Home, Lord Kames

Principles of Equity - Henry Home, Lord Kames


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so framed, in order to act the part that is allotted him in this life. The unhappy progress of selfishness, especially among commercial nations, is a favourite topic of declamation; and facts are accumulated without end to inforce that topic. It would be no difficult task to produce instances, not less numerous, of benevolence, generosity, and disinterestedness. In the midst of these opposite instances, what can any sensible person fairly conclude, but that the social and selfish principles are, by divine wisdom, so blended as to fit man for his present state? But supposing selfishness to prevail in action, it certainly prevails not in sentiment, nor in affection: all men equally conspire to put a high estimation upon generosity, benevolence, and other social qualities; while even the most selfish are disgusted with selfishness in others, and can scarce be reconciled to it in themselves. Another fact, equally worthy of attention, proceeds from the same cause with the former. Laying aside particular prejudices arising from love or hatred, good fortune happening to any one is agreeable to all, and bad fortune happening to any one is disagreeable to all. Hence effects or events, whether produced by the operation of the laws of matter, or by the actions of self-motive beings, may be distinguished into three kinds, viz. agreeable, disagreeable, and indifferent. Beneficial effects or events are agreeable: hurtful effects or events are disagreeable: and those that are neither beneficial nor hurtful, are indifferent.

      [print edition page xxxviii]

      These preliminaries lead directly to the true foundation of morality, <4> which foundation is discovered upon taking under consideration effects or events produced by human actions. An agreeable effect or event produced intentionally by acting, is perceived by all to be good:* a disagreeable effect or event produced intentionally by acting, is perceived by all to be ill: and an indifferent effect or event is not in our perception either good or ill. These perceptions of good and of ill are the primary moral perceptions, with which, as will be seen afterward, every other moral perception is intimately connected.

      In an attempt to investigate the true foundation of morality, an effect or event, being the end for which we act, presents itself first to the mind as its capital object: an action is only a mean employ’d to produce some effect or event, and means are always subordinate to the end. For this reason, I thought it necessary to vary from other writers upon moral philosophy, who begin with actions as the capital object, without giving due attention to the ends for which we act.

      Good and ill, like agreeable and disagreeable, bitter and sweet, hard and soft, are simple qualities, incapable of a definition; and, like these, and all other qualities, are objects of perception, independent of consequences, and independent of reasoning or reflection. I illustrate this doctrine by the following examples: We require no argument to prove, that children of the poor bred to useful employments by means of a charitable endowment, an infant rescued from the jaws of a lion, a sick person restored to health, the hungry fed, and the naked clothed, are good effects; they are perceived to be such intuitively: an argument is as little necessary to prove, that an old man abandoned to poverty by his favourite son in opulent circumstances, a virtuous young woman corrupted by artifice, are ill effects; and that breach of engagement, and harm done to one who dreads

      [print edition page xxxix]

      no harm from us, are equally so: these effects are perceived intuitively to be ill.

      Next as to actions considered as means productive of effects. To the qualities of good and ill in effects, correspond the qualities of right and wrong in actions: An agreeable effect produced intentionally, is perceived to be good; and the action by which it is produced, is perceived to be right: a disagreeable effect produced intentionally <5> is perceived to be ill; and the action by which it is produced, is perceived to be wrong.* And as it will be seen afterward, that some effects are perceived to be ill without being intended; it will also be seen, that the actions by which such effects are produced, are perceived to be wrong.

      An action is perceived to be right or wrong according to the effect intended, whether the effect follow or not. Thus, if to save my friend from being drowned, I plunge into a river, the action is right though I come too late: and if I aim a stroke at a man behind his back, the action is wrong though I happen not to touch him.

      It holds in actions as in effects: good effects are a species of agreeable effects, and right actions a species of agreeable actions: ill effects are a species of disagreeable effects, and wrong actions a species of disagreeable actions.

      Thus, right and wrong, like good and ill, and all other qualities, are objects of perception or intuition; and supposing them hid from our perception, an attempt to discover them by reasoning would be absurd; not less so, than such an attempt with respect to beauty or colour, or with respect to the external objects to which these qualities belong.

      For the sake of perspicuity, the foregoing observations are confined to the simplest case, that of an effect or event produced intentionally. When we afterward descend to particulars, there will be occasion to show, first, That if in acting we foresee the probability of a disagreeable effect, though

      [print edition page xl]

      without intending it, the effect in that case is perceived to be ill, and the action to be wrong; but not in such a degree as when intended: and, next, That if the disagreeable effect, though not foreseen, might have been foreseen, it is also perceived to be ill, and the action wrong, though in a still lower degree.

      As instinctive actions are caused by blind instinct, without the least view to consequences, they are not perceived to be right or <6> wrong, but indifferent: and the effects produced by them may be agreeable or disagreeable; but they are not perceived to be good or ill; they are also indifferent.

      Right actions are distinguishable into two kinds, viz. what ought to be done, and what may be done or left undone. Wrong actions are all of one sort, viz. what ought not to be done. Right actions that may be done or left undone, are, from our very conception of them, a matter of choice: they are right when done; but it is not a wrong to leave them undone. Thus, to remit a just debt for the sake of a growing family; to yield a subject in controversy, rather than go to law with a neighbour; generously to return good for ill, are right actions, universally approved: yet every man is sensible, that such actions are left to his free will, and that he is not bound to perform any of them.

      Actions that ought to be done, as well as actions that ought not to be done, merit peculiar attention; because they give occasion to the moral terms duty and obligation; which come next in order. To say that an action ought to be done, means that we have no liberty nor choice, but are necessarily tied or obliged to perform: and to say that an action ought not to be done, means that we are necessarily restrained from doing it. Though this necessity be moral only, not physical; yet we conceive ourselves deprived by it of liberty and choice, and bound to act, or to forbear acting, in opposition to every other motive. The necessity here described is termed duty: the abstaining from harming the innocent is a proper example; which the moral sense makes an indispensable duty, without leaving a single article of it to our own free will.

      If I be bound in duty to perform or to forbear any particular action, there must be a title or right in some person to exact that duty from me; and accordingly a duty or obligation necessarily implies a title or right.

      [print edition page xli]

      Thus, the duty of abstaining from mischief implies a right in others to be secured against mischief: the man who does an injury, perceives that he has done wrong by violating the right of the person injured; and that person hath a perception of suffering wrong by having his right violated.

      Our duty is two-fold; duty to others, and duty to ourselves. With respect to others, an action that we ought to do is termed just; an action that we ought not to do is termed unjust; and the omission of what we ought to do is also termed unjust. With respect to ourselves, an action that we ought to do is termed proper; and an action that <7> we ought not to do, as well as the omission of what we ought to do, are termed improper.

      Thus, right, signifying a quality of certain actions, is a genus, of which just and proper are species:


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