The Principles of Natural and Politic Law. Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui
men to become happy. This also implies that persons involved in legislation should have a more solid understanding of what makes the subjects virtuous and happy than the uneducated citizens generally have themselves. For Burlamaqui, the science of natural law is in effect a science of happiness. In all of these views, Burlamaqui defends a different understanding of politics and law than most Pufendorfians.11
Burlamaqui’s distinct approach to natural law is also obvious in his opposition to Pufendorf ’s and Hobbes’s claim that all obligation derives from the commands of a superior.12 Burlamaqui argues that reason provides a simple rule for man by pointing out to him the shortest route to his happiness. This rule brings with it what Burlamaqui sometimes terms “primitive obligation” (I.i.5 §9). As the term indicates, all other sorts of obligation are ultimately derived from the primitive rule. The reason why men ought to obey the natural laws, then, is not that God has commanded such obedience. It is rather that God is more competent at providing a legislation conducive to human happiness than we are ourselves. This makes reason as the judge of the means to happiness the real source of obligation, not (divine) will. Although the commands of a legitimate superior add an external component to obligation, they do so only by adding stronger motives for obeying, that is, by providing sanctions for the laws (I.ii.7 §13).
Burlamaqui’s approach to obligation, which he articulates, for example, in his chapter “Of the Foundation of Sovereignty, or the Right of Commanding” (I.i.9), implies that the obligation to obey a law or a sovereign must be explained in terms of the motives that make a person desire to obey. Pufendorf by contrast drew a sharp distinction between the motives working on the human will on the one hand and moral obligation or duty on the other. This distinction was further emphasized by Barbeyrac in his replies to Leibniz’s famous critique of Pufendorf ’s principles: the natural laws impose absolute duties, telling us what we must do, not what we desire to do.13 Burlamaqui rejects Pufendorf ’s and Barbeyrac’s approach to moral obligation. Rather than restraints by a superior, the laws of nature are the rational egoist’s principles for finding the shortest road to felicity. In many respects, Burlamaqui’s understanding of the natural laws is closer to Leibniz, or to medieval natural law theory, than it is to the Pufendorfian tradition.
In his political theory Burlamaqui stands out, together with Barbeyrac, as one of the early modern natural law theorists with something resembling a theory of human rights. According to Harvey, “Burlamaqui was the first modern philosopher to enumerate happiness as a natural right—a right which forms the basis of the state.”14 Burlamaqui in fact holds that all men have a “right of endeavoring to provide for their safety and happiness, and of employing force and arms against those who declare themselves their enemies” (II.iv.1 §5). Yet, as we have seen, the obvious way to pursue happiness is to submit to the rule of the ablest. The Genevan citizen has an inalienable right to pursue his own felicity by submitting to the small council’s expert decisions.15 The sovereign, conversely, not only has a duty to hinder men from harming each other but must through legislation and education also ensure that the citizens become happy and virtuous.16 This gives the state a role as moral tutor of the individual that Pufendorf had consistently denied it.17 In spite of his copious use of Pufendorf ’s and Barbeyrac’s words, Burlamaqui in fact rejects or alters the legacy of his predecessors in fundamental respects.
Petter Korkman
Note on the Text
The present edition is based on the text of the 1763 London edition. The original spelling of the translation has been retained, but typographical errors have been silently removed. Footnotes have been added to point out passages where the translation differs from the original. In addition, the editor has added footnotes to help the reader perceive when Burlamaqui’s paragraphs are taken verbatim from, or reproduce, the central content of passages in the DHC, DNG, and DGP. Page breaks in the 1763 edition are indicated by the use of angle brackets. For example, page 112 begins after<112>.
This work has been completed in the supportive and friendly atmosphere of the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies. I am grateful to colleagues at the Collegium and elsewhere for helpful discussions both within the framework of our conference on the history of rights discourse and in numerous private conversations. Special thanks go to Timo Kaitaro for important observations on a number of topics and to Juha Himanka for an unfailing ability to apply surprising perspectives. I am also grateful to Klaus Karttunen for expert assistance with Greek quotations and to Sari Kivistö for answering my questions concerning some of the Latin quotations. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to Knud Haakonssen, friend and editor of this series, for his patience, his friendly encouragement, and his untiring professionalism. Thanks also go to Åsa Söderman, to Liberty Fund’s indexer, and to production editor Diana Francoeur.
I am grateful to members of the international Pufendorf circles with whom I have discussed my views on Burlamaqui and Barbeyrac, in particular Kari Saastamoinen, Knud Haakonssen, Ian Hunter, Hans Blom, and Tim Hochstrasser.
I was supported in one manner by the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, the Academy of Finland, and the Ella and Georg Ehrnrooth Foundation, and in another by Leena, Elsa, Lisa, and Kaius. Thank you.
VOLUME 1 THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW
THE
PRINCIPLES
OF
NATURAL and POLITIC
LAW,
IN TWO VOLUMES,
By J. J. BURLAMAQUI,
Counsellor of State, and late Professor of NATURAL
and CIVIL LAW at GENEVA.
Translated into ENGLISH by Mr. NUGENT.
The SECOND EDITION, revised and corrected.
VOL. I.
LONDON,
printed for J. NOURSE, Bookseller in Ordinary to his
MAJESTY.
To Dr. MEAD.
Sir,
To intrude in this manner upon your time, so usefully employed in the duties of your profession, would expose me in some measure to blame, were it upon a less important occasion than that of recommending the following work to your generous protection. The dignity of the subject, which, handled by other pens, has been thought worthy of being inscribed to the most illustrious personages of the last and present age, will plead, I hope, some excuse for an address, which is designed not so much to interrupt your occupations, as to avail itself of the sanction of your name in introducing this work to the public. And indeed a nobler subject I could not select for the favour of your acceptance, than that which so nearly relates to the moral duties of life, and the foundation of human contentment and happiness; a subject moreover illustrated by one of the ablest masters of the present age, whose extraordinary ability and skill in curing the disorders of the mind, may be compared very aptly to yours in removing those of the body.1 One of the principal encouragements I had to this address, is the near relation between the following work, and those elevated sentiments with which you have been always inspired. Such an admirable system of moral precepts, such noble maxims of true Christian policy, and such excellent rules for the government of our lives, cannot but be acceptable to a gentleman, who, in the whole tenor of his conduct, has been an illustrious example of those rules and maxims which are here most judiciously established. A very good opportunity this of entering upon the encomium of those virtues which have so eminently distinguished you at the head of your profession; but the little value any commendations of mine would have, the apprehension I should be under of being suspected of adulation, and the danger I should incur of offending your modesty, obliges me to wave any attempt of this nature. However, I cannot help taking notice of that true magnificence