A Methodical System of Universal Law. Johann Gottlieb Heineccius
killing another in defence of his honour and reputation, e.g. for a box on the ear, or some more slight injury, is more difficult. But tho’ nothing be more valuable, life only excepted, than honour; and therefore some think, that in this case violent self-defence is not unlawful; (see Grotius of the rights of war and peace, 2. 1. 10.) yet because the danger of losing life, or other things upon an equal footing with life, alone give us the right to blameless self-defence (§186); and because honour and reputation are not lost by an injury done to us; and there are not wanting in civil governments lawful means of revenging an injury; we cannot choose but assent to their opinion, who prudently affirm, that the right of violent self-defence ceases in these cases.
SECTION CLXXXVIII
No person ought to be injured with regard to his understanding.
Again, the absolute duty of not hurting any person extends no less to the mind than to the body (§178), and the faculties of the mind are will and understanding: as to the first therefore, none can deny that he greatly injures a person, who seduces into error a young person, or any one of less acute parts than himself by falshood and specious sophistry; or who prepossesses any one with false opinions, or he who, even by a tedious disagreeable method of teaching, or affected severity, begets, in any one committed to his charge, an aversion to truth and the study of wisdom.* <133>
SECTION CLXXXIX
Nor with respect to the will.
Now because that injury done to the will, which is called corruption, is no less detrimental to one; the consequence is, that they act contrary to their duty who corrupt any person, by alluring him to pursue unlawful pleasures, or to commit any vice, and either by vitious discourse or example, debauch his mind; or when they have it in their power, and ought to restrain one from a vitious action, and reclaim him into the right course of life, either do it not, or set not about it with that serious concern which becomes them; but, on the contrary, do all that lies in them to forward him in his vitious carrier.* <134>
SECTION CXC
Nor with respect to the body.
Since it is not more allowable to hurt one’s body than his mind (§178), it is certainly unlawful to beat, strike, hurt, injure, wound any one in any manner or degree, or to maim any member or part of his body; to torment him by starving, pinching, shackling him, or in any other way; or by taking from him, or diminishing any of the things he stands in need of in order to live agreeably and comfortably; or, in one word, to do any thing to any one by which his body, which he received from nature sound and intire, can, by the malice or fault of another, suffer any wrong or detriment. Because since we ourselves certainly are so abhorrent of all these things, that death itself does not appear less cruel to us than such injuries do; surely what we would not have done to ourselves by others, we ought not to do to them, and we must, for that very reason, or by that very feeling, know that we ought not to do so to them.* <135>
SECTION CXCI
Nor in respect of fame and reputation.
As to the state or condition of man, to this article chiefly belongs reputation, not only a simple good name, or being looked upon not as a bad person, but likewise the superior reputation one deserves by his superior merits above others; (for of wealth and possessions, which cannot be conceived without dominion or property, we are afterwards to speak). Now, seeing one’s fame cannot but be hurt by calumnies (§154), or deeds and words tending to disgrace one, which we call injuries; it is as clear and certain that we ought to abstain from all these, as it is, that we ourselves take them in very ill part.*
SECTION CXCII
Nor in respect of chastity.
Besides, the condition of a person may be wronged in respect of chastity, because being thus corrupted by violence, or by flattery, one’s good name suffers, and the tranquillity of families is disturbed, (§178); whence it is plain, that we ought not to lay snares against one’s chastity, and that all uncleanness, whether violently forced, or voluntary; and much more, adultery, and other such abominable, cruel injuries, are absolutely contrary to the law of nature.† <136>
SECTION CXCIII
One may be injured by thoughts, gestures, words, and deeds.
From what hath been said, it is plain enough that a person may be wronged even by internal actions; i.e. by thoughts intended to one’s prejudice, as well as by external actions, as gestures, words, and deeds (§18); whence it follows, that even hatred, contempt, envy, and other such vices of the mind, are repugnant to the law of nature. And that we ought to abstain from all gestures shewing hatred, contempt, or envy, and what may give the least disturbance to the mind of any person. But that hurt, which consists in words and deeds, is accounted greatest (in foro humano) in human courts of judicature.* <137>
SECTION CXCIV
The faculty of speech distinguishes man above the brute creation.
Because a person may be hurt by words or discourse (§193), it is worth while to enquire a little more accurately into our duties with relation to speech. For such is the bounty of the kind author of nature towards us, that he hath not only given us minds to perceive, judge and reason, and to pursue good, but likewise the faculty of communicating our sentiments to others, that they may know our thoughts and inclinations. For tho’ the brutes, we see, can express, by neighing, hissing, grunting, bellowing, and other obscure ways, their feelings,* yet to man is given the superior faculty of distinctly signifying his thoughts by words, and thus making his mind certainly known to others. <138>
SECTION CXCV
What discourse is.
Seeing what peculiarly distinguishes us from the brutes, with relation to speech, consists in our being able clearly to communicate our thoughts to others, (§193), which experience tells us we do by articulate sounds;†i.e. by sounds so diversified by our organs of speech as to form different words, by which all things, and all their affections and properties or modes may be expressed; therefore discourse is articulated sound, by which we impart the thoughts of our minds to others distinctly and clearly. <139>
SECTION CXCVI
How it ought to be employed.
From this definition it is obvious enough, that the faculty of speech is given us, not for the sake of God, nor of brutes, but for our own advantage, and that of our kind; and therefore, that God wills that by it we should communicate our thoughts to others agreeably to the love he requires of us: for which reason, he wills that we should not injure any one by our discourse, but employ it, as far as is in our power, to our own benefit, and the advantage of others.*
SECTION CXCVII
We ought to use words in their received signification.
The design of discourse being to communicate our sentiments to others (§196), which is done by articulate sounds, denominating things, and their affections, modes, qualities, and properties (§195); it follows, that being to speak to others, we ought not to affix any meaning to words but what they are intended and used to signify in common discourse; <140> or if we make use of uncommon words, or employ them in a less ordinary acceptation, we ought accurately to explain our mind. But no person has reason to be displeased, if we use words in a sense they have been taken in by those acquainted with languages, or which is received at the present time, if the construction of words and other circumstances admit of it.
SECTION CXCVIII
No person ought to be wronged by discourse.
And since God wills that we communicate the sentiments of our mind to others by speech, agreeably to the love of others he requires of us by his law (§196); which love does not permit us to hurt any person by our discourse: but it is to injure a person, to detract any thing from his perfection or felicity (§82): hence it follows, that we ought, not to hide from any one any thing, the knowledge of which