The American Commonwealth. Viscount James Bryce

The American Commonwealth - Viscount James Bryce


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be reduced in proportion to the number of adult male citizens disqualified in that state. As a state desires to have its full weight in national politics, it has a strong motive for the widest possible enlargement of its federal franchise, and this implies a corresponding width in its domestic franchise.

      The number of members of the legislature varies greatly from state to state. Delaware, with seventeen senators, has the smallest Senate, Minnesota, with sixty-three, the largest. Delaware has also the smallest House of Representatives, consisting of thirty-five members; while New Hampshire, a very small state, has the largest with 389. The New York houses number 51 and 150 respectively, those of Pennsylvania 50 and 201, those of Massachusetts 40 and 240. In the Western and Southern states the number of representatives rarely exceeds 120.15

      As there is a reason for everything in the world, if one could but find it out, so for this difference between the old New England states and those newer states which in many other points have followed their precedents. In the New England states local feeling was and is intensely strong, and every little town wanted to have its member. In the West and South, local divisions have had less natural life; in fact, they are artificial divisions rather than genuine communities that arose spontaneously. Hence the same reason did not exist in the West and South for having a large assembly; while the distrust of representatives, the desire to have as few of them as possible and pay them as little as possible, have been specially strong motives in the West and South, as also in New York and Pennsylvania, and have caused a restriction of numbers.

      

      In all states the members of both houses receive salaries, which in some cases are fixed at an annual sum of from $150 (Maine) to $1,500 (New York), the average being $500. More frequently, however, it is calculated at so much for every day during which the session lasts, varying from $1 (in Rhode Island) to $8 (in California and Nevada) per day ($5 seems to be the average), besides a small allowance, called mileage, for travelling expenses. These sums, although unremunerative to a man who leaves a prosperous profession or business to attend in the state capital, are an object of such desire to many of the representatives of the people, that the latter have thought it prudent to restrict the length of the legislative sessions, which now generally stand limited to a fixed number of days, varying from 40 days in Georgia, Nebraska, and Oregon, to 150 days in Pennsylvania. The states which pay by the day are also those which limit the session. Some states secure themselves against prolonged sessions by providing that the daily pay shall diminish, or shall absolutely cease and determine, at the expiry of a certain number of days, hoping thereby to expedite business and check inordinate zeal for legislation.16

      It was formerly usual for the legislature to meet annually, but the experience of bad legislation and over legislation has led to fewer as well as shorter sittings; and sessions are now biennial in all states except two (Alabama and Mississippi)17 where they are quadrennial, and in the six following: Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, all of them old states. In these the sessions are annual, save in that odd little nook Rhode Island, which still convokes her legislature every May at Newport, and afterwards holds an adjourned session at Providence, the other chief city of the commonwealth. There is, however, in nearly all states a power reserved to the governor to summon the houses in extraordinary session should a pressing occasion arise, but the provisions for daily pay do not usually apply to these extra sessions.18

      Bills may originate in either house, save that in most states money bills must originate in the House of Representatives, a rule for which, in the present condition of things, when both houses are equally directly representative of the people and chosen by the same electors, no sufficient ground appears. It is a curious instance of the wish which animated the framers of the first constitutions of the original thirteen states to reproduce the details of the English Constitution that had been deemed bulwarks of liberty. The newer states borrowed it from their elder sisters, and the existence of a similar provision in the federal Constitution has no doubt helped to perpetuate it in all the states. But there is a reason for it in Congress, the federal Senate not being directly representative of equal numbers of citizens, which is not found in the state legislatures; it is in these last a mere survival of no present functional value. Money bills may, however, be amended or rejected by the state Senates like any other bills, just as the federal Senate amends money bills brought up from the House.

      In one point a state Senate enjoys a special power, obviously modelled on that of the English House of Lords and the federal Senate. It sits as a court under oath for the trial of state officials impeached by the House.19 Like the federal Senate, it has in many states the power of confirming or rejecting appointments to office made by the governor. When it considers these it is said to “go into executive session.” The power is an important one in those states which allow the governor to nominate the higher judges. In other respects the powers and procedure of the two houses of a state legislature are identical;20 except that, whereas the lieutenant-governor of a state is generally ex officio president of the Senate, with a casting vote therein, the House always chooses its own Speaker. The legal quorum is usually fixed, by the constitution, at a majority of the whole number of members elected,21 though a smaller number may adjourn and compel the attendance of absent members. Both houses do most of their work by committees, much after the fashion of Congress,22 and the committees are in both usually chosen by the Speaker (in the Senate by the president of that body), though it is often provided that the House (or Senate) may on motion vary their composition.23 Both houses sit with open doors, but in most states the constitution empowers them to exclude strangers when the business requires secrecy.

      The state governor has of course no right to dissolve the legislature, nor even to adjourn it unless the houses, while agreeing to adjourn, disagree as to the date. Such control as the legislature can exercise over the state officers by way of inquiry into their conduct is generally exercised by committees, and it is in committees that the form of bills is usually settled and their fate decided, just as in the federal Congress. The proceedings are rarely reported. Sometimes when a committee takes evidence on an important question reporters are present, and the proceedings more resemble a public meeting than a legislative session. In some states when a bill is referred to a committee any citizen of the state may appear and give evidence for or against it, so that ample security is taken for the ascertainment of public sentiment and for enabling all private interests affected to state their case. This liberty is largely used in Massachusetts, and with excellent results. It need scarcely be added that neither house separately, nor both houses acting together, can control an executive officer otherwise than either by passing a statute prescribing a certain course of action for him, which if it be in excess of their powers will be held unconstitutional and void, or by withholding the appropriations necessary to enable him to carry out the course of action he proposes to adopt. The latter method, where applicable, is the more effective, because it can be used by a bare majority of either house, whereas a bill passed by both houses may be vetoed by the governor, a point so important as to need a few words.

      One state only, North Carolina, still vests legislative authority in the legislature alone. All the rest now require a bill to be submitted to the governor, and permit him to return it to the legislature with his objections. If he so returns it, it can only be again passed “over the veto” by something more than a bare majority. To so pass a bill over the veto there is required:

      In one state (Connecticut) a majority in each house

      In eight states a majority in each house of all the members elected to that house

      In three states a majority of three-fifths in each house of all the members elected

      In eight states a majority of two-thirds in each house of all the members present

      In twenty-seven states a majority of two-thirds of all the members elected

      In one state (Massachusetts) two-thirds of the elected members of the house in which the bill originated, and two-thirds of the members present in the other house

      In one state (Virginia) two-thirds of the members present and a majority of those elected in each house

      Here, therefore, as in the federal Constitution, we find a useful safeguard against the unwisdom


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