Urban Warfare in the Twenty-First Century. Anthony King

Urban Warfare in the Twenty-First Century - Anthony  King


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(print) | LCCN 2020053372 (ebook) | ISBN 9781509543656 (hardback) | ISBN 9781509543663 (paperback) | ISBN 9781509543670 (epub)

      Subjects: LCSH: Urban warfare--History--21st century. | Metropolitan areas--Strategic aspects. | Siege warfare--History.

      Classification: LCC U167.5.S7 K56 2021 (print) | LCC U167.5.S7 (ebook) | DDC 355.4/26--dc23

      LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020053371 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020053372

      The publisher has used its best endeavours to ensure that the URLs for external websites referred to in this book are correct and active at the time of going to press. However, the publisher has no responsibility for the websites and can make no guarantee that a site will remain live or that the content is or will remain appropriate.

      Every effort has been made to trace all copyright holders, but if any have been overlooked the publisher will be pleased to include any necessary credits in any subsequent reprint or edition. The author and publisher would like to thank the following for permission to use copyright material: Figure 3.1 from Castle, The Journal of the Royal Anglian Regiment; Map 1.1 and Map 5.3 from the Institute for the Study of War; Map 2.3 from The Map Archive; Map 3.1 from Geografski vestnik; Map 11.1 from Army University Press; and Map 2.2 and Map 8.1 from Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq by Michael R. Gordon, copyright © 2006, 2007 by Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor. Used by permission of Pantheon Books, an imprint of the Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.

      For further information on Polity, visit our website: politybooks.com

      I cannot remember precisely when it was. It may have been in 2001 or 2002, or it might have been in 2004 or 2005, after I had already started to work on the armed forces. However, the memory itself remains quite distinct. In my first years at Exeter University my office was directly opposite that of Barry Barnes, who held the professorial chair of the department. I was very lucky. Our proximity in the department was congenial and instructive for me. As an eminent sociologist, Barry was a very fine mentor and friend. I met Barry frequently, as a result, and we talked about many things, including sociology and social theory. In one of those conversations, as was common, he invited me into his room and, as we chatted, he showed me a small, yellow booklet, the reading list from an old course on ‘Social Order’ which he had taught at Edinburgh. On the cover of this booklet was the photocopy of an engraving of a late fifteenth- or early sixteenth-century siege, in which cannon had breached a wall, while soldiers attacked a gate as defenders poured burning oil upon them. Barry motioned excitedly at the image and cried: ‘Look at all the social stuff going on there.’ His point was, of course, that once humans were able to form social groups and cooperate with each other, there was almost no limit to their powers – for good or ill.

      As always, many friends and colleagues helped me with this book. I am grateful to them all. I offer special thanks to the following. I could not have conducted the military research I have without the support of the British Army and the Royal Marines, and especially 40 and 45 Commando Royal Marines. I am personally grateful to: Ben Baker, James Bashall, Jules Buczacki, Matt Cansdale, Alec Case, Innes Caton, James Cook, Kevin Copsey, Mike Cornwell, Gerry Ewart-Brookes, Adam Fraser-Hitchen, Paddy Ginn, Stephen Greenberg (USMC), Paul Hammett, Sigolene Hobson, Rupert Jones, James Martin, Nick McGinley, Charles ‘Jack’ Nicholson, Nick Perry, Jamie Powell, Dan Reeve, Clo O’Neill, Dom Rogers, Simon Rogers, Dickie Sernberg, Jolyon Simpson, Al Speedie, Zac Stenning, Andrew Stuart and Matt Taylor. Stephen Bowns, Peter Dixon, Robert Goodin and the Royal Anglian Regiment were extremely generous in their support for my research on Belfast in 1972 and the permission to use some images. I would also like to thank Ben Barry, Virginia Comolli and Antonio Sampaio at the International Institute for Strategic Studies; Marcus Geisser at the International Committee of the Red Cross; and James Denselow at Save the Children. At Warwick, Jon Coaffee and Stuart Elden provided very useful guidance, as did Randall Collins and Jeremy Black.

      At Polity, I am very grateful to John Thompson, who initially saw potential in the project; Louise Knight, who has been a brilliant editor; Inès Boxman for her assistance; and Sarah Dancy. Will Crosby helped check the references. As always, I am indebted to those who read and commented on the manuscript. Charles Heath-Saunders and Patrick Jackson at the MOD confirmed that the book did not breach operational or personal security and provided useful comments. The feedback from Christopher Dandeker, Chris Torchia and two anonymous reviewers at Polity was very helpful indeed. I am particularly grateful here to Patrick Owen, an excellent student from my first cohort at Warwick. Finally, as always, Patrick Bury provided perceptive and very pertinent guidance about how to improve the manuscript.

      Mosul

      On 16 July 2018, the last bombs fell on Mosul. A battle, which some American generals described as ‘the most significant urban combat since World War Two’, was over.1 After nine months of bitter fighting, ISIS was defeated, but the city was also destroyed. Homes, government and commercial buildings, factories, shops, mosques and hospitals had been ruined; the streets were choked with rubble and the detritus of war. The civil infrastructure – water, electricity, sewage – had collapsed. The fighting had been truly terrible. One of the American commanders of the operation, General Stephen Townsend, recalled: ‘The battle of Mosul was the most disorganized, chaotic, debrislittered place I’ve ever seen. Large swathes of the city were damaged. Some parts, especially the west side, were completely levelled – entire neighbourhoods destroyed.’2 Other US officers, closer to the combat, were shocked: ‘You can’t replicate how stressful it was: how bad the slaughter was in Mosul.’3


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