An der Front und Hinter der Front - Au front et à l'arrière. Группа авторов
Zeit darauf drängte, den überproportionalen Anteil des Königreichs an der Stellung von Mannschaften zurückzufahren. Unter Leitung des bisherigen ungarischen Landesverteidigungsministers Baron Samu (Samuel) Hazai, der im Februar 1917 zum «Chef des Ersatzwesens für die gesamte bewaffnete Macht» der Habsburgermonarchie ernannt wurde, sollten durch systematische Ausnutzung aller Personalreserven, unter anderem auch durch die Einberufung von Arbeitskräften der Kriegsindustrie, Lücken in den Mannschaftsständen geschlossen werden. Nun strebte die Militärführung auch gezielt eine bessere Ausbildung der Ersatzmannschaften und deren bedarfsgerechte Zuweisung zu den Frontverbänden an.29
Im Mai 1917 ging die Habsburgermonarchie daran, ihre Landstreitkräfte neu zu formieren. Um zusätzliche Verbände aufstellen zu können, wurde teilweise auch die Heeresstruktur verändert. Infanterieregimenter sollten statt vier nur mehr drei Feldbataillone aufweisen, wie in anderen Armeen bereits üblich. 1916 war ein entsprechender Vorschlag des Kriegsministeriums, der eine solche Strukturveränderung allerdings erst für die Nachkriegszeit vorsah, noch am Widerstand des AOK unter Conrad gescheitert, aber nun spielte das 2. AOK bei der Neuregelung mit. So liess sich die neue Ausgestaltung der Infanteriedivisionen zu jeweils zwölf Bataillonen durchführen, ohne die Brigaden auflassen zu müssen. Die Zahl der Divisionen wurde im Krieg von 48 auf 71 gesteigert; die Friedensgliederung sollte künftig im Vergleich zu 1914 zehn zusätzliche Infanteriedivisionen und eine weitere Kavalleriedivision aufweisen. Auf Reservedivisionen sollte verzichtet werden.30 Dieser Umstand liess sich aus den Opfern des laufenden Kriegs heraus begründen, aber letztlich ging es auch um Standesinteressen des Offizierskorps. Die Reform liess schon die Wünsche für die Nachkriegszeit durchschimmern: «Eine starke Vermehrung von Truppenverbänden war sicherlich am besten noch während des Krieges möglich, aus dem die neuen Regimenter überdies mit einer Geschichte und Tradition hervorgehen würden», so das Urteil im österreichischen Weltkriegswerk. «Neue höhere Offiziersstellen verbesserten wenigstens einigermassen die ungünstigen Aufstiegsmöglichkeiten des Truppenoffizierskorps.»31 Quantität ging beim Berufsoffizierskorps also letztlich vor Qualität, und falls die Rekrutenkontingente nicht erhöht worden wären, hätte sich die k. u. k. Armee schon nach wenigen Jahren wieder dem alten Problem der niedrigen Mannschaftsstände gegenübergesehen. Aber dazu kam es nicht, dank des «Kräfte-Missverhältnisses» zwischen den Mittelmächten und ihren Gegnern, an dem eben auch die teilweise hausgemachten strukturellen Schwächen der Landstreitkräfte ihren Anteil besassen.
In 1914 the British army was an imperial constabulary of just 247 000 regular soldiers recruited by voluntary enlistment, backed by 773 000 reservists and part-time soldiers. There were 4,9 million further enlistments between 1914 and 1918. Of those wartime enlistments, 2,4 million took place prior to the introduction of conscription in January 1916, and 2,5 million after it: 1,3 million men were actually conscripted.1 Conscription had been introduced for the first time since the suspension of the militia ballot (for home defence) in 1831, and for the first time for service overseas since the early eighteenth century. Thus, by 1918, a total of 5,7 million men passed through the British army, equating to 22,1 per cent of the male population of the United Kingdom. This excludes an additional 2,8 million men from the white dominions and from the other British colonies and possessions, 1,4 million of them from India.2
The war compelled the army to come to terms with this unprecedented expansion of a force of citizen soldiers, initially recruited entirely haphazardly. A process of adjustment and adaptation was required of all participants to forge an effective military instrument, yet one arguably founded on the characteristics of British society and popular culture.
Looking first at recruitment, the pre-war reforms of R. B. Haldane had assumed a British Expeditionary Force (BEF) of six infantry divisions and one cavalry division, about 60 per cent of the manpower upon mobilisation drawn from the reserves. Any further expansion would be through the mechanism of the County Territorial Associations (CTAs), the part-time Territorial Force being intended to be ready for overseas service after six months’ additional training following mobilisation. During the passage of the Territorial legislation through Parliament, however, Haldane had been forced by opposition to switch the emphasis from overseas service to home defence. No Territorial could be compelled to go overseas unless he had taken the Imperial Service Obligation (ISO) and, by 1914, only just over 18 000 officers and men had done so. Moreover, under constant attack from regular soldiers, who cast doubt on the ability of «amateur soldiers», and from pro-conscriptionists, the Territorial Force was seriously short of establishment.
All was then set aside by the appointment on 5 August 1914 of Field Marshal Lord Kitchener as Secretary of State for War. On home leave from being British Agent and Consul General in Egypt, this great proconsular figure was wholly unfamiliar with pre-war arrangements. Unlike most others, he believed the war would last at least three years. A mass army would enable Britain to become the strongest partner in the entente; able to impose its own terms on enemies and allies alike, provided it was not committed immediately. As Kitchener expressed it, «our Army should reach its full strength at the beginning of the third year of the War, just when France is getting into rather low water and Germany is beginning to feel the pinch».3 While Kitchener’s prediction was prescient, ultimately it was unrealistic to expect France and Russia to shoulder the burden of continental war indefinitely. Thus, Kitchener remarked sadly of Loos in September 1915, to which two of his «New Army» divisions were committed, that «unfortunately we have to make war as we must, and not as we should like to».4
Men of the 1/1st Royal Bucks Hussars (TF), photographed upon mobilisation in the King’s Head Yard, Aylesbury, Bucks, 4 August 1914. (Bucks Military Museum Trust)
Kitchener’s organisational acumen did not match his strategic insight. The Unionist politician, Leo Amery, aptly described Kitchener as a «great improviser but also a great disorganiser».5 This was particularly seen in Kitchener’s distaste for the Territorials, whom he characterised as a «town clerk’s army». Kitchener’s attitude effectively spelled the end of the plans to expand through the CTAs, as he resolved to raise his «New Armies» entirely through the War Office. Nevertheless, there was more to Kitchener’s reasoning than simple prejudice. There were no actual practical plans for expansion through CTAs, and Kitchener believed they would be swamped by having to train and recruit simultaneously. Similarly, he was reluctant to put pressure on married men to volunteer for service abroad, the Territorials containing not only a high proportion of married men, but also those underage for overseas service. The issue of the ISO was clearly a factor. While between 80 and 90 per cent of many units responded immediately to the call to go overseas, commitments made by some commanding officers proved highly optimistic. In what was to become the 51st (Highland) Division, for example, the 75 per cent acceptance rate officially recorded fell significantly when individuals had to signify their assent on paper. Many Territorials were declared unfit for overseas service. It was also the case that pre-war Territorials could, and did, enlist for home service only until March 1915, and pre-war Territorials could, and did, seek their discharge at the end of their original term of service until May 1916. A further difficulty was that the ISO form Territorials signed specified they would remain with their own units, and could not be subsequently transferred to another. Amalgamating or disbanding Territorial units was also theoretically illegal.
The 1/1st Bucks Battalion (TF) leaving Chelmsford, Essex for embarkation for France, 30 March 1915. (Bucks Military Museum Trust)
Above all, Kitchener was preoccupied with possible German invasion, against which the Territorials were the principal defence. Despite the Admiralty’s pre-war dismissal of concerns, there were genuine fears following the German capture of Antwerp. Earlier, indeed, the regulars of the 4th and 6th Divisions had been kept back temporarily from joining the BEF. Kitchener was eventually reluctantly persuaded to allow Territorials to «fill the gap» in France and Flanders in the winter of 1914/15 before his New Armies were ready to do so. Meanwhile, the failure to utilise CTAs resulted in duplication