A Christian Directory, Part 4: Christian Politics. Richard Baxter
Not by the first or last; for both those do but determine who shall be the recipient of that power; whether one or more, and who individually. Not the second, for that is but a limiting, or bounding, or regulating the governing power, that it be not exercised to their hurt; the bounding and regulating of their power, is not the giving them power. The people having the strength, cannot be ruled against their concordant wills: and therefore, if they contract with their governors, that they will be ruled thus and thus, or not at all, this is not to give them power. Yet propriety they have, and there they may be givers. So that this bounding, or regulating, and choosing the form, and persons, and giving of their propriety, is all that they have to do. And the choosing of the family or person, is not at all a giving the power. They are but sine quibus non to that; they do but open the door to let in the governor; they do but name the family or man, to whom God, and not they, shall give the power.
As, when God hath already determined what authority the husband shall have over the wife, the wife by choosing him to be her husband, giveth him not his power, but only chooseth the man, to whom God giveth it by his standing law: though about the disposing of her estate, she may limit him by precontracts; but if she contract against his government, it is a contradiction and null. Nor if he abuse his power, doth it at all fall into her hands.
If the king by charter give power to a corporation to choose their mayor, or other officer, they do but nominate the persons that shall receive it, but it is the king's charter, and not they, that give him the power.
If a soldier voluntarily list himself under the king's general, or other commanders, he doth but choose the man that shall command him, but it is the king's commission that giveth him the power to command those that voluntarily so list themselves. And if the authority be abused or forfeited, it is not into the soldiers' hands, but into the king's.
Prop. VI. The constituting consent or contract of ancestors obligeth all their posterity, if they will have any of the protection or other benefit of government, to stand to the constitution; else governments should be so unsettled and mutable, as to be uncapable of their proper end.
Prop. VII. God hath neither in nature or Scripture, estated this power of government, in whole or in part, upon the people of a mere community, (much less on subjects,) whether noble or ignoble, learned or unlearned, the part of the community, or the whole body, real or representative.38 The people as such, have not this power, either to use or to give; but the absolute Sovereign of all the world, doth communicate the sovereign power in every kingdom, or other sort of commonwealth, from himself immediately; I say, immediately: not without the mediation of an instrument signifying his will; for the law of nature and Scripture are his instrument, and the charter of authority; nor yet so immediately, as without any kind of medium; for the consent and nomination of the community before expressed, may be conditio sine qua non, so far as aforesaid; but it is so immediately from God, as that there is no immediate recipient, to receive the power first from God, and convey it to the sovereign.
Prop. VIII. The natural power of individual persons over themselves, is tota specie different from this political or civil power. And it is not the individual's resignation of this natural power of self-disposal, unto one or more, which is the efficient cause of sovereignty or civil power.39
Prop. IX. If you take the word law properly, for the expression of a ruler's will obliging the governed, or making their duty; and not improperly, for mere contracts between the sovereign and the people; then it is clear in the definition itself, that neither subjects, nor the community, as such, have any legislative power. Neither nature nor Scripture hath given the people a power of making laws, either by themselves, or with the sovereign; either the sole power, or a part of it. But the very nature of government requireth, that the whole legislative power, that is, the power of making governing laws, belong to the summa majestas, or sovereign alone. (Unless when the summa potestas is in many hands, you compare the partakers among themselves, and call one party the sovereign, as having more of the sovereignty than the rest.) For those that are no governors at all, cannot perform the chief act of government, which is the making of governing laws; but the people are no governors at all, either as a community, or as subjects; so that you may easily perceive, that all the arguments for a natural democracy, are built upon false suppositions; and wherever the people have any part in the sovereignty, it is by the after constitution, and not by nature; and that kings receive not their power from the people's gift, (who never had it themselves to use or give,) but from God alone.
Prop. X. Though God have not made a universal determination for any one sort of government, against the rest, (whether monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy,) because that is best for one people, which may be worse for others, yet ordinarily monarchy is accounted better than aristocracy, and aristocracy better than democracy. So much briefly of the original of power.
Object. I. But, saith worthy Mr. Richard Hooker, Eccl. Polit. lib. i. sect. 10. p. 21,40 "That which we spake of the power of government, must here be applied to the power of making laws, whereby to govern; which power, God hath over all, and by the natural law, whereto he hath made all subject, the lawful power of making laws to command whole politic societies of men, belongeth so properly to the same entire societies, that for any prince or potentate of what kind soever upon earth, to exercise the same of himself, and not either by express commission immediately and personally received from God, or else by authority derived at first from their consent, upon whose persons they impose laws, it is no better than mere tyranny. Laws they are not therefore, which public approbation hath not made so."
Answ. Because the authority of this famous divine is with his party so great, I shall adventure to say something, lest his words do the more harm; but not by confident opposition, but humble proposal and submission of my judgment to superiors and wiser men, as being conscious of my own inferiority and infirmity. I take all this to be an assertion no where by him proved (and by me elsewhere disproved fully). Laws are the effects and signs of the ruler's will; and instruments of government. Legislation is the first part of government; and if the whole body are naturally governors, the pars imperans and pars subdita are confounded. If the most absolute monarch can make no laws, then disobeying them were no fault. It is enough that their power be derived from God immediately, though the persons be chosen by men. Their authority is not derived from the people's consent, but from God, by their consent, as a bare condition sine qua non. What if a community say all to their elected king, "We take not ourselves to have any governing power to give or use, but we only choose you or your family to that office which God hath instituted, who in that institution giveth you the power upon our choice;" can any man prove, that such a king hath no power, but is a tyrant; because the people disclaim the giving of the power; when indeed they do their duty? Remember that in all this we speak not of the government of this or that particular kingdom, but of kingdoms and other commonwealths indefinitely.41
Object. II. But, saith he, lib. viii. p. 192, "Unto me it seemeth almost out of doubt and controversy, that every independent multitude before any certain form of regimen established, hath under God supreme authority, full dominion over itself," —
Answ. If by dominion were meant propriety, every individual hath it; but for governing power, it seemeth as clear to me, that your independent multitude hath no civil power of government at all; but only a power to choose them governors; while they have no governors, they have no governing power, for that maketh a governor.
Object. III. Ibid. "A man who is lord of himself, may be made another's servant," &c.
Answ. 1. He may hire out himself to labour for another; because he hath so far the power of himself, and his labour is his own, which he may sell for wages; but in a family, that the master be the governor to see God's laws obeyed by his servants, is of divine appointment, and this governing power the servant giveth not to his master, but only maketh himself the object of it. 2. The power that nature giveth a man over himself, is tota specie distinct from civil government; (as Dr. Hammond hath well showed against I. G.) An individual person hath not that power of his own life as the king hath. He may not put himself to death, for that which the king may put him
So foolish and bad is the multitude too often, that it made Aristippus hold it as probable, that a wise man should not endanger himself for his country, because wisdom is not to be cast away for the commodity of fools. Laert. in Aristip. But a wise man must be wise for others, and not only for himself.
It was one of the Roman laws of the twelve tables, Vendendi filium patri potestas esto. But this law rather giveth the father that power, than declareth it to be naturally in him. Nature alloweth him no other selling of him, than what is for his child's own good.
So p. 23. The same error of the original of power hath Acosta, 1. ii. c. 2. p. 208. with many other Jesuits and papists.
Bishop Andrews in Tortur. Tort. p. 385. Actuus homo non distinguit inter formam, atque authoritatem regiminis; forma de hominibus esse potest: de cœlo semper est authoritas. An rex sit supra leges, Vid. Seb. Fox. lib. ii. de Instit. Reg.