Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812. Volume 1. Alfred Thayer Mahan
a great majority. He made no immediate attempt to resume legislation favoring the American trade with the West Indies. The disposition of the majority of Englishmen in the matter had been plainly shown, and other more urgent commercial reforms engaged his attention. Soon after the receipt of the news in America, some of the states passed retaliatory measures, on their own account, or authorized the Continental Congress so to act for them. The bad feeling already caused by the non-fulfilment, on both sides, of certain stipulations of the treaty of peace was particularly exasperated by this proclamation; for anticipation, aroused by Pitt's proposed measure, had been nursed into confident expectation during the four months' interval, in which intercourse had been openly or tacitly allowed. It was at this period that Nelson first came conspicuously into public notice, by checking the connivance of the West Indian governors in the infractions of the Navigation Laws; the Act authorizing commanders of Kings' ships to seize offending vessels, and bring them before the Court of Admiralty.73 It is said also that his experience had much to do with shaping subsequent legislation upon the same prohibitory lines. In America disappointment was bitter. Little concern was felt in England. Concerted action by several states was thought most unlikely, and a more perfect union impossible. While Massachusetts, for example, in 1785 forbade import or export in any vessel belonging in whole or in part to British subjects, the state then next to her in maritime importance, Pennsylvania, in 1786 repealed laws imposing extra charges on British ships, and admitted all nations on equal terms with her sister states. "The ministry in England," wrote Adams, "build all their hopes and schemes upon the supposition of such divisions in America as will forever prevent a combination of the States, either in prohibition or in retaliatory duties."74
Effective retaliation consequently was not feared, and as for results otherwise, it was doubtless thought best to await the test of experience. Proclamation, annually authorized and re-issued, remained therefore the mode of regulating commerce between the British dominions and the United States up to the date of Jay's treaty. Once only, in 1788, Parliament interfered so far as to pass a law, confining the trade with the West Indies to British-built ships and to certain enumerated articles, in the strict spirit of the Navigation system. Otherwise, intercourse with the United States was throughout this period subject at any moment to be modified or annulled by the single will of the Executive; whereas that with other nations, fixed by statute,—the Navigation Act,—could be altered only by the legislature.75
Of this British commercial policy, following immediately upon the recognition of independence, Americans had not the slightest reason to complain. They had insisted upon being independent, and it would be babyish to fret about the consequences, when unpalatable. It was unpleasant to find that Great Britain, satisfied that the carrying trade was the first of her interests, upon which depended her naval supremacy, rigorously excluded Americans from branches of that trade before permitted to them; but in so doing she was simply seeking her own advantage by means of her own laws, as a nation does, for instance, when it imposes heavy protective duties. It is quite as legitimate to protect the carrying trade as any other form of industry; and the Navigation Act was no new device, for the special annoyance of Americans. It is very possible that the action of Great Britain at this time was so stupid, that, to use words of Jefferson's, the only way to prophesy what she would do was to ascertain what she ought to do, and infer the contrary. The rule, he said, never failed. This particular stupidity, if such it were,—and there was at least partial ground for the charge,—was simply another case of a most common form of human dulness of perception, preoccupation with a fixed idea. But were the policy wise or foolish, as regards herself, towards the Americans it was not a wrong, but an injury; and, consequently, what the newly independent people had to do was not to complain, but to strike back with retaliatory commercial measures. Jefferson, no friend generally to coercive action, wrote concerning this particular situation, "It is not to the moderation or justice of others we are to trust for fair and equal access to market with our productions, or for our due share in the transportation of them; but to our own means of independence, and the firm will to use them."76
Equally, when Great Britain, under the emergencies of the French Revolution, resorted to measures that overpassed her rights, either municipal or international, and infringed our own, the resort should have been to the remedy with which nations defend their rights, as distinct from their interest. The American people, then poor, and habituated to colonial dependence, failed to create for themselves in due time the power necessary to self-assertion; nor did they as a nation realize, what men like John Adams and Gouverneur Morris saw and preached, that in the complicated tangle of warring interests which constitutes every contemporary situation, the influence of any single factor depends, not merely upon its own value, but upon that value taken in connection with other conditions. A pound is but a pound; but when the balance is nearly equal, a pound may turn a scale. Because America could not possibly put afloat the hundred—or two hundred—ships-of-the-line which Great Britain had in commission, therefore, many argued, as many do to-day, it was vain to have any navy. "I believe," wrote Morris in 1794,77 and few men better understood financial conditions, "that we could now maintain twelve ships-of-the-line, perhaps twenty, with a due proportion of frigates and smaller vessels. And I am tolerably certain that, while the United States of America pursue a just and liberal conduct, with twenty sail-of-the-line at sea, no nation on earth will dare to insult them. I believe also, that, not to mention individual losses, five years of war would involve more national expense than the support of a navy for twenty years. One thing I am thoroughly convinced of, that, if we do not render ourselves respectable, we shall continue to be insulted."
A singular, and too much disregarded, instance of the insults to which the United States was exposed, by the absence of naval strength, is found in the action of the Barbary Powers towards our commerce, which scarcely dared to enter the Mediterranean. It is less known that this condition of things was eminently satisfactory to British politicians of the old-fashioned school, and as closely linked as was the Navigation system itself to the ancient rivalry with Holland. "Our ships," wrote the Dutch statesman De Witt, who died in 1672, "should be well guarded by convoy against the Barbary pirates. Yet it would by no means be proper to free that sea of those pirates, because we should hereby be put upon the same footing with East-landers, [i.e., Baltic nations, Denmark, Sweden, etc.] English, Spaniards, and Italians; wherefore it is best to leave that thorn in the sides of those nations, whereby they will be distressed in that trade, while we by convoy engross all the European traffic and navigation."78 This cynical philosophy was echoed in 1784 by the cultured English statesman, Lord Sheffield, the intimate friend of the historian Gibbon, and editor of his memoirs. "If the great maritime powers know their interests," he wrote, "they will not encourage the Americans to be carriers. That the Barbary States are an advantage to the maritime powers is obvious. If they were suppressed, the little states of Italy, etc., would have much more of the carrying trade. The Armed Neutrality would be as hurtful to the great maritime powers as the Barbary States are useful."79
It may be a novel thought to many Americans, that at that time American commerce in the Mediterranean depended largely for protection upon Portuguese cruisers; its own country extending none. When peace was unexpectedly made between Portugal and Algiers in 1793, through the interposition of a British consular officer, a wail of dismay went up to heaven from American shipmen. "The conduct of the British in this business," wrote the American consul at Lisbon, "leaves no room to doubt or mistake their object, which was evidently aimed at us, and that they will leave nothing unattempted to effect our ruin." It proved, indeed, that the British consul's action was not that of his Government, but taken on his own initiative; but the incident not only recalls the ideas of the time, long since forgotten, but in its indications, both of British commercial security and American exposure, illustrates the theory of the Navigation Act as to the reciprocal influence of the naval and merchant services. There was then nothing, in the economical conditions of the United States, to forbid a navy stronger than the Portuguese; yet the consul, in his pitiful appeal to the Portuguese Court, had to write: "My countrymen have been led into their present embarrassment by confiding in the friendship, power, and protection of
Reeves, pp. 47, 57.
Works of John Adams, vol. viii. p. 281.
American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i. p. 307.
American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i. p. 304.
Morris to Randolph (Secretary of State), May 31, 1794. American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i. p. 409. The italics are Morris's.
Quoted from De Witt's Interest of Holland, in Macpherson's Annals of Commerce, vol. ii. p. 472.
Observations on the Commerce of the American States, 1783, p. 115. Concerning this pamphlet, Gibbon wrote, "The Navigation Act, the palladium of Britain, was defended, perhaps saved, by his pen."