Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812. Volume 1. Alfred Thayer Mahan

Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812. Volume 1 - Alfred Thayer Mahan


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At that time, very few vessels belonging to British merchants, resident in the British European dominions, or in the British Islands in the West Indies, had a share in this trade. The vessels employed in this trade can now only belong to British subjects residing in the present British dominions. Many vessels now go from the ports of Great Britain, carrying British manufactures to the United States, there load with lumber and provisions for the British Islands in the West Indies, and return with the produce of these islands to Great Britain. The whole of this branch of freight may also be considered as a new acquisition, and was obtained by your Majesty's Order in Council before mentioned,90 which has operated to the increase of British Navigation, compared to that of the United States in a double ratio; but it has taken from the navigation of the United States more than it has added to that of Great Britain."

      The last sentence emphasizes the fact, which John Adams had noted, that the object of the Navigation system was scarcely more defensive than offensive, in the military sense of the word. The Act carried provisions meant distinctly to impede the development of foreign shipping, as far as possible to do so by municipal regulation. The prohibition of entrance to a port of Great Britain by a foreign trader, unless three-fourths manned by citizens of the country whose flag she bore, was distinctly offensive in intent. But for this, other states might increase their tonnage by employing seamen not their own, which Great Britain could not do without weakening the reserves available for her navy, and imperative to her defence. Rivalry was thus engendered, and became bitter and apprehensive in proportion to the national interests involved; but at no time had such considerations persuaded the country to depart from its purpose. "The foreign war which those measures first brought upon us, and the odium which they have never ceased to cause, to the present day (1792) among neighboring nations, have not induced the legislature to give up any one of its principles."91 In the case of the United States, the exasperation aroused was very great. It perpetuated the national animosity surviving from the War of Independence, and provoked retaliation. Before the formation of the better Union this was too desultory and divided to have much effect, and the artificial system of which Sheffield was the chief public champion had the appearance of success which has been described; but as soon as the thirteen states could wield their power as one whole, under a system at once consistent and permanent, American navigation began to make rapid headway. In 1790 there entered American ports from abroad 355,000 tons of American shipping and 251,000 foreign, of which 217,000 were British.92 After one year of the discriminating tonnage dues laid by the national Congress, the American tonnage entering home ports from Great Britain had risen, from the 26,564 average of the three years, 1787 to 1789, ascertained by the British committee, to 43,580.93 In 1801 there entered 799,304 tons of native shipping,94 and but 138,000 foreign.95 The amount of British among the latter is not stated; but in the year 1800 there cleared from Great Britain, under her own flag, for the United States, but 14,381 tons.96 This reversal of the conditions in 1787-89, before quoted,97 was the result of a gradual progress, noticeable immediately after the American imposition of tonnage duties, and increasing up to 1793, when it was accelerated by the war between Great Britain and France.

      It is carefully to be remembered that the British committee, representing strictly the prepossessions of the body by which it was constituted, looked primarily to the development of national carrying trade. "As the security of the British dominions principally depends on the greatness of your Majesty's naval power, it has ever been the policy of the British Government to watch with a jealous eye every attempt that has been made by foreign nations to the detriment of its navigation; and even in cases where the interests of commerce and those of navigation could not be wholly reconciled, the Government of Great Britain has always given the preference to the interests of navigation; and it has never yet submitted to the imposition of any tonnage duties by foreign nations on British ships trading to their ports, without proceeding immediately to retaliation."98 It had, however, submitted to several such measures, retaliatory for the exclusion from the West India trade, enacted by the separate states in the years 1783 to 1789; as well as to other legislation, taxing British shipping by name much above that of other foreigners. This quiescence was due to confidence, that the advantages possessed by Great Britain would enable her to overcome all handicaps. It was therefore with satisfaction that, after six years of commercial antagonism, the committee was able, not only to report the growth of British shipping, already quoted, but to show by the first official statement of entries issued by the American Government,99 for the first year of its own existence, that for every five American tons entering American ports from over sea, there entered also three British; and that of the whole foreign tonnage there were six British to one of all other nations together.

      Upon the whole, therefore, while regretting the evidence in the American statement which showed increasing activity by American shipping over that ascertained by themselves for the previous years,—to be accounted for, as was believed, by transient circumstances,—the committee, after consultation with the leading merchants in the American trade, thought better to postpone retaliation for the new tonnage duties, which contained no invidious distinction in favor of other foreign shipping against British. The system of trade regulation so far pursued had given good results, and its continuance was recommended; though bitterly antagonizing Americans, and maintaining ill-will between the two countries. Upon one point, especially desired by the United States, the committee was particularly firm. It considered that its Government might judiciously make one proposition—and one only—for a commercial treaty; namely, that there should be entire equality of treatment, as to duties and tonnage, towards the ships of both nations in the home ports of each other. "But if Congress should propose (as they certainly will) that this principle of equality should be extended to the ports of our Colonies and Islands, and that the ships of the United States should there be treated as British ships, it should be answered that this demand cannot be admitted even as a subject of negotiation.... This branch of freight is of the same nature with the freight from one American state to another" (that is, trade internal to the empire is essentially a coasting trade). "Congress has made regulations to confine the freight, employed between the different states, to the ships of the United States, and Great Britain does not object to this restriction."100 "The great advantages which have resulted from excluding American ships appear in the accounts given in this report; many of the merchants and planters of the West Indies, who formerly resisted this advice, now acknowledge the wisdom of it."101

      The committee recognized that exclusion from the carrying trade of the British West Indies was in some degree compensated to the American carrier, by the permission given by the Government of France for vessels not exceeding sixty tons to trade with her colonies, actually much greater producers, and therefore larger customers. Santo Domingo in particular, in the period following the American war, had enjoyed a heyday of prosperity, far eclipsing that of all the British islands together. This was due partly to natural advantages, and partly to social conditions,—the planters being generally resident, which the British were not; but cheaper supplies through free intercourse with the American continent also counted for much. From the French West Indies there entered the United States in 1790, 101,417 tons of shipping, of which only 3,925 were French.102 From the British Islands there came 90,375, but of these all but 4,057 were British.103 Returning, the exports from the United States to the two were respectively, $3,284,656 and $2,077,757.104 The flattering testimony borne by these figures to the meagreness of French navigation, in the particular quarter, needed doubtless to be qualified by reference to their home trade from the West Indies, borne in French ships. This amounted in 1788 to 296,435 tons from Santo Domingo alone;105 whereas the British trade from all their islands employed but 133,736.Скачать книгу


<p>90</p>

June 18, 1784, substantially the re-issue of that of Dec. 26, 1783, which Reeves (p. 288) considers the standard exemplar.

<p>91</p>

Reeves, p. 431.

<p>92</p>

American State Papers, Commerce and Navigation, vol. x. p. 389.

<p>93</p>

Ibid., Foreign Relations, vol. i. p. 301.

<p>94</p>

Ibid., Commerce and Navigation, vol. x. p. 528.

<p>95</p>

Ibid., p. 584.

<p>96</p>

Macpherson, Annals of Commerce, vol. iv. p. 535.

<p>97</p>

Ante, pp. 77, 78.

<p>98</p>

Report of the Committee, p. 85.

<p>99</p>

Ibid., p. 52.

<p>100</p>

Report, p. 96.

<p>101</p>

Ibid., p. 94.

<p>102</p>

American State Papers, Commerce and Navigation, vol. x. p. 47.

<p>103</p>

Ibid., p. 45.

<p>104</p>

Ibid., p. 24.

<p>105</p>

Coxe, p. 171.