The Histories of Polybius (Vol.1&2). Polybius
expense of cities in league with themselves, in order to strengthen Cleomenes in his attitude of opposition to the Achaeans.120 Aratus, however, resolved to wait for some definite act of hostility before moving. This was supplied by Cleomenes building a fort (the Athenaeum) at Belbina, in the territory of Megalopolis, a league city. Upon this the league necessarily proclaimed war with Sparta. Thus does Polybius, a warm friend of the league, state the case in its behalf. The league, he argues, had been growing by the voluntary adherence of independent towns: it had shown no sign of an intention to attack Laconian territory, or towns in league with Aetolia: while Cleomenes had committed an act of wanton aggression and provocation by building a hostile fort in its territory. But what the other side had to say may be gathered from Plutarch’s life of Cleomenes, founded principally on the work of Phylarchus the panegyrist of Cleomenes.121 Here the case is put very differently. Aratus, according to him, had made up his mind that a union of the Peloponnesus was the one thing necessary for the safety of the league. In a great measure he had been already successful; but the parts which still stood aloof were Elis, Laconia, and the cities of Arcadia which were under the influence of Sparta.122 He therefore harassed these last by every means in his power; and the erection or fortification of the Athenaeum at Belbina by Cleomenes was in truth only a measure of necessary defence. Aratus, indeed, held that some of these Arcadian cities had been unfairly seized by Cleomenes, with the connivance of the Aetolians;123 but to this Cleomenes might reply that, if the league claimed the right of extending its connexion with the assent, often extorted, of the various cities annexed, the same right could not justly be denied to himself.
B.C. 226-221.
A series of military operations took place during the next five years, in which Cleomenes nearly always got the better of Aratus; who, able and courageous in plots and surprises, was timid and ineffective in the field. The one important blow struck by Aratus, that of seizing Mantinea, was afterwards nullified by a counter-occupation of it by the Lacedaemonians; and in spite of troubles at home, caused by his great scheme of reform, Cleomenes was by B.C. 224 in so superior a position that he could with dignity propose terms to the league. He asked to be elected Strategus, therefore.124 At first sight this seemed a means of effecting the desired union of the Peloponnese; and as such the Achaeans were inclined to accept the proposal. Aratus, however, exerted all his influence to defeat the measure: and, in spite of all his failures, his services to the league enabled him to convince his countrymen that they should reject the offer; and he was himself elected Strategus for the twelfth time in the spring of B.C. 223. Aratus has been loudly condemned for allowing a selfish jealousy to override his care for the true interests of his country, in thus refusing a prospect of a united Achaia, in which some one besides himself should be the leading man.125 But I think there is something to be said on the other side. What Aratus had been working for with a passionate eagerness was a union of free democratic states. Cleomenes, in spite of his liberal reforms at home, was a Spartan to the back bone. Aratus would have no manner of doubt that a league, with Sparta supreme in it, would inevitably become a Spartan kingdom. The forces of Sparta would be used to crush dissenting cities; and soon to put down the free institution which would always be disliked and feared by the Spartan government. Security from Macedonian influence, if it were really obtained,—and that was far from certain,—would be dearly purchased at the price of submission to Spartan tyranny, which would be more galling and oppressive in proportion as it was nearer and more unremitting. With these views Aratus began to turn his eyes to the Macedonian court, as the only possible means of resisting the encroaching policy of Cleomenes. The character of Antigonus Doson, who was then administering Macedonia, gave some encouragement to hope for honest and honourable conduct on his part; and after some hesitation Aratus took the final step of asking for his aid.126 I do not expect to carry the assent of many readers when I express the opinion that he was right; and that the Greek policy towards Macedonia had been from the first a grievous error,—fostered originally by the patriotic eloquence of Demosthenes, and continued ever since by that ineradicable sentiment for local autonomy which makes Greek history so interesting, but inevitably tended to the political annihilation of Greece. Had some modus vivendi been found with the series of very able sovereigns who ruled Macedonia, a strong Greek nation might have been the result, with a central government able to hold its own even in the face of the great “cloud in the West,” which was surely overshadowing Greek freedom. But this was not to be. The taste for local freedom was too strong; and showed itself by constant appeals to an outside power against neighbours, which yet the very men who appealed to it would not recognise or obey. The Greeks had to learn that nations cannot, any more than individuals, eat their cake and have it too. Local autonomy, and the complete liberty of every state to war with its neighbours as it chooses, and of every one to speak and act as he pleases, have their charms; but they are not compatible with a united resistance to a great centralised and law-abiding power. And all the eloquence of all the Greek orators rolled into one could not make up for the lack of unity, or enable the distracted Greeks to raise an army which might stand before a volley of Roman pila or a charge of Roman legionaries.
The help asked of Antigonus Doson was given with fatal readiness; but it had to be purchased by the admission of a Macedonian garrison into the Acrocorinthus, one of those “fetters of Greece,” the recovery of which had been among Aratus’s earliest and most glorious triumphs. The battle of Sellasia (B.C. 221) settled the question of Spartan influence. Cleomenes fled to Alexandria and never returned. Sparta was not enslaved by Antigonus; who on the contrary professed to restore her ancient constitution,—probably meaning that the Ephoralty destroyed by Cleomenes was to be reconstituted, and the exiles banished by him recalled. Practically she was left a prey to a series of unscrupulous tyrants who one after the other managed to obtain absolute power, Lycurgus (B.C. 220-210), Machanidas, B.C. 210-207; Nabis, B.C. 207-192; who, though differing in their home administrations, all agreed in using the enmity of the Aetolians in order to harass and oppress the Achaeans in every possible way.
B.C. 213. Death of Aratus.
Aratus died in B.C. 213. The last seven years of his life were embittered by much ill success in his struggles with the Aetolians; and by seeing Philip V., of whose presence in the Peloponnese he was the main cause, after rendering some brilliant services to the league, both in the Peloponnese and the invasion of Aetolia, develop some of the worst vices of the tyrant; and he believed himself, whether rightly or wrongly, to be poisoned by Philip’s order: “This is the reward,” he said to an attendant when he felt himself dying, “of my friendship for Philip.”127
The history of the league after his death followed the same course for some years. The war with the Aetolians went on, sometimes slackly, sometimes vigorously, as Philip V. was or was not diverted by contests with his barbarian neighbours, or by schemes for joining the Carthaginian assaults upon the Roman power.
B.C. 208-183, Philopoemen.
The next phase of vigorous action on the part of the league is that which corresponds with the career of Philopoemen, who had already shown his energy and skill at the battle of Sellasia. He was elected Hipparch in B.C. 210, and Strategus in B.C. 209. In his first office he did much to reorganise the Achaean cavalry and restore them to some discipline,128 and he extended this as Strategus to the whole army.129 His life’s work, however, was the defeating and either killing or confining to their frontier the tyrants of Sparta. But while he was absent from the country after B.C. 200 a new element appeared in the Peloponnese. In 197 the battle of Cynoscephalae put an end for ever to Macedonian influence, and Flamininus proclaimed the liberty of all Greece in B.C. 195 at the Nemean festival.
B.C. 195-194.
But Nabis was not deposed; he was secured in his power by a treaty with Rome; and when Philopoemen returned from Crete (B.C. 193), he found a fresh war on the point of breaking out owing to intrigues between that tyrant and the Aetolians.
B.C. 193.
They suggested, and he eagerly undertook to make, an attempt to recover the maritime towns of which he had been deprived by the Roman settlement.130
193-192.
Nabis at once attacked Gythium: and seemed on the point of taking it and the whole of the coast towns, which would thus have been lost to the league. Philopoemen, now again Strategus (B.C. 192), failed to relieve Gythium; but by a skilful piece