The War Against The Nazi U-Boats 1942 – 1944. L. Douglas Keeney
coming as it did on top of a long discussion of the problem of jurisdiction over coastal defense operations, and at a time when the Army was confronted by urgent obligations in half a dozen theaters, all demanding heavy-and medium-bombardment planes. The Navy received part, though not all, of the Army-type allocations asked for, but had to be content for the time being with the forces supplied mainly by the I Bomber Command and related units. Considerable effort was made to increase the number of aircraft allocated by the Army to antisubmarine activity, but it was felt in the War Department that diversion beyond that already made would seriously jeopardize other equally important projects.
And so, from the very first, the Army’s participation in the antisubmarine campaign became involved in, and at times overshadowed by, the issues of jurisdiction and organization which it had raised. The Navy request for Army-type planes raised again, or rather reinvigorated, the standing controversy concerning control of the air arm. To Admiral King’s request, General Arnold replied that for the Navy to build up a force of land-based aircraft would lead to a duplication of equipment, maintenance, and supply that would eventually “deny the essential differences between armies and navies.” Some felt that, if Army aircraft were so vital a part of coastal defense, unity of command over joint operations in the coastal frontiers should be vested in the Army. This notion, of course, ran counter to the established policy as outlined in Joint Action, and would in any cases have lacked the support of the Navy. General Arnold proposed to settle the question in a practical compromise. In a letter to Admiral King, 9 May 1942, he wrote: “to meet the present situation, I propose to recommend the establishment of a Coastal Command, within the Army Air Corps which will have for its purpose operations similar to the Coastal Command, RAF,” operating “when necessary under the control of the proper Naval authority.” The virtues of such an organization would, he felt, be many: it would not only do the job, it would also have the flexibility necessary for antisubmarine action, and could readily be decreased as the need decreased, the units then simply reverting to normal bombardment duty without becoming stranded wastefully in a naval program which left no place for them. In this proposal General Arnold pointed the way to the settlement finally adopted in the creation of the AAF Antisubmarine Command.
Many other influences were tending in the same direction by May of 1942. Above all, of course, was the ugly fact that in that month sinking’s in the sea frontiers had risen to a new and terrifying point. Something had obviously to be done to improve the organization of the antisubmarine campaign. Closely related was the fact that the enemy had shifted his strategy and had once more caught the US defenses badly prepared. Most of the May sinking’s had occurred in the Gulf and Caribbean areas. Scarcely adequate to protect shipping in the ESP, the existing organization of antisubmarine operations proved quite inadequate to cope with a greatly extended area of activity.
In answer to a request for reinforcement from the Commander, Gulf Sea Frontier, a few B-18’s were sent south, and shortly after, on 26 May, Maj. Gen. Follett Bradley, Commanding General of the First Air Force, created the Gulf Task Force. This unit was to control all aircraft of the First Air Force which were operating, according to the agreement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for such situations, under the operational control of the Gulf Sea Frontier. For a time located at Charleston, SC, the new headquarters was finally set up at Miami.
The situation in the Gulf and Caribbean areas had, however, become so serious that General Arnold requested the Third Air Force to use certain of its units for antisubmarine patrol during their regular overwater training missions. General Frank responded by advising the placing of the appropriate units under the operational control of the Gulf Task Force and the routing of training missions over sea and Gulf shipping lanes. This plan was approved on 1 July, and steps were at once taken to put it into effect. Meanwhile, arrangements were made to establish a combined operations center at Miami, to be built on the general pattern being laid down for similar purposes in New York City. This project was initiated early in June.
Considerable progress was made in relocating units to meet the expanded and fluid nature of the campaign. Beginning in January with operations from four states only, from Bangor, Maine, to Langley Field, VA, the I Bomber Command by September 1942 was operating in seven states, from Westover Field, Mass, to Galveston, TX.
Despite this energetic effort to meet a rapidly changing situation with complicated machinery constructed essentially on static principles, the extension of AAP antisubmarine operations emphasized the need for reform in the existing system of joint command. Only recently had any attempt been made to clarify even this existing system. Prior to 26 March 1942, units of the I Bomber Command and the I Air Support Command had been operating under the control of the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier, but the system rested only on very general definitions set forth in Joint Action. And there had been some talk of “mutual cooperation” rather than “unity of command.” On that date the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a message to the commanding generals of the defense commands which read, in extract, as follows:
Pending the reaching of agreements as to terms under which unity of command will be exercised … unity of command as set forth in … Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935, is hereby vested in sea Frontier Commands over all Navy forces duly allocated thereto and over all Army air units allocated by defense commanders over the sea for the protection of shipping and for antisubmarine and other operations … Defense commanders will allocate Army air units on full time basis but may rotate them in not less then two week periods as requisite for essential training …
This seemed a convenient temporary arrangement, but in reality it did nothing to meet the administrative and tactical problems. It merely made more definite what had hitherto been left studiously vague.
The fact was that the two services were not organized for this type of joint control. Command boundaries overlapped: the areas assigned to the First Air Force and the I Bomber Command extended beyond the Eastern Sea Frontier into the territory of the Gulf Sea Frontier, and the Third Air Force had to share the operational control of the Commander, Gulf Sea Frontier with the First Air Force. Worse than that, joint operations involved two complete sets of headquarters through which orders must be filtered before reaching the combat unit.
General McNarney described the command situation in April as follows:
At present the Bomber Command is allocated to the Eastern Sea Frontier for operational control. The Civil Air Patrol is under the Air Support Command for operational control. The Air Support Command is under the Bomber Command for operational control. The Bomber Command is operating under a directive from the Navy, which was a two page, seven paragraph letter, which was very verbose.
He might have added that the Bomber Command was under the First Air Force and the Eastern Defense Command for administration, if any further complication were desired.
Desired or not, further complication did enter the picture when in May it became necessary to extend operations into the Gulf and Caribbean areas. The I Bomber Command was still the only agency equipped and situated to provide the Army air coverage necessary for successful antisubmarine activity. It was therefore essential to extend its operation southward to include the entire EDO and that part of the Southern Defense Command which borders on the Gulf of Mexico. In this area I Bomber Command operated under the control of the Gulf Sea Frontier. To augment this over-extended force, some aircraft had been loaned by the Third Air Force to the EST and GSF commanders for patrol purposes. These units, however, operated under the direct control of the Bomber Command, which retained responsibility for Army antisubmarine patrol in the coastal frontiers. The plight of these few pilots, who were connected administratively or operationally with two defense commands, two sea frontiers, two air forces, and an antisubmarine bomber command, simply represents the reduction ad absurdum of the command situation.
The trouble was obvious. A multiplicity of headquarters would have slowed up the functioning of any dependent organization. It was all the more serious in its effects on antisubmarine operations which depended above all else on rapid coordination and extreme nobility. The division of the sea frontiers into districts and subdistricts had been enough of a handicap especially in view of the habit of thinking in terms of rigid boundaries or “chop lines” which seemed to be an ingrained part of the naval administrative mind. Yet local arrangement had been made to mitigate this handicap. Army air units