The War Against The Nazi U-Boats 1942 – 1944. L. Douglas Keeney
naval commanders, a practice which, if adopted, would have ruined the effectiveness of the Army antisubmarine forces. The real trouble came when aircraft were required in other sea frontiers, all of which were under COMMINCH, but without liaison or means of rapid inter-communication. Yet the antisubmarine campaign depended on the ability of air striking units to fellow the submarines wherever they might go and to change stations rapidly.
Unity of command, then, became the first prerequisite for improved operations. The antisubmarine campaign needed other things: better equipment, a better training program, a better communication system, and an organization devoted completely to the task of hunting U-boats, unimpeded by competing claims on its services. Above all, it required mobility of forces. But all these needs were subordinate to, and in one way or another dependent upon, the attaining of unity of command.
With these needs in mind, and impelled by the desperate shipping situation, the War Department began, in May, to take concerted action to improve the situation. On the 20th of that month, Maj. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, then Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, directed the commanding generals of the AAF and the EDS to do everything in their power to improve the antisubmarine activity being undertaken by the First Air Force. Specifically he directed that all available planes on the eastern seaboard be fitted with bomb racks and all B-18 air craft be equipped with radar, even at the expense of prior allocations. All necessary bases were to be made available, and the EDC was to cooperate with the First Air Force in the solution of problems of supply, maintenance, and communications for the antisubmarine squadrons. An organization was to be established “with the least possible delay” for the purpose of engaging in the development of antisubmarine weapons, tactics, and techniques in cooperation with all agencies working toward a similar end. A training unit was also authorized in order to make available crews trained in the use of these devices and techniques.
Finally, General Arnold was requested to reorganize the I Bomber Command in such a way as to “fulfill the special requirements of antisubmarine and allied air operations, in consonance with the Army responsibility in operating in support of, or in lieu of naval forces for protection of shipping.”
This action on the part of the War Department General Staff marks the beginning of plans for a separate, mobile air striking force, organized within the Army for the sole purpose of hunting submarines. In taking this action the Army in effect accepted the responsibility for a job not generally considered part of its function. No longer considered simply as an emergency, short-term measure, the participation of AAF units in the antisubmarine war now became admittedly part of the Army program. And, in the circumstances, the Army found itself in a relatively strong position. Its air force had the weapons, and had already taken part in antisubmarine activity for nearly 5 months during which time it had developed some sort of organization, some special techniques, and many ambitious plans.
Plans of a more or less specific nature soon followed. General Eisenhower had stated in his directive that “although unity of command is vested in the Navy, it is felt that the Army must be prepared to submit recommendations and to take every action to make antisubmarine warfare fully effective.” He had requested that General Bradley and Brig. Gen. Westside T. Larson, Commanding General, I Bomber Command, confer with the Assistant Chief of Staff and present plans for future development.
Plans had for some weeks been evolving in the minds of the AAF officials concerned. In general they had been shaped along the lines suggested in General Eisenhower’s directive: a separate organization was to be created for the purpose of waging antisubmarine warfare, with mobility and striking power as its chief characteristic, and with an experimental agency acting as an auxiliary for developing new techniques and for training personnel in their use. But they were naturally more specific and somewhat more radical in their color than that directive called for. Through all this initial planning can be seen the strong influence of the British Coastal Command. And naturally so, because that command had pioneered since the beginning of the war in antisubmarine warfare under circumstances roughly analogous to those in which the American forces found themselves in 1942. A few officers from the British Coastal Command had been detailed to advise the I Bomber Command in its early efforts to combat the U-boats, and their influence was in many respects decisive. In February, Wing Commander P.F. Canning, RAF, had outlined the Coastal Command system of operational control as a pattern for a similar organization modified to suit the situation in the western Atlantic. Admittedly far from perfect, this system bore the authority of 4 years’ experience in joint action for the specific purpose of antisubmarine warfare. In March, Wing Commander S.R. Libles, RAF, submitted a report on his observations of antisubmarine activity in which he stressed the need for a clearer allocation of responsibility between Army and Navy, for closer cooperation between the headquarters involved, and for a decreased emphasis on rigid command boundaries. All these factors pointed toward the ultimate solution in the form of a separate command, presumably shaped on lines similar to those of the British Coastal Command.
General Eisenhower had suggested that a conference on antisubmarine measures be held in Washington. In preparation for this meeting, Generals Bradley and Larson drew up and discussed various plans. Although a detailed critique of these proposals is unnecessary, some of the points highlighted in them clarify the train of thought that led to the establishment of the Antisubmarine Command. A précis of the principal plans follows:
1 The basic principle upon which successful antisubmarine warfare must rest is unity of command. The submarine possesses great mobility; successful action against it necessitates elimination of overlapping jurisdiction in order that prompt action may be facilitated. Command channels must be direct, and the “maddening and intolerable” system of verbal orders from one office and written orders from another must be eliminated. Mobility is essential. A successful antisubmarine force must be able to move units from point to point to meet the requirements of a shifting strategic situation.
2 A “Coastal Air Force” should be organized with the I Bomber Command as its nucleus. The chain of command then would be from Commanding General, AAF, the Commanding General, Coastal Air Force, to Coastal Air Force Controller to Squadron Commander. An operations control room would be set up at each base, and steps would be taken to establish adequate coordination of intelligence with the Navy. The Navy would, however, no longer exercise direct operational control over Army planes, because all orders would pass through Headquarters, Coastal Air Force.
3 In the Coastal Air Force, the area of operation would be unlimited and not confined by existing boundaries of commands having other missions to perform.
4 A chain of bases should be set up on the Atlantic coast to operate directly under the Coastal Air Force. Weather, intelligence, communications, maintenance and housing and all housekeeping facilities would be provided by the bases, leaving the striking forces to consist of combat and key personnel only. The combat squadrons would therefore be “in reality mobile.”
Another plan, evidently prepared by General Bradley for use in the conference with General Eisenhower, proposed that the I Bomber Command, or similar organization, be charged with the protection of all coastal shipping, the operation to be under the direct control of the Commanding General of the First Air Force. Not only would all Army aircraft thus be placed under an Army officer, but all Navy and Marine heavier-than-air aircraft allocated to antisubmarine activity would also be under the I Bomber Command for operational control, only dirigibles (a waning force) remaining under the Navy.
All other coordination’s between Army and Navy to be by cooperation rather than by unity of command, as is now the case between Eastern Defense Command and Eastern Sea Frontier. If operational control by Navy must be continued, a single Navy commander, not three, should be responsible for the entire East and Gulf Coasts and Bermuda, and exercise operational control or unity of command over those Army Air Forcer which are allotted to him.
In short, the Navy had been relegated to a position of remote and shadowy authority. But they left no doubt on certain other points: the need for unity of command, a more direct chain of command, greater potential mobility, and a continued and increased participation of Army air forces in the “trade war,” all of which depended in some way on the creation of a separate command, organized, trained, and equipped for the purpose.
Running through this entire discussion there may