The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha. Madhava
congregation, and the red vesture, are adopted by the Bauddha mendicants."[39]
A. E. G.
FOOTNOTES:
[29] This śloka is quoted in the "Benares Pandit," vol. i. p. 89, with a commentary, and the latter part of the second line is there read more correctly, 'darśanán na na darśanát.
[30] Kusumánjali, iii. 7.
[31] The Bauddhas are thus divided into—
(1.) Mádhyamikas or Nihilists.
(2.) Yogácháras or Subjective Idealists.
(3.) Sautrántikas or Representationists.
(4.) Vaibháshikas or Presentationists.
[32] Cf. Ferrier's Lectures and Remains, vol. i. p. 119.
"Suppose yourself gazing on a gorgeous sunset. The whole western heavens are glowing with roseate hues, but you are aware that within half an hour all these glorious tints will have faded away into a dull ashen grey. You see them even now melting away before your eyes, although your eyes cannot place before you the conclusion which your reason draws. And what conclusion is that? That conclusion is that you never, even for the shortest time that can be named or conceived, see any abiding colour, any colour which truly is. Within the millionth part of a second the whole glory of the painted heavens has undergone an incalculable series of mutations. One shade is supplanted by another with a rapidity which sets all measurement at defiance, but because the process is one to which no measurement applies, … reason refuses to lay an arrestment on any period of the passing scene, or to declare that it is, because in the very act of being it is not; it has given place to something else. It is a series of fleeting colours, no one of which is, because each of them continually vanishes in another."
[33] Principium exclusi medii inter duo contradictoria.
[34] Query, Laṅkávatára?
[35] Cf. Ferrier's Institutes of Metaphysic, p. 213. "If every completed object of cognition must consist of object plus the subject, the object without the subject must be incomplete, that is, inchoate—that is, no possible object of knowledge at all. This is the distressing predicament to which matter is reduced by the tactics of speculation; and this predicament is described not unaptly by calling it a flux—or, as we have depicted it elsewhere, perhaps more philosophically, as a never-ending redemption of nonsense into sense, and a never-ending relapse of sense into nonsense."
[36] Cf. Burnouf, Lotus, p. 520.—Should we read samudaya?
[37] Cf. G. H. Lewes' History of Philosophy, vol. i. p. 85. "We not only see that the architect's plan determined the arrangement of materials in the house, but we see why it must have done so, because the materials have no spontaneous tendency to group themselves into houses; that not being a recognised property of bricks, mortar, wood, and glass. But what we know of organic materials is that they have this spontaneous tendency to arrange themselves in definite forms; precisely as we see chemical substances arranging themselves in definite forms without the intervention of any extra-chemical agency."
[38] These are not the usual four 'sublime truths;' cf. p. 30.
[39] Mádhava probably derived most of his knowledge of Buddhist doctrines from Brahmanical works; consequently some of his explanations (as, e.g., that of samudáya or samudaya, &c.) seem to be at variance with those given in Buddhist works.
CHAPTER III.
THE ÁRHATA SYSTEM.
The Gymnosophists[40] (Jainas), rejecting these opinions of the Muktakachchhas,[41] and maintaining continued existence to a certain extent, overthrow the doctrine of the momentariness of everything. (They say): If no continuing soul is accepted, then even the arrangement of the means for attaining worldly fruit in this life will be useless. But surely this can never be imagined as possible—that one should act and another reap the consequences! Therefore as this conviction, "I who previously did the deed, am the person who now reap its consequences," establishes undoubtedly the existence of a continuing soul, which remains constant through the previous and the subsequent period, the discriminating Jaina Arhats reject as untenable the doctrine of momentary existence, i.e., an existence which lasts only an instant, and has no previous or subsequent part.
But the opponent may maintain, "The unbroken stream (of momentary sensations) has been fairly proved by argument, so who can prevent it? In this way, since our tenet has been demonstrated by the argument, 'whatever is, is momentary, &c.,' it follows that in each parallel line of successive experiences the previous consciousness is the agent and the subsequent one reaps the fruit. Nor may you object that, 'if this were true, effects might extend beyond all bounds'—[i.e., A might act, and B receive the punishment]—because there is an essentially controlling relation in the very nature of cause and effect. Thus we see that when mango seeds, after being steeped in sweet juices, are planted in prepared soil, there is a definite certainty that sweetness will be found in the shoot, the stalk, the stem, the branches, the peduncle, &c., and so on by an unbroken series to the fruit itself; or again, when cotton seeds have been sprinkled with lac juice, there will be a similar certainty of finding, through the same series of shoot, &c., an ultimate redness in the cotton. As it has been said—
"'In whatever series of successive states the original impression of the action was produced,
"'There verily accrues the result, just like the redness produced in cotton.
"'When lac juice, &c., are poured on the flower of the citron, &c.,
"'A certain capacity is produced in it—do you not see it?'"
But all this is only a drowning man's catching at a straw, for it is overthrown by the following dilemma:—
In the example of the "cloud," &c. [supra, p. 15], was your favourite "momentariness" proved by this very proof or by some other? It could not be the former, because your alleged momentariness is not always directly visible in the cloud, and consequently, as your example is not an ascertained fact, your supposed inference falls to the ground. Nor can it be the latter—because you might always prove your doctrine of momentariness by this new proof (if you had it), and consequently