The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha. Madhava
is, is momentary," &c.] would become needless. If you take as your definition of "existence" "that which produces an effect," this will not hold, as it would include even the bite of a snake imagined in the rope, since this undoubtedly produces the effect [of fear]. Hence it has been said that the definition of an existence is "that which possesses an origin, an end, and an [intermediate] duration."
As for what was said [in p. 16] that "the momentariness of objects is proved by the fact that the contrary assumption leads to contradictory attributes of capacity and want of capacity existing contemporaneously," that also is wrong—for the alleged contradiction is not proved, as the holders of the Syád-váda[42] doctrine [vide infra] willingly admit the indeterminateness of the action of causes. As for what was said of the example of the cotton, that is only mere words, since no proof is given, and we do not accept even in that instance a separate destruction [at each moment]. And again, your supposed continued series cannot be demonstrated without some subject to give it coherence, as has been said, "In individual things which are of the same class or successively produced or in mutual contact, there may be a continued series; and this series is held to be one [throughout all"].
Nor is our objection obviated by your supposed definite relation between causes and effects. For even on your own admission it would follow that something experienced by the teacher's mind might be remembered by that of the pupil whom he had formed, or the latter might experience the fruits of merit which the former had acquired; and thus we should have the twofold fault that the thing done passed away without result, and that the fruit of the thing not done was enjoyed. This has been said by the author of the Siddhasenávákya—
"The loss of the thing done—the enjoyment of the fruit of a thing not done—the dissolution of all existence—and the abolition of memory—bold indeed is the Buddhist antagonist, when, in the teeth of these four objections, he seeks to establish his doctrine of momentary destruction!"
Moreover, (on your supposition of momentary existence), as at the time of the perception (the second moment) the object (of the first moment) does not exist, and similarly at the time of the object's existence the perception does not exist, there can be no such things as a perceiver and a thing perceived, and consequently the whole course of the world would come to an end. Nor may you suppose that the object and the perception are simultaneous, because this would imply that, like the two horns of an animal, they did not stand in the relation of cause and effect [as this relation necessarily involves succession], and consequently the Álambana, or the object's data [supra, p. 29], would be abolished as one of the four concurrent causes (pratyaya).[43]
If you say that "the object may still be perceived, inasmuch as it will impress its form on the perception, even though the one may have existed in a different moment from the other," this too will not hold. For if you maintain that the knowledge acquired by perception has a certain form impressed upon it, you are met by the impossibility of explaining how a momentary perception can possess the power of impressing a form; and if you say that it has no form impressed upon it, you are equally met by the fact that, if we are to avoid incongruity, there must be some definite condition to determine the perception and knowledge in each several case. Thus by perception the abstract consciousness, which before existed uninfluenced by the external object, becomes modified under the form of a jar, &c., with a definite reference to each man's personality [i.e., I see the jar], and it is not merely the passive recipient of a reflection like a mirror. Moreover, if the perception only reproduced the form of the object, there would be an end of using such words as "far," "near," &c., of the objects.[44] Nor can you accept this conclusion, "as exactly in accordance with your own views," because, in spite of all our logic, the stubborn fact remains that we do use such phrases as "the mountain is nearer" or "further," "long" or "large." Nor may you say that "it is the object (which supplies the form) that really possesses these qualities of being 'further,' &c., and they are applied by a fashion of speech to the perception [though not really belonging to it]"—because we do not find that this is the case in a mirror [i.e., it does not become a far reflection because it represents a far object.] And again, as the perception produced by an object follows it in assuming the form of blue, so too, if the object be insentient, it ought equally to assume its form and so become itself insentient. And thus, according to the proverb, "wishing to grow, you have destroyed your root," and your cause has fallen into hopeless difficulties.
If, in your wish to escape this difficulty, you assert that "the perception does not follow the object in being insentient," then there would be no perception that the object is insentient,[45] and so it is a case of the proverb, "While he looks for one thing which he has lost, another drops." "But what harm will it be if there is no perception of a thing's being insentient?" [We reply], that if its being insentient is not perceived, while its blue form is perceived, the two may be quite distinct [and as different from each other as a jar and cloth], or it may be a case of "indeterminateness" [so that the two may be only occasionally found together, as smoke with fire]. And again, if insentience is not perceived contemporaneously with the blue form, how could there then be conformity between them [so that both the blue and the insentience should together constitute the character of the thing?] We might just as well maintain that, on perceiving a post, the unperceived universe entered into it as also constituting its character.[46]
All this collection of topics for proof has been discussed at full length by the Jaina authors, Pratápachandra and others, in the Prameyakamalamártaṇḍa, &c., and is here omitted for fear of swelling the book too much.
Therefore those who wish for the summum bonum of man must not accept the doctrine of Buddha, but rather honour only the Árhata doctrine. The Arhat's nature has been thus described by Arhachchandra-súri,[47] in his Áptaniśchayálaṅkára.
"The divine Arhat is the supreme lord, the omniscient one, who has overcome all faults, desire, &c.—adored by the three worlds, the declarer of things as they are."
But may it not be objected that no such omniscient soul can enter the path of proof, since none of the five affirmative proofs can be found to apply, as has been declared by Tautátita [Bhaṭṭa Kumárila[48]]?
1. "No omniscient being is seen by the sense here in this world by ourselves or others; nor is there any part of him seen which might help us as a sign to infer his existence.
2. "Nor is there any injunction (vidhi) of scripture which reveals an eternal omniscient one, nor can the meaning of the explanatory passages (arthaváda) be applied here.
3. "His existence is not declared by those passages which refer to quite other topics; and it cannot be contained in any emphatic repetitions (anuváda), as it had never been mentioned elsewhere before.
4. "An omniscient being who had a beginning can never be the subject of the eternal Veda; and how can he be established by a made and spurious Veda?
5. "Do you say that this omniscient one is accepted on his own word? How can you establish either when they thus both depend on reciprocal support?
6. "[If you say,] 'The saying is true because it was uttered by one omniscient, and this proves the Arhat's existence;' how can either point be established without some previously established foundation?
7. "But they who accept a [supposed] omniscient on the baseless word of a parviscient know nothing of the meaning of a real omniscient's words.
8. "And again, if we now could see anything like an omniscient being, we might have a chance of recognising him by the [well-known fourth] proof, comparison (upamána).
9.