Elements of Military Art and Science. H. W. Halleck
cannon.
Namur, near the end of the seventeenth century, sustained a siege of ten weeks.
Ismaïl, in 1790, sustained a siege of more than two months against the Russians.
Maestricht, in 1793, sustained a siege of nearly two weeks; and again, in 1794, sustained a blockade and siege of nearly two months.
Magdeburg, in the thirty years' war, resisted the army of Wallenstein for seven months; and in 1813–14, although garrisoned by only 4,000 men, it for a long time resisted the overwhelming forces of the allies.
Dantzic, at the same time, sustained a siege against superior forces for more than nine months.
Landau, in 1793, sustained a siege of nine months.
Valenciennes and Mayence, in 1793, each sustained a siege of about three months.
Charleroi, Fort Vauban, and L'Ecluse, in 1794, each sustained a siege of about thirty days.
Quesnoy, in 1794, sustained a siege of about three weeks.
Rosas, in 1795, sustained a siege of some seventy days.
Mantua, in 1796–7, protected from invasion, for eight months, the Tyrol and the heart of the Austrian monarchy.
Kehl and Huninguen, in 1796, sheltered Moreau for three months against all the efforts of the Archduke Charles.
St. Jean d'Acre, in 1799, sustained a siege of sixty days of open trench.
Ulm, in 1800, held Moreau in check for more than a month.
Genoa, in 1800, sustained a blockade of sixty and a siege of forty days.
Saragossa in 1808 sustained a close siege of near two months; and in 1809 it was again besieged for two months.
Rosas in 1808 sustained a siege of thirty days.
Gerona in 1809 sustained a siege and blockade of seven months, nearly four of them being of open trench.
Mequinenza (a very small work) in 1810 sustained a siege of more than two weeks.
Astorga in 1810 sustained a siege of thirty days; twenty-four being of open trench.
Lerida in 1810 sustained a siege of thirty days, two weeks being of open trench.
Ciudad Rodrigo in 1810 sustained a siege of two months.
Almeida in 1810 sustained a siege of more than a month.
Tortosa in 1810 sustained a siege of six months.
Tarragona in 1811 sustained a siege of nearly two months.
Badajos in 1811 sustained a siege of more than forty days open trench.
Lerida in 1811 sustained a siege of two weeks open trench.
Saguntum in 1811 sustained a siege of a month.
Valencia in 1811–12 sustained a siege of two months
Ciudad Rodrigo in 1812 sustained a blockade of several months, and a close siege of two weeks.
Badajos in 1812 sustained twenty-one days of open trenches.
Burgos in 1812 sustained thirty-three days of open trenches.
St. Sebastian in 1813 sustained a siege and blockade of nearly three months, with fifty-nine days of open trenches.
Pampeluna in 1813 sustained a siege of more than four months.
Monzon in 1813–14 also sustained a siege of more than four months.
This list might be increased with numerous other examples, to show that even poorly fortified towns are capable of defending themselves, on an average, for more than a month. These examples, be it remembered, are nearly all taken from a period of history since any material improvements have been made in the art of attack. Since the time of Vauban the improvements in attack have not kept pace with the increased means of defence. Moreover, these examples are taken from the sieges of towns defended mainly by old and antiquated works, and entirely incapable of offering the same resistance as detached fortifications, with all the modern improvements.
The value of fortifications, as land defences, is sufficiently proved by showing their general capability of resisting an invader, even for a limited period; thus affording us time and opportunity to provide other means of security. But it must not be inferred that forts besieged en règle will necessarily fall after so many days. Such is far from being the case. The besieged have usually great advantages over the besiegers; and unless the latter are vastly superior in number, or the work is of a very inferior character, or the garrison is destitute of the requisite means and energy to resist an attack, they will not be taken.
Mezieres was not taken in 1520; nor Marseilles in 1524; nor Peronne in 1536; nor Landrecies in 1543; nor Metz in 1552; nor Montauban in 1621; nor Lerida in 1647; nor Maestricht in 1676; nor Vienna in 1529, and again in 1683; nor Turin in 1706; nor Conde in 1744; nor Lille in 1792; nor Landau in 1793; nor Ulm in 1800; nor Saragossa in 1808; nor Burgos in 1812. This list might be extended almost indefinitely with the names of places that could be reduced neither by force nor by starvation.
But, as has already been noticed, some have asserted that fortifications have become of little comparative importance, under the new system of warfare introduced during the wars of the French Revolution. On this subject let us consult the opinions of the best military judges of the present century.
Napoleon says of fortifications, "they are an excellent means of retarding, fettering, enfeebling, and disquieting a conquering foe."
"The possession of strategic points," says the Archduke Charles, "is decisive in military operations; and the most efficacious means should, therefore, be employed to defend points whose preservation is the country's safeguard. This object is accomplished by fortifications, inasmuch as they can resist, for a given time, with a small number of troops, every effort of a much larger force; fortifications should, therefore, be regarded as the basis of a good system of defence." "It should be a maxim of state policy in every country, to fortify, in time of peace, all such points, and to arrange them with great care, so that they can be defended by a small number of troops. For the enemy, knowing the difficulty of getting possession of these works, will look twice before he involves himself in a war." "Establishments which can secure strategic advantages are not the works of a moment; they require time and labor. He who has the direction of the military forces of a state, should, in time of peace, prepare for war." "The proper application or neglect of these principles will decide the safety or the ruin of the state." "Fortifications arrest the enemy in the pursuit of his object, and direct his movements on less important points;—he must either force these fortified lines, or else hazard enterprises upon lines which offer only disadvantages. In fine, a country secured by a system of defences truly strategic, has no cause to fear either the invasion or the yoke of the enemy; for he can advance to the interior of the country only through great trouble and ruinous efforts. Of course, lines of fortifications thus arranged cannot shelter a state against all reverses; but these reverses will not, in this case, be attended by total ruin; for they cannot take from the state the means nor the time for collecting new forces; nor can they ever reduce it to the cruel alternative of submission or destruction."
"Fortifications," says Jomini, "fulfil two objects of capital importance—1st. The protection of the frontiers; and 2d. Assisting the operations of the army in the field." "Every part of the frontiers of a state should be secured by one or two great places of refuge, secondary places, and even small posts for facilitating the active operations of the armies. Cities girt with walls and slight ditches may often be of great utility in the interior of a country, as places of deposit, where stores, magazines, hospitals, &c., may be sheltered from the incursions of the enemy's light troops. These works are more especially valuable where such stores, in order not to weaken the regular army by detachments, are intrusted to the care of raw and militia forces." It is not supposed that any system of fortifications can hermetically close a frontier; "but, although they of themselves can rarely present an absolute obstacle to the advance of the hostile army, yet it