Elements of Military Art and Science. H. W. Halleck
Lines of intrenchment and temporary works may sometimes serve him as a sufficient protection. Finally, when the unfavorable season compels him to suspend his operations, he will go into winter cantonments, and prepare for a new campaign.
Such are the ordinary operations of war: its relations to strategy must be evident, even to the most superficial reader.
Not unfrequently the results of a campaign depend more upon the strategic operations of an army, than upon its victories gained in actual combat. Tactics, or movements within the range of the enemy's cannon, is therefore subordinate to the choice of positions: if the field of battle be properly chosen, success will be decisive, and the loss of the battle not disastrous; whereas, if selected without reference to the principles of the science, the victory, if gained, might be barren, and defeat, if suffered, totally fatal: thus demonstrating the truth of Napoleon's maxim, that success is oftener due to the genius of the general, and to the nature of the theatre of war, than to the number and bravery of the soldiers. (Maxim 17, 18.)
We have a striking illustration of this in the French army of the Danube, which, from the left wing of General Kray, marched rapidly through Switzerland to the right extremity of the Austrian line, "and by this movement alone conquered all the country between the Rhine and Danube without pulling a trigger."
Again, in 1805, the army of Mack was completely paralyzed, and the main body forced to surrender, at Ulm, without a single important battle. In 1806, the Prussians were essentially defeated even before the battle of Jena. The operations about Heilesberg, in 1807, the advance upon Madrid, in 1808, the manœuvres about Ratisbon, in 1809, the operations of the French in 1814, and the first part of the campaign of 1815, against vastly superior numbers, are all familiar proofs of the truth of the maxim.
Strategy may therefore be regarded as the most important, though least understood, of all the branches of the military art.[4]
Strategy may be learned from didactic works or from general military histories. There are very few good elementary works on this branch of the military art. The general treatises of the Archduke Charles, and of General Wagner, in German, (the former has been translated into French,) are considered as the best. The discussions of Jomini on this subject in his great work on the military art, are exceedingly valuable; also the writings of Rocquancourt, Jacquinot de Presle, and Gay de Vernon. The last of these has been translated into English, but the translation is exceedingly inaccurate. The military histories of Lloyd, Templehoff, Jomini, the Archduke Charles, Grimoard, Gravert, Souchet, St. Cyr, Beauvais, Laverne, Stutterheim, Wagner, Kausler, Gourgaud and Montholon, Foy, Mathieu Dumas, Ségur, Pelet, Koch, Clausewitz, and Thiers, may be read with great advantage. Napier's History of the Peninsular War is the only English History that is of any value as a military work: it is a most excellent book. Alison's great History of Europe is utterly worthless to the military man; the author is ignorant of the first principles of the military art, and nearly every page is filled with the grossest blunders.
We subjoin the titles of a few of the best works that treat of strategy, either directly or in connection with military history.
Principes de la Stratégie, &c., par le Prince Charles, traduit de l'Allemand, 3 vols. in 8vo. This is a work of great merit. The technical terms, however, are very loosely employed.
Précis de l'Art de la Guerre, par le Baron Jomini. His chapter on strategy embodies the principles of this branch of the art.
Grundsätze der Strategic, Von Wagner.
Cours Elémentaire d'Art et d'Histoire Militaire, par Rocquancourt. This work contains much valuable information connected with the history of the art of war; but it is far too diffuse and ill-arranged for an elementary book.
Cours d'Art et d'Histoire Militaire, par Jacquinot de Presle. This work is especially designed for cavalry officers, and the other branches of military service are but very briefly discussed.
De Vernon's Treatise on the Science of War and Fortification contains much valuable information; but, as an elementary book, it has the same objections as that of Rocquancourt.
History of the Seven Years' War, by Lloyd and Templehoff. The military writings of Lloyd and Templehoff are valuable as connected with the history of strategy; but many of the principles laid down by these writers are now regarded as erroneous.
Mémoires de Napoléon. The Memoirs of Napoleon, as dictated by himself to Gourgaud and Montholon, have been translated into English. It is hardly necessary to remark that they contain all the general principles of military art and science. No military man should fail to study them thoroughly. The matter is so condensed, and important principles are embodied in so few words, that they are not easily understood by the ordinary reader, and probably will never be popular with the multitude.
Essai général de Tactique, par Guibert. A work very popular in its day, but now far less valuable than the writings already mentioned.
Ausführliche Beschreibung der Schlacht des Pirmasens, von Gravert. Regarded by military men as a valuable historical fragment.
Mémoires sur les Campagnes en Espagne. Souchet.
Mémoires de Gouvion St. Cyr.
Statistique de la Guerre, par Reveroni St. Cyr.
Première Campagnes de la Revolution, par Grimoard.
Victoires et Conquêtes. Beauvais.
Campagnes de Suwarrow. Laverne.
Histoire de la Guerre de la Péninsule. Foy.
Précis des Evénements Militaires. Mathieu Dumas.
Histoire de Napoléon et de la Grande Armée en 1812. Ségur
Mémoires sur la Guerre de 1809. Pelet.
La Campagne de 1814. Koch.
Vom Kriege—Die Feldzügge, &c. Clausewitz.
La Révolution, le Consulat et l'Empire. Thiers.
Mémoires sur la Guerre de 1812—sur la Campagne du Vice roi en Italie, en 1813 et 1814; Histoire de la Guerre en Allemagne en 1814; Histoire des Campagnes de 1814 et 1815, en France. Vaudoncourt.
Essai sur l'Art Militaire, &c. Carion-Nisas.
Histoire de l'Expédition en Russie en 1812. Chambray.
War in Spain, Portugal, and the South of France. John Jones.
Peninsular War. Napier.
Notices of the War of 1812. Armstrong
All the above are works of merit; but none are more valuable to the military man than the military histories of Jomini and Kausler, with their splendid diagrams and maps.
CHAPTER III.
FORTIFICATIONS.
Fortifications, or engineering, may be considered with reference to the defence of states and the grand operation of armies; or with reference to the details of the construction, and attack, and defence of forts, and the influence of field-works on the tactical manœuvres of armies. It is proposed to speak here only of its general character, as a branch of the military art, without entering into any professional discussion of details.
The connection of fortification and strategy may be considered under two distinct heads: 1st, the choice of sites for constructing fortresses for defence; 2d, their influence in offensive operations, and the determination