The Grammar of English Grammars. Goold Brown
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RULE III.—THE SENSE.
Words otherwise liable to be misunderstood, must be joined together or written separately, as the sense and construction may happen to require. Thus, a glass house is a house made of glass, but a glasshouse is a house in which glass is made; so a negro merchant is a coloured trader, but a negro-merchant is a man who buys and sells negroes.
RULE IV.—ELLIPSES.
When two or more compounds are connected in one sentence, none of them should be split to make an ellipsis of half a word. Thus, "six or seventeen" should not be said for "sixteen or seventeen;" nor ought we to say, "calf, goat, and sheepskins" for "calfskins, goatskins, and sheepskins" In the latter instance, however, it might be right to separate all the words; as in the phrase, "soup, coffee, and tea houses."—Liberator, x, 40.
RULE V.—THE HYPHEN.
When the parts of a compound do not fully coalesce, as to-day, to-night, to-morrow; or when each retains its original accent, so that the compound has more than one, or one that is movable, as first-born, hanger-on, laughter-loving, garlic-eater, butterfly-shell, the hyphen should be inserted between them.
RULE VI.—NO HYPHEN.
When a compound has but one accented syllable in pronunciation, as watchword, statesman, gentleman, and the parts are such as admit of a complete coalescence, no hyphen should be inserted between them. Churchill, after much attention to this subject, writes thus: "The practical instruction of the countinghouse imparts a more thorough knowledge of bookkeeping, than all the fictitious transactions of a mere schoolbook, however carefully constructed to suit particular purposes."—New Gram., p. vii. But counting-house, having more stress on the last syllable than on the middle one, is usually written with the hyphen; and book-keeping and school-book, though they may not need it, are oftener so formed than otherwise.
OBSERVATIONS.
OBS. 1.—Words are the least parts of significant language; that is, of language significant in each part; for, to syllables, taken merely as syllables, no meaning belongs. But, to a word, signification of some sort or other, is essential; there can be no word without it; for a sign or symbol must needs represent or signify something. And as I cannot suppose words to represent external things, I have said "A Word is one or more syllables spoken or written as the sign of some idea." But of what ideas are the words of our language significant? Are we to say, "Of all ideas;" and to recognize as an English word every syllable, or combination of syllables, to which we know a meaning is attached? No. For this, in the first place, would confound one language with an other; and destroy a distinction which must ever be practically recognized, till all men shall again speak one language. In the next place, it would compel us to embrace among our words an infinitude of terms that are significant only of local ideas, such as men any where or at any time may have had concerning any of the individuals they have known, whether persons, places, or things. But, however important they may be in the eyes of men, the names of particular persons, places, or things, because they convey only particular ideas, do not properly belong to what we call our language. Lexicographers do not collect and define proper names, because they are beyond the limits of their art, and can be explained only from history. I do not say that proper names are to be excluded from grammar; but I would show wherein consists the superiority of general terms over these. For if our common words did not differ essentially from proper names, we could demonstrate nothing in science: we could not frame from them any general or affirmative proposition at all; because all our terms would be particular, and not general; and because every individual thing in nature must necessarily be for ever itself only, and not an other.
OBS. 2.—Our common words, then, are the symbols neither of external particulars, nor merely of the sensible ideas which external particulars excite in our minds, but mainly of those general or universal ideas which belong rather to the intellect than to the senses. For intellection differs from sensation, somewhat as the understanding of a man differs from the perceptive faculty of a brute; and language, being framed for the reciprocal commerce of human minds, whose perceptions include both, is made to consist of signs of ideas both general and particular, yet without placing them on equal ground. Our general ideas—that is, our ideas conceived as common to many individuals, existing in any part of time, past, present, or future—such, for example, as belong to the words man, horse, tree, cedar, wave, motion, strength, resist—such ideas, I say, constitute that most excellent significance which belongs to words primarily, essentially, and immediately; whereas, our particular ideas, such as are conceived only of individual objects, which arc infinite in number and ever fleeting, constitute a significance which belongs to language only secondarily, accidentally, and mediately. If we express the latter at all, we do it either by proper names, of which but very few ever become generally known, or by means of certain changeable limitations which are added to our general terms; whereby language, as Harris observes, "without wandering into infinitude, contrives how to denote things infinite."—Hermes, p. 345. The particular manner in which this is done, I shall show hereafter, in Etymology, when I come to treat of articles and definitives.
OBS. 3.—If we examine the structure of proper names, we shall find that most of them are compounds, the parts of which have, in very many instances, some general signification. Now a complete phrase commonly conveys some particular notion or conception of the mind; but, in this case, the signification of the general terms is restricted by the other words which are added to them. Thus smith is a more general term than goldsmith; and goldsmith is more general than a goldsmith; a goldsmith, than the goldsmith; the goldsmith, than one Goldsmith; one Goldsmith, than Mr. Goldsmith; Mr. Goldsmith, than Oliver Goldsmith. Thus we see that the simplest mode of designating particular persons or objects, is that of giving them proper names; but proper names must needs be so written, that they may be known as proper names, and not be mistaken for common terms. I have before observed, that we have some names which are both proper and common; and that these should be written with capitals, and should form the plural regularly. It is surprising that the Friends, who are in some respects particularly scrupulous about language, should so generally have overlooked the necessity there is, of compounding their numerical names of the months and days, and writing them uniformly with capitals, as proper names. For proper names they certainly are, in every thing but the form, whenever they are used without the article, and without those other terms which render their general idea particular. And the compound form with a capital, is as necessary for Firstday, Secondday, Thirdday, &c., as for Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, &c. "The first day of the week,"—"The seventh day of the month,"—"The second month of summer,"—"The second month in the year," &c., are good English phrases, in which any compounding of the terms, or any additional use of capitals, would be improper; but, for common use, these phrases are found too long and too artificial. We must have a less cumbersome mode of specifying the months of the year and the days of the week. What then? Shall we merely throw away the terms of particularity, and, without substituting in their place the form of proper names, apply general terms to particular thoughts, and insist on it that this is right? And is not this precisely what is done by those who reject as heathenish the ordinary names of the months and days, and write "first day," for Sunday, in stead of "the first day of the week;" or "second month," for February, in stead of "the second month in the year;" and so forth? This phraseology may perhaps be well understood by those to whom it is familiar, but still it is an abuse of language, because it is inconsistent with the common acceptation of the terms. Example: "The departure of a ship will take place every sixth day with punctuality."—Philadelphia Weekly Messenger. The writer of this did not mean, "every Friday;" and it is absurd for the Friends so to understand it, or so to write, when that is what they mean.
OBS. 4.—In the ordinary business of life, it is generally desirable to express our meaning as briefly as possible; but legal phraseology