The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898, Volume 30 of 55. Aduarte Diego
and battles, in which the arms of España have always remained victorious. Nevertheless, since the military force of Philipinas is small, the territory that they must defend large, and the aid which is given to them for this purpose very limited, it has not been possible to prevent the treachery and persistence of the Dutch from having some effect; nor to put a stop to their sharing in the clove trade at some forts which they keep in the Molucas, though at the cost of many men, armed vessels, and expenses. From all of these islands are produced each year 2,816,000 libras of cloves, of which the Dutch secure 1,098,000 libras, and the Portuguese and Castilians 1,718,000 – and this latter supply is due to the protection of the Philipinas; while it is computed that the cloves which the Dutch carry away amount to three times as much as it will cost them to be absolute lords of the Molucas, even with the large garrisons and armed fleets which they keep and maintain for purchasing the spice and transporting it to Bantan. From this it obviously follows that without the Philipinas the Molucas would be lost, and their commerce and trade in cloves would cease – from which would follow two pernicious results, which would cause the loss of whatever his Majesty possesses in the Orient. One is, that India would be greatly weakened, for lack of that commerce; for if that country languishes on account of not having all of that trade, it may well be understood that she will perish if it be taken from her. The other is, that the Dutch in that case would have the entire benefit of the trade, and without much expense; for if [Holanda] with less than half the trade – and that at the cost of so many garrisons and fleets – gains such profits that they are enough to maintain whatever she has in India; if she were to secure all the cloves and, on account of the less cost, thus gain a profit of more than a thousand per cent upon her investments, while the gross amount would be doubled: it is very plain that India would not remain safe, the Western Indias would be more effectively harassed, the rebel states in Flandes would be strengthened, the coasts of España would experience their invasions, and everywhere the treasure that could be obtained from the Molucas alone would cause most injurious effects – as may be seen, with more detailed arguments, in the memorial that I have cited in behalf of the Philipinas, to which [colony] we owe the only compensation [that we receive] for all these losses.
The fourth reason is almost the sequence of what has been said in the third, although it is more general, since it takes notice that the Dutch fleets have entered the Orient with so strong a force that they have often placed India in risk of being lost to us; for if they were aided by the Moorish and heathen kings and the rulers of Persa and Mogòr4– and sometimes the Dutch are leagued with the English, who also navigate those seas – their invasion would be irresistible. What has prevented this danger has been the diversion furnished by the Philipinas – not only by diminishing their trade and profits in Moluco (as has been seen), in China, and in other regions, but by compelling them to divide their forces, and to maintain in some places very large ones. India is divided into two parts – [one], from the Cape of Buena Esperanza to the Straits of Sincapura; the other, from the straits to China and Japòn. The first is defended by the Portuguese fleets of India, which seldom go thither through the straits; the second, by the Castilians of Philipinas, who never come here by way of the straits. For both these, it is necessary that the Dutch send thither and maintain squadrons; and therefore it is proved, at this very beginning, that if the fleets of this crown are deficient in either of those regions, and the enemy can transfer all of his naval force to the one that remains [without defense] because there is no diversion [of his forces] in the other, it will be difficult if not impossible to defend [the one to which he goes] – an argument which admits no debate in the naval as well as in the military world. From this it follows that if now the Philipinas fail us Eastern India will remain without aid, and consequently in evident danger of being lost [to us]. This is further confirmed by the fact that, of the two parts into which India is divided, the enemy expends much more of his energy in the second than in the first. In the latter he is content with factories and barter, without keeping any fortified posts; in the former, he maintains the forts of Malayo, Toloco, Tacubo, Malaca, Tacome, Marieco, Motir, Nofagia, Tafacen, Tabelole, Bermevelt, Tabori, Gilolo, Amboino, Lagu, Maruco, Mozovia, Belgio, Bantan, and Hermosa Island. In these nineteen presidios there were, in the year 1616, 3,000 soldiers; 193 pieces of bronze artillery and 310 of iron, and 300 stone-mortars [pedreros]; and thirty war galleons. And all this is solely to defend themselves from the Philipinas, and to attack the islands so that the armed fleets of India shall not sail to that region – or, if they should go thither, it would be easy to stop them at the Strait of Sincapura. If then, the Philipinas were unable to act, and the Dutch should abandon those nineteen forts (which now are many more), as being no longer necessary to them, they would proceed to the coasts of India, and their galleons to those seas. If even when their energies are diverted, their forces divided, and their gains diminished as they are now, they cause so much anxiety, what would it be if, with little if any opposition, their forces united, and their profits increased, they should harass India? It is easy to see that they would occasion that region the utmost distress, and that consequently the Philipinas are an absolutely necessary defense for it.
The fifth reason has the same ground as the fourth; for, on account of the diversion of forces and the expense which the enemy now encounters in the Orient and in the forts of Moluco, he is compelled to refrain from annoying the Western Indias, and must devote less attention, military force, and money to that object. And since what he spends or fails to gain in India enables the Philipinas to oppose or to embarrass him, it follows that if he there shall gain more and spend less, he will here take possession of both [the Indias]. And if the Indias, even with so effective a diversion [of the enemy’s force as they have now], need the Windward Fleet which is being built there, and for which a subsidy of 600,000 ducados is granted annually: in order to dispense with the garrisons, fleets, and expenditures in India everything would have to be increased, so that in the Indias more expense would be incurred for their defense than is consumed in the Philipinas.
The sixth is a reason of honor and profit, for these two admirable results follow from the victories which the inhabitants of Philipinas have gained over the Dutch: honor, on account of the glory which the Catholic arms acquire in those seas, which gains for them the esteem of the Japanese, Chinese, Sianese, Mindanaos, and innumerable other peoples, who serve as spectators in the theatre for such exploits; and profit, since, if the enemy’s forces are weakened it follows that, besides those that he loses in being conquered, he is compelled to expend still greater ones in order to keep his foothold. This is the most notable reason for maintaining powerful squadrons on the sea, in order that if the pirate undertakes to plunder successfully, he will have to do it with so great a force that either he will abandon the prize because he cannot hold it, or he will let it alone because the profits do not make it worth his while. Of the victories which the Spaniards have gained in those seas there are extant histories and accounts; and in the large memorial some of these are mentioned.
The seventh is, that [by the islands] are aided the two crowns of Castilla and Portugal, who are so united and in so fraternal relations in the Orient, each possessing its share of the two parts into which that region is, as we have said, divided. If we are to base our opinion on experience, the facts are evident in the restoration of Moluco; for in the time of Governor Don Juan de Sylva the forces of both crowns were joined, and it is regarded as certain that, if death had not intercepted his designs, he would have driven from those seas the arms of Holanda and of Inglaterra, and awakened fear and dread in many kings who were awaiting the result of so powerful a combination; and, even though success is not always so immediate, it suffices that it should be possible to make the enemy fear, and to lead them to believe that what has occurred sometimes may occur often.
The eighth reason is to protect and preserve the commerce of China for both crowns. For this argument it is taken for granted that this commerce is one of the most beneficial and lucrative of those in the entire Orient; and we can say that there is no other in all the world that equals it. The Oriental traffic of ancient times, which the Romans so highly valued, originated in China and in the drugs, fabrics, and curiosities of that country – although, as they were ignorant of its real origin, they called it the India trade, since they received it from that country. In the larger memorial I have already discoursed upon this at length. Now all the nations in those [Oriental] kingdoms take part in this commerce, but it is conducted most extensively and steadily by the Portuguese of India and the Castilians of Manila; we shall soon relate how important it
i. e., Hindostan (see VOL. XVII, p. 252). The grave accent is here used in the word Mogòr, simply as following the usage of the Extracto, which throughout prints the grave instead of the acute accent.