The Life of John Marshall, Volume 3: Conflict and construction, 1800-1815. Beveridge Albert Jeremiah

The Life of John Marshall, Volume 3: Conflict and construction, 1800-1815 - Beveridge Albert Jeremiah


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assault we are now to examine.

      At the time of his inauguration, Jefferson apparently meant to carry out the bargain61 by which his election was made possible. "We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists," were the reassuring words with which he sought to quiet those who already were beginning to regret that they had yielded to his promises.62 Even Marshall was almost favorably impressed by the inaugural address. "I have administered the oath to the Presdt.," he writes Pinckney immediately after Jefferson had been inducted into office. "His inauguration speech … is in general well judged and conciliatory. It is in direct terms giving the lie to the violent party declamation which has elected him, but it is strongly characteristic of the general cast of this political theory."63

      It is likely that, for the moment, the President intended to keep faith with the Federalist leaders. But the Republican multitude demanded the spoils of victory; and the Republican leaders were not slow or soft-spoken in telling their chieftain that he must take those measures, the assurance of which had captivated the popular heart and given "the party of the people" a majority in both House and Senate.

      Thus the Republican programme of demolition was begun. Federalist taxes were, of course, to be abolished; the Federalist mint dismantled; the Federalist army disbanded; the Federalist navy beached. Above all, the Federalist system of National courts was to be altered, the newly appointed Federalist National judges ousted and their places given to Republicans; and if this could not be accomplished, at least the National Judiciary must be humbled and cowed. Yet every step must be taken with circumspection – the cautious politician at the head of the Government would see to that. No atom of party popularity64 must be jeopardized; on the contrary, Republican strength must be increased at any cost, even at the temporary sacrifice of principle.65 Unless these facts are borne in mind, the curious blending of fury and moderation – of violent attack and sudden quiescence – in the Republican tactics during the first years of Jefferson's Administration are inexplicable.

      Jefferson determined to strike first at the National Judiciary. He hated it more than any other of the "abominations" of Federalism. It was the only department of the Government not yet under his control. His early distrust of executive authority, his suspicion of legislative power when his political opponents held it, were now combined against the National courts which he did not control.

      Impotent and little respected as the Supreme Court had been and still was, Jefferson nevertheless entertained an especial fear of it; and this feeling had been made personal by the thwarting of his cherished plan of appointing his lieutenant, Spencer Roane of Virginia, Chief Justice of the United States.66 The elevation of his particular aversion, John Marshall, to that office, had, he felt, wickedly robbed him of the opportunity to make the new regime harmonious; and, what was far worse, it had placed in that station of potential, if as yet undeveloped, power, one who, as Jefferson had finally come to think, might make the high court of the Nation a mighty force in the Government, retard fundamental Republican reforms, and even bring to naught measures dear to the Republican heart.

      It seems probable that, at this time, Jefferson was the only man who had taken Marshall's measure correctly. His gentle manner, his friendliness and conviviality, no longer concealed from Jefferson the courage and determination of his great relative; and Jefferson doubtless saw that Marshall, with his universally conceded ability, would find means to vitalize the National Judiciary, and with his fearlessness, would employ those means.

      "The Federalists," wrote Jefferson, "have retired into the judiciary as a stronghold … and from that battery all the works of republicanism are to be beaten down and erased."67 Therefore that stronghold must be taken. Never was a military plan more carefully devised than was the Republican method of capturing it. Jefferson would forthwith remove all Federalist United States marshals and attorneys;68 he would get rid of the National judges whom Adams had appointed under the Judiciary Act of 1801.69 If this did not make those who remained on the National Bench sufficiently tractable, the sword of impeachment would be held over their obstinate heads until terror of removal and disgrace should render them pliable to the dominant political will. Thus by progressive stages the Supreme Court would be brought beneath the blade of the executioner and the obnoxious Marshall decapitated or compelled to submit.

      To this agreeable course, so well adapted to his purposes, the President was hotly urged by the foremost leaders of his party. Within two weeks after Jefferson's inauguration, the able and determined William Branch Giles of Virginia, faithfully interpreting the general Republican sentiment, demanded "the removal of all its [the Judiciary's] executive officers indiscriminately." This would get rid of the Federalist marshals and clerks of the National courts; they had been and were, avowed Giles, "the humble echoes" of the "vicious schemes" of the National judges, who had been "the most unblushing violators of constitutional restrictions."70 Again Giles expressed the will of his party: "The revolution [Republican success in 1800] is incomplete so long as that strong fortress [the Judiciary] is in possession of the enemy." He therefore insisted upon "the absolute repeal of the whole judiciary system."71

      The Federalist leaders quickly divined the first part of the Republican purpose: "There is nothing which the [Republican] party more anxiously wish than the destruction of the judicial arrangements made during the last session," wrote Sedgwick.72 And Hale, with dreary sarcasm, observed that "the independence of our Judiciary is to be confirmed by being made wholly subservient to the will of the legislature & the caprice of Executive visions."73

      The judges themselves had invited the attack so soon to be made upon them.74 Immediately after the Government was established under the Constitution, they took a position which disturbed a large part of the general public, and also awakened apprehensions in many serious minds. Persons were haled before the National courts charged with offenses unknown to the National statutes and unnamed in the Constitution; nevertheless, the National judges held that these were indictable and punishable under the common law of England.75

      This was a substantial assumption of power. The Judiciary avowed its right to pick and choose among the myriad of precedents which made up the common law, and to enforce such of them as, in the opinion of the National judges, ought to govern American citizens. In a manner that touched directly the lives and liberties of the people, therefore, the judges became law-givers as well as law-expounders. Not without reason did the Republicans of Boston drink with loud cheers this toast: "The Common Law of England! May wholesome statutes soon root out this engine of oppression from America."76

      The occasions that called forth this exercise of judicial authority were the violation of Washington's Neutrality Proclamation, the violation of the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, and the numberless threats to disregard both. From a strictly legal point of view, these indeed furnished the National courts with plausible reasons for the position they took. Certainly the judges were earnestly patriotic and sincere in their belief that, although Congress had not authorized it, nevertheless, that accumulation of British decisions, usages, and customs called "the common law" was a part of American National jurisprudence; and that, of a surety, the assertion of it in the National tribunals was indispensable to the suppression of crimes against the United States. In charging the National grand jury at Richmond, May 22, 1793, Chief Justice John Jay first announced this doctrine, although not specifically naming the common law.77 Two months later, Justice James Wilson claimed the same inclusive power in his address to the grand jury at Philadelphia.78

      In 1793, Joseph Ravara, consul for Genoa,


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<p>61</p>

See vol. ii, 531-47, of this work.

<p>62</p>

See Adams: U.S. i, chaps. ix and x, for account of the revolutionary measures which the Republicans proposed to take.

<p>63</p>

Marshall to Pinckney, March 4, 1801, "four o'clock," MS.

<p>64</p>

"It is the sole object of the Administration to acquire popularity." (Wolcott to Cabot, Aug. 28, 1802, Lodge: Cabot, 325.)

"The President has … the itch for popularity." (J. Q. Adams to his father, November, 1804, Writings, J. Q. A.: Ford, iii, 81.)

"The mischiefs of which his immoderate thirst for … popularity are laying the foundation, are not immediately perceived." (Adams to Quincy, Dec. 4, 1804, Quincy, 64.)

"It seems to be a great primary object with him never to pursue a measure if it becomes unpopular." (Plumer's Diary, March 4, 1805, Plumer MSS. Lib. Cong.)

"In dress, conversation, and demeanor he studiously sought and displayed the arts of a low demagogue seeking the gratification of the democracy on whose voices and votes he laid the foundation of his power." (Quincy's Diary, Jan. 1806, Quincy, 93.)

<p>65</p>

Ames to Gore, Dec. 13, 1802, Works of Fisher Ames: Ames, i, 309.

<p>66</p>

Dodd in American Historical Review, xii, 776; and see next chapter.

<p>67</p>

Jefferson to Dickinson, Dec. 19, 1801, Writings of Thomas Jefferson: Washington, iv, 424.

<p>68</p>

"The only shield for our Republican citizens against the federalism of the courts is to have the attorneys & Marshals republicans." (Jefferson to Stuart, April 8, 1801, Works: Ford, ix, 248.)

<p>69</p>

"The judge of course stands until the law [Judiciary Act of 1801] shall be repealed which we trust will be at the next Congress." (Jefferson to Stuart, April 8, 1801, Works: Ford, ix, 247.) For two weeks Jefferson appears to have been confused as to the possibility of repealing the Judiciary Act of 1801. A fortnight before he informed Stuart that this course would be taken, he wrote Giles that "the courts being so decidedly federal and irremovable," it was "indispensably necessary" to appoint "republican attorneys and marshals." (Jefferson to Giles, March 23, 1801, MSS. Lib. Cong. as quoted by Carpenter in American Political Science Review, ix, 522.)

But the repeal had been determined upon within six weeks after Jefferson's inauguration as his letter to Stuart shows.

<p>70</p>

Giles to Jefferson, March 16, 1801, Anderson: William Branch Giles – A Study in the Politics of Virginia 1790-1830, 77.

<p>71</p>

Same to same, June 1, 1801, ib. 80.

<p>72</p>

Sedgwick to King, Dec. 14, 1801, King, iv, 36.

<p>73</p>

Hale to King, Dec. 19, 1801, King, iv, 39.

<p>74</p>

It must be carefully kept in mind that from the beginning of the Revolution most of the people were antagonistic to courts of any kind, and bitterly hostile to lawyers. (See vol. i, 297-99, of this work.)

Braintree, Mass., in 1786, in a town meeting, denounced lawyers and demanded by formal resolution the enactment of "such laws … as may crush or, at least, put a proper check of restraint" upon them.

Dedham, Mass., instructed its members of the Legislature to secure the passage of laws that would "check" attorneys; and if this were not practicable, then "you are to endeavor [to pass a bill declaring] that the order of Lawyers be totally abolished." (Warren: History of the American Bar, 215.) All this, of course, was the result of the bitter hardships of debtors.

<p>75</p>

For an able defense of the adoption by the National courts of the British common law, see Works of the Honourable James Wilson: Wilson, iii, 384.

<p>76</p>

Columbian Centinel, July 11, 1801, as quoted in Warren, 225-27.

<p>77</p>

Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay: Johnston, iii, 478-85.

<p>78</p>

Wharton: State Trials of the U.S. during the Administrations of Washington and Adams, 60 et seq.; and see Wilson's law lecture on the subject, Wilson, iii, 384.