Villainage in England: Essays in English Mediaeval History. Paul Vinogradoff
its origin distinctly from pre-Conquest conditions. The manors forming it are taken as the manors of St. Edward240; the tenants, whenever they want to make a solemn claim, set forth their rights from the time of St. Edward241, or even Cnut242. But does this mean that the actual privileges of the tenure were extant in Saxon times? Surely not. Such things as freedom from common taxation, exemption from toll, separate jurisdiction, certainly existed in behalf of the king's demesnes before the Conquest, but there is no intimation whatever that the king's tenants enjoyed any peculiar right or protection as to their holdings and services. The 'little writ of right' and the 'Monstraverunt' are as Norman, in a wide sense of the word, as the freedom from serving on assizes or sending representatives to parliament. But although there is no doubt that this tenure grew up and developed several of its peculiarities after the Conquest, it had to fall back on Saxon times for its substance243, which may be described in few words—legal protection of the peasantry. The influence of Norman lawyers was exercised in shaping out certain actionable rights, the effect of conquest was to narrow to a particular class a protection originally conferred broadly, and the action of Saxon tradition was to supply a general stock of freedom and independent right, from which the privileged condition of Norman times could draw its nourishment, if I may put it in that way. It would be idle now to discuss in what proportion the Saxon influence on the side of freedom has to be explained by the influx of men who had been originally owners of their lands, and what may be assigned to the contractual character of Saxon tenant-right. This subject must be left till we come to examine the evidence supplied by Saxon sources of information. My present point is that the ancient demesne tenure of the Conquest is a remnant of the condition of things before the Conquest244.
It may well be asked why the destructive effects of Norman victory were arrested on ancient demesne soil? Was not the king as likely to exercise his discretion in respect of the peasantry as any feudal lord, and is it likely that he would have let himself be fettered by considerations and obligations which did not bind his subjects? In view of such questions one is tempted to treat the protection of the tenants on the ancient demesne merely as a peculiar boon granted to the people whom the king had to give away. I need not say that such an interpretation would be entirely wrong. I hope I have been able to make out convincingly that legal protection given against private lords on manors which had been alienated was only an outgrowth from that certainty of condition which was allowed on the king's own lands. I will just add now that one very striking fact ought to be noticed in this connexion; certainty of tenure and service is limited to one particular class in the manor, although that class is the most numerous one. If this privilege came into being merely by the fixation of status at the time when a manor passed from the crown, the state of the villain pure would have got fixed in the same way as that of the villain socman. But it did not, and so one cannot shirk the difficult question, What gave rise to the peculiar protection against the lord when the lord happened to be king?
I think that three considerations open the way out of the difficulty. To begin with, the king was decidedly considered as the one great safeguard of Saxon tradition and the one defender against Norman encroachments. He had constantly to hear the cry about 'the laws of Edward the Confessor,' and although the claim may be considered as a very vague one in general matters, it became substantiated in this case of tenure and services by the Domesday record. Then again, the proportion of free owners who had lapsed into territorial dependence must have been much greater on the king's land than anywhere else; it was quite usual to describe an allodial owner from the feudal point of view as holding under the king in a particular way, and villain socage was only one of several kinds of socage after all. Last, but not least, the protection against exactions was in reality directed not against the king personally but against his officers, and the king personally was quite likely to benefit by it almost as much as his men. It amounted after all only to a recognition of definite customs in general, to a special judicial organisation of the manor which made it less dependent upon the steward, and to the facilities afforded for complaint and revision of judgments. As to this last it must be noted that the king's men were naturally enough in a better position than the rest of the English peasantry; the curse of villainage was that manorial courts were independent of superior organisation as far as the lower tenants were concerned. But courts in royal manors were the king's courts after all, and as such they could hardly be severed from the higher tribunals held in the king's name.
I may be allowed to sum up the conclusions of this chapter under the following heads:—
1. The law of ancient demesne is primarily developed in regard to the manors in the king's own hand.
2. The special protection granted to villain socmen in ancient demesne is a consequence of a certainty of condition as much recognised in manors which the king still holds as in those which he has alienated.
3. This certainty of condition is derived from the Conquest as the connecting link between the Norman and the Saxon periods.
CHAPTER IV.
LEGAL ASPECT OF VILLAINAGE. CONCLUSIONS
Method of investigation.
I have been trying to make out what the theories of the lawyers were with regard to villainage in its divers ramifications. Were we to consider this legal part of the subject merely as a sort of crust superposed artificially over the reality of social facts, we should have to break through the crust in order to get at the reality. But, of course, the law regulating social conditions is not merely an external superstructure, but as to social facts is both an influence and a consequence. In one sense it is a most valuable product of the forces at play in the history of society, most valuable just by reason of the requirements of its formalism and of those theoretical tendencies which give a very definite even if a somewhat distorted shape to the social processes which come within its sphere of action.
The formal character of legal theory is not only important because it puts things into order and shape; it suggests a peculiar and efficient method of treating the historical questions connected with law. The legal intellect is by its calling and nature always engaged in analysing complex cases into constitutive elements, and bringing these elements under the direction of principles. It is constantly struggling with the confusing variety of life, and from the historian's point of view it is most interesting when it succumbs in the struggle. There is no law, however subtle and comprehensive, which does not exhibit on its logical surface seams and scars, testifying to the incomplete fusing together of doctrines that cannot be brought under the cover of one principle. And so a dialectic examination of legal forms which makes manifest the contradictions and confused notions they contain actually helps us to an insight into the historical stratification of ideas and facts, a stratification which cannot be abolished however much lawyers may crave for unity and logic.
Uncertainty and contradictions of legal theory.
In the particular case under discussion medieval law is especially rich in such historical clues. The law writers are trying hard to give a construction of villainage on the basis of the Roman doctrine of slavery, but their fabric gives way at every point. It would be hardly a fair description to say that we find many survivals of an older state of things and many indications of a new development. Everything seems in a state of vacillation and fermentation during the thirteenth century. As to the origin of the servile status the law of bastards gets inverted; in the case of matrimony the father-rule is driving the mother-rule from the ground; the influence of prescription is admitted by some lawyers and rejected by others. As to the means whereby persons may issue out of that condition, the views of Glanville and Bracton are diametrically opposed, and there are still traces in practice of the notion that a villain cannot buy his freedom and that he cannot be manumitted by the lord himself in regard to third persons. In their treatment of services in their reference to status the courts apply the two different tests of certainty and of kind. In their treatment of tenure they still hesitate between a complete denial of protection to villainage and the recognition of it as a mode of holding which is protected by legal remedies. And even when the chief lines are definitely drawn they only disclose fundamental contradictions in all their
Stoneleigh Reg., 4 a: 'Que quidem maneria existencia in possessione et manu domini regis Edwardi per universum regnum vocantur antiquum dominicum corone regis Anglie prout in libro de Domesday continetur.'
'Loquebantur de tempore Sti Edwardi Regis coram W. de Wilton.'
The men of King's Ripton.
I do not think there is any ground for the suggestion thrown out by M. Kovalevsky in the Law Quarterly, iv. p. 271, namely, that the law of ancient demesne was imported from Normandy. Whatever the position of the villains was in the Duchy, Norman influence in England made for subjection, because it was the influence of conquest. It must be remembered that in a sense the feudal law of England was the hardest of all in Western Europe, and this on account of the invasion.
Stubbs, Const. Hist. i. 454: 'In those estates, which, when they had been held by the crown since the reign of Edward the Confessor, bore the title of manors in ancient demesne, very much of the ancient popular process had been preserved without any change, and to the present day some customs are maintained in them which recall the most primitive institutions.' I shall have to speak about the mode of holding the courts in another chapter.