Twelve Months with the Eighth Massachusetts Infantry in the Service of the United States. Harry Endicott Webber
two regiments to compose the Brigade, and this arrangement was not changed while the Division remained in service.
On the 16th of November I was relieved from the command of the Second Division and ordered to the Second Brigade, relieving General Waites, and was thus brought into closer contact with the Eighth Massachusetts. The Brigade remained in Americus until November 26th when, under orders from the War Department, the headquarters, the Brigade Hospital and the Twelfth New York Regiment, were ordered to Charleston, S. C. en route to Matanzas, Cuba, where it arrived January 1st.
A few days later the Eighth Massachusetts rejoined, and not long thereafter the One Hundred and Sixtieth Indiana, Third Kentucky, Tenth United States Infantry, and six troops of the Second United States Cavalry which composed the garrison of the city and district of Matanzas, and the Second Brigade of the Second Division of the First Army Corps, practically ceased to exist. When the Third Division became the Second Division, Major General Ludlow was assigned to command it. He remained in command until December 17th when I was ordered to relieve him. I rejoined the Second Brigade in Americus December 26th and went with it to Cuba.
The Eighth remained in Matanzas until April 4, 1899, when it sailed for Boston, where it was mustered out of the service of the United States, and reverted to its status as a regiment of the National Guard. While it was not given to the Eighth Massachusetts to undergo the supreme test of the battlefield, it proved beyond the shadow of a doubt by its calm indifference to death in other forms and its devotion to duty, that it would have met that test with a glorified record of good discipline and steadfast courage. Who among all of those who had the misfortune to remain in Chickamauga Park through the summer of 1898, will ever forget the trials and dangers of that encampment? From forty to sixty thousand men huddled together within an area not too large for a sedentary camp of two divisions.1
Prior to August 1st the camps of all the regiments of the Third Division, were in the woods with an average of from six to eight men in a tent, many of which were unfit for occupancy. Polluted water, insufficient supplies and protection from the incessant rains of that year, and the fact that neither the camp nor the tents were ever moved, from lack of space, produced their inevitable result, and when the Third Division left the Park, August 21st, there were twenty-nine officers and 1237 enlisted men on the sick report, out of 337 officers and 9464 men present; or, in other words, one officer out of twelve and one man out of eight. Although questioned at the time by those high in authority, it is now well known that a large proportion of the sick had typhoid fever; in fact it was epidemic.2
My recollections of Chickamauga Park are not pleasant for reasons which I cannot very well explain here. It is sufficient to say that I was fully cognizant of the wretched conditions which sent the sick report higher each day and subjected the sick in hospital to needless privation and suffering, but was powerless to prevent or ameliorate them. In fact, for administrative purposes, I was very little more than a figure head, although held responsible by the regiments, whose appeals for a relief which never came while we remained in the Park, were most distressing to me. At that time the collapse of the war had not been foreseen, and although the Spanish forces in the eastern district of Santiago, Cuba had capitulated July 16, it was not until the protocol of August 12th, providing for a cessation of hostilities, that we felt the war was over and that the Third Division would probably never fire a hostile shot. In the meantime, however, under the orders of the Corps Commander, the Division was held in readiness to move at a moment's notice, and every effort was made to prepare it for service against the Spaniards.
To this end, and on the day after I assumed the command, orders were issued to prepare the Division for active service in accordance with the instructions of the War Department. These prescribed the clothing, ammunition, and rations to be carried on the person and in the two wagons allowed each company,—all other clothing and all other personal belongings of the men to be packed in boxes legibly marked with the company and regiment, and turned over to the depot quartermaster for storage or shipment. To render the officers and men expert in packing, and to determine just what could be carried under the instructions referred to, each regiment was required to strike tents and pack up, after which it was marched to the regimental parade grounds, followed by its wagons, and inspected by the Brigade Commander. It was well understood that all regimental and company property which had not been disposed of when marching orders were received, must be abandoned.
As up to the time I assumed command of the Division there had been no target practice, on July 1, Major Edward H. Eldredge, of the Eighth Massachusetts, was appointed Inspector of Rifle Practice, and preparations were at once made to begin target practice. Nothing could have been more fortunate than the selection of the major for this most important branch of instruction. Conscientious, enthusiastic, and thoroughly competent, he had the target ranges established, and the Division at work firing within a week, and this was continued daily (Sunday excepted), until just before the Division left the Park.
On July 26 a division rifle competition was held, each regiment furnishing a team of 12 men; ten shots were fired off hand by each man, at 160 yards (possible score 600 points). The highest score was made by the Eighth Massachusetts with 481 points; the lowest score was 409.
In the course of the instruction it was found that many men had never fired a gun and were correspondingly ignorant of this most important requirement. What would they have done in the line of battle? Well, I will tell you. Those who were not killed would have been perfectly demoralized until they either ran away or perhaps were wounded, in which case they would have added vastly to the cares of the Division Commander and his medical staff. In either case, they would have been of no possible use except as stretcher bearers. Nothing could be more objectionable on the part of the high military authorities than to send such men under fire, and there is no possible excuse for it.
Other measures taken to prepare the Division for active service were careful instruction in guard duty, the service of advance guards and outposts, by battalions and regiments; litter drill and "first aid."
As it was rumored that the First Corps would be sent against Havana, orders were issued for the formation of a pioneer detachment in each regiment to consist of one officer, two non-commissioned officers and ten privates, to be specially selected for their practical knowledge of the duties of pioneers, viz: the removal of obstructions, corduroying roads, the building, repair and destruction of simple bridges, culverts, railroad beds and embankments, and the use of high explosives. No difficulty whatever was experienced in finding the men who in the discharge of their duties rendered most valuable services to the Division.
To give the brigade and regimental commanders some idea of the difficulty of forming the Division in line of battle on broken and obstructed ground, and to exercise the officers and men in preserving the line, supplying ammunition, and caring for the wounded,—problems in which the entire Division took part, were carried out practically.
Many of you will doubtless remember those exercises and how difficult it was to form the Division in line without wide gaps between brigades, or to move it in any direction without breaking the formation. These problems, although extremely simple, were of great benefit as a relief to the monotony of drill, and in testing the field efficiency of the medical and ordinance services.
In the meantime, the Corps Commander, with the First Division of the Corps, left the Park en route to Cuba and Porto Rico, and on August 15th I went to Lexington to select a camp for the Third Division, in which the typhoid had spread rapidly, and on August 21st, the movement to Lexington began. Although we left between three and four hundred men in the hospital when we moved to Lexington, the Division was so thoroughly impregnated with this disease and with malarial fever that more cases were inevitable, and the hospital of 1000 beds, which was established in anticipation of this very contingency, proved inadequate, and but for the timely removal of the convalescents to other places, would have needed a large extension. Those of the regiment now living will not have forgotten the struggle which then took place to stamp out the typhoid fever. It was a fight to a finish, in which every available means known to medical and sanitary science was used during a period of three months.
For the information of those members of the regiment who have joined since the war with Spain, and because it
In 1898, the Park proper contained 5530.4 acres, of which 2032.8 acres were cleared and 3506.6 wooded. Troops on the march may camp or bivouac in the woods with but little risk to the health of the men, but in a sedentary camp the tents must be in the open.
The records of the War Department show that in August there were 1568 cases of typhoid in the Division and General Hospitals; there were probably as many more in the regiments.