The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature. Butler Joseph
Nor is it a presumption against Christianity, that it contains things unlike the apparent course of nature.1.) We cannot suppose every thing, in the vast universe, to be just like what is the course of nature in this little world.2.) Even within the present compass of our knowledge, we see many things greatly unlike.
3. If we choose to call what is unlike our known course of things, miraculous, still that does not make it improbable.
II. There is no presumption against such a revelation, as we should now call miraculous, being made, at the beginning of the world.
1. There was then no course of nature, as to this world.
2. Whether man then received a revelation involves a question not of miracles, but of fact.
3. Creation was a very different exertion of power from that which rules the world, now it is made.
4. Whether the power of forming stopped when man was made; or went on, and formed a religion for him, is merely a question as to the degree or extent, to which a power was exerted.
5. There is then no presumption from analogy against supposing man had a revelation when created.
6. All tradition and history teaches that he had, which amounts to a real and material proof.
III. There is no presumption against miracles, or a miraculous revelation, after the course of nature was settled.
1. Such a presumption, requires the adduction of some parallel case.
2. This would require us to know the history of some other world.
3. Even then, if drawn from only one other world, the presumption would be very precarious.
To be more particular,
1. There is a strong presumption against any truth till it is proved—which yet is overcome by almost any proof.—Hence the question of a presumption against miracles, involves only the degree of presumption, (not whether the presumption is peculiar to miracles,) and whether that degree is such as to render them incredible.
2. If we leave out religion, we are in total darkness as to the cause or circumstances on which the course of nature depends.—Five or six thousand years may have given occasion and reasons for miraculous interpositions of Providence.
3. Taking in religion, there are distinct reasons for miracles; to afford additional instruction; to attest the truth of instruction.
4. Miracles must not be compared with common events, but with uncommon; earthquakes, pestilence, &c.
CONCLUSION.
1. There are no analogies to render miracles incredible.
2. On the contrary, we see good reasons for them.
3. There are no presumptions against them, peculiar to them, as distinguished from other unusual phenomena.
CHAPTER III.
OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING WHAT SHOULD BE EXPECTED IN A REVELATION FROM GOD.
Beside the objectors to the evidences of Christianity, there are many who object to its nature. They say it is not full enough: has in it foolish things: gives rise to superstition: subserves tyranny: is not universally known: not well arranged: figurative language, &c.
It is granted that if it contained immoralities or contradictions they would show it to be false. But other objections against religion, aside from objections against its evidences, are frivolous: as will now be shown.
Let the student look to the force of the proofs, rather than any consequences which may be drawn from them.
I. The Scripture informs us of a scheme of government, in addition to the material laws of the world.
1. If both these schemes, the physical and the moral, coincide and form one whole, then our inability to criticise the system of nature, renders it credible that we are incompetent to criticise the system of grace.
2. Nature shows many things we should not have expected, prior to experience.
3. Hence it is altogether likely it would be so in religion.
4. If a citizen is incompetent to judge of the propriety of the general laws of his government, he is equally incompetent to judge when and how far those laws should be suspended, or deviated from.
II. We are no better judges of how revelation should be imparted.
Whether to every man, or to some for others; or what mode or degree of proof should be given; or whether the knowledge should be given gradually or suddenly.
1. We are not able to judge how much new knowledge ought to be given by revelation.
2. Nor how far, nor in what way, God should qualify men to transmit any revelation he might make.
3. Nor whether the evidence should be certain, probable, or doubtful.
4. Nor whether all should have the same benefit from it.
5. Nor whether it should be in writing, or verbal. If it be said that if not in writing it would not have answered its purpose: I ask, what purpose? Who knows what purposes would best suit God’s general government?
6. All which shows it to be absurd to object to particular things in revelation as unsuitable.
III. Hence the only question, concerning the truth of revelation is, whether it is a revelation.
1. No obscurities, &c. could overthrow the authority of a revelation.
2. It can only be overthrown by nullifying the proofs.
3. Though the proofs could be shown to be less strong than is affirmed, it still should control our conduct.
IV. Modes of arguing, which are perfectly just, in relation to other books, are not so as to the Bible.
1. We are competent judges of common books, but not of Scripture.
2. Our only inquiry should be to find out the sense.
3. In other books, internal improbabilities weaken external proof; but in regard to revelation, we scarcely know what are improbabilities.1.) Those who judge the Scripture by preconceived expectations, will imagine they find improbabilities.2.) And so they would by thus judging in natural things.—It would seem very improbable, prior to experience, that man should be better able to determine the magnitudes and motions of heavenly bodies, than he is to determine the causes and cures of disease, which much more nearly concerns him.—Or that we should sometimes hit upon a thing in an instant, even when thinking of something else, which we had been vainly trying to discover for years.—Or that language should be so liable to abuse, that every man may be a deceiver.—Or that brute instinct should ever be superior to reason.
V. Such observations apply to almost all objections to Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its evidence.
For instance, the disorderly manner in which some, in the apostolic age used their miraculous gifts.
1. This does not prove the acts not