The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature. Butler Joseph
really virtuous.2.) But when they are done in face of danger and difficulty, virtuousness is increased, and confirmed into a habit.
Objec. 1. As our intellectual or physical powers may be overtasked, so may our moral.Ans. This may be so in exceptional cases, but it does not confute the argument. In general, it holds good. All that is intended to be proved is, that this world is intended to be a state of improvement, and is fitted for it.1.) Some sciences which of themselves are highly improving, require a trying measure of attention, which some will not submit to.2.) It is admitted that this world disciplines many to vice: but this viciousness of many is the very thing which makes the world a virtuous discipline to good men. The whole end in placing mankind as they are we know not; but these things are evident—the virtues of some are exercised:—and so exercised as to be improved: and improved beyond what they would be in a perfectly virtuous community.3.) That all, or even the generality, do not improve, is no proof that their improvement was not intended. Of seeds and animals not one in a million comes to perfection; yet such as do, evidently answer an end for which they were designed. The appearance of waste in regard to seeds, &c. is just as unaccountable, as the ruin of moral agents.
Objec. 2. Rectitude arising from hope and fear, is only the discipline of self-love.Ans. Obedience is obedience, though prompted by hope or fear: and a course of such obedience, forms a habit of it: and distinct habits of various virtues, by repressing inclination whenever justice, veracity, &c. require. Beside, veracity, justice, regard to God’s authority, and self-interest, are coincident; and each, separately, a just principle. To begin a good life from either of them, and persist, produces that very character which corresponds to our relations to God, and secures happiness.
Objec. 3. The virtues requisite for a state of afflictions, and produced by it, are not wanted to qualify us for a state of happiness.Ans. Such is not the verdict of experience. Passive submission is essential to right character. Prosperity itself begets extravagant desires; and imagination may produce as much discontent as actual condition. Hence, though we may not need patience in heaven, we shall need that temper which is formed by patience. Self-love would always coincide with God’s commands, when our interest was rightly understood; but it is liable to error. Therefore, HABITS of resignation are necessary, for all creatures; and the proper discipline for resignation is affliction.
Objec. 4. The trouble and danger of such discipline, might have been avoided by making us at once, what we are intended to become.Ans. What we are to be, is the effect of what we are to do. God’s natural government is arranged not to save us from trouble or danger, but to enable and incline us to go through them. It is as natural for us to seek means to obtain things, as it is to seek the things; and in worldly things we are left to our choice, whether to improve our powers and so better our condition, or to neglect improvement and so go without the advantage. Analogy, therefore, makes the same arrangement credible, as to a future state.
III. This state of discipline may be necessary for the display of character.
1. Not to the all-knowing Being, but to his creation, or part of it, and in many ways which we know not.
2. It may be a means in disposing of men according to character.
3. And of showing creation that they are so disposed of.
4. Such display of character certainly contributes, largely, to the general course of things considered in this chapter.
CHAPTER VI.
OF NECESSITY AS INFLUENCING CONDUCT.
Fatalists have no right to object to Christianity, for they of course hold the doctrine to be compatible with what they see in nature.
The question is, whether it be not equally compatible with what Christianity teaches.
To argue on the supposition of so great an absurdity as necessity, is puzzling; and the obscurity and puzzle of the argument must therefore be excused.
I. Necessity does not destroy the proof of an intelligent Author and Governor of the world.
1. It does not exclude design and deliberation.1.) This is matter of actual experience and consciousness.—Necessity does not account for the existence of any thing, but is only a circumstance relating to its origin. Instance the case of a house: the fatalist admits that it had a builder, and the only question would be, was he obliged to build it as he did?2.) It is the same as to the construction of the world. To say it exists by necessity must mean it had a maker, who acted by necessity: for necessity is only an abstract notion, and can do nothing.3.) We say God exists by necessity, because we intuitively discern that there must be an infinite Being, prior to all causes; but we cannot say that every thing so exists. The fact that many changes in nature are produced by man’s contrivance is a proof of this.4.) Thus though the fatalist does not choose to mean by necessity an agent acting necessarily, he is obliged to mean this.5.) And it also follows that a thing’s being done by necessity does not exclude design.
2. It does not exclude a belief that we are in a state of religion.1.) Suppose a fatalist to educate a child on his own principles—viz.: that he cannot do otherwise than he does; and is not subject to praise or blame. (It might be asked, would he, if possessed of common sense, so educate his child?)—The child would be delighted with his freedom; but would soon prove a pest, and go to destruction.—He would meet with checks and rebuffs, which would teach him that he was accountable.—He would, in the end, be convinced either that his doctrine was wrong, or that he had reasoned inconclusively upon it, and misapplied it.2.) To apply fatalism to practice, in any other way, would be found equally fallacious: e.g. that he need not take care of his life.3.) No such absurdity follows the doctrine of freedom.—Reasoning on this ground is justified by all experience.—The constitution of things is as if we were free.4.) If the doctrine of necessity be true, and yet, when we apply it to life, always misleads us; how, then, can we be sure it would not mislead us with respect to future interests?5.) It follows that if there are proofs of religion on the supposition of freedom, they are just as conclusive on the supposition of necessity.
3. It does not refute the notion that God has a will and a character.1.) It does not hinder us from having a will and a character; from being cruel, or benevolent, or just, &c.2.) If necessity be plead as the excuse for crime, it equally excuses the punishment of crime; for if it destroys the sin of the one, it destroys the sin of the other.3.) The very assumption of injustice in punishing crime, shows that we cannot rid ourselves of the notion of justice and injustice.
Objec. If necessity be reconcilable with the character of God, as portrayed in Christianity, does it not destroy the proof that he has that character; and so destroy the proofs of religion?Ans. No. Happiness and misery are not our fate, but the results of our conduct. God’s government is that of a father and a magistrate; and his natural rule of government must be veracity and justice. We shall proceed to show that,
II. Necessity does not destroy the proofs of religion.
1. It is a plain fact that God rewards and punishes.1.) He has given us a moral faculty, by which we discern between actions, and approve or disapprove, &c.2.) This implies a rule, a peculiar kind of rule; i.e. one from which we cannot depart without being self-condemned.3.) The dictates of our moral faculty are God’s laws, with sanctions. It not only raises a sense of duty, but a sense of security in obeying, and danger in disobeying; and this is an explicit sanction.4.) God’s government must conform to the nature he has given us; and we must infer that in the upshot happiness will follow virtue, and misery vice.5.) Hence religious worship is a duty, if only as a means of keeping up the sense of this government.6.) No objection from necessity can lie against this course of proof.—The conclusion is wholly and directly from facts; not from what might appear to us to be fit, but from what his