The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature. Butler Joseph

       1. In determining our judgments and practice.1.) There may be cases in which its value is doubtful.2.) There may be seeming analogies, which are not really such.3.) But as a mode of argument, it is perfectly just and conclusive.

       2. In noting correspondencies between the different parts of God’s government.1.) We may expect to find the same sort of difficulties in the Bible, as we do in Nature.2.) To deny the Bible to be of God, because of these difficulties, requires us to deny that the world was made by him.3.) If there be a likeness between revelation and the system of nature, it affords a presumption that both have the same author.4.) To reason on the construction and government of the world, without settling foundation-principles, is mere hypothesis.5.) To apply principles which are certain, to cases which are not applicable, is no better.6.) But to join abstract reasonings to the observation of facts, and argue, from known present things, to what is likely or credible, must be right.7.) We cannot avoid acting thus, if we act at all.

       3. In its application to religion, revealed, as well as natural. This is the use which will be made of analogy in the following work. In so using it,1.) It will be taken for proved that there is an intelligent Creator and Ruler.—There are no presumptions against this, prior to proof.—There are proofs:—from analogy, reason, tradition, &c.—The fact is not denied by the generality of skeptics.2.) No regard will be paid to those who idly speculate as to how the world might have been made and governed.—Such prating would amount to this:· All creatures should have been made at first as happy as they could be.· Nothing of hazard should be put upon them.· Should have been secured in their happiness.· All punishments avoided.—It is a sufficient reply to such talk that mankind have not faculties for such speculations.3.) We are, to some extent, judges as to ends; and may conclude that Nature and Providence are designed to produce virtue and happiness; but of the means of producing these in the highest degree, we are not competent judges.—We know not the extent of the universe;—Nor even how one person can best be brought to perfection.—We are not often competent to judge of the conduct of each other.—As to God, we may presume that order will prevail in his universe; but are no judges of his modes for accomplishing this end.4.) Instead of vainly, and perhaps sinfully, imagining schemes for God’s conduct, we must study what is.—Discovering general laws.—Comparing the known course of things with what revelation teaches us to expect.

       1. Sometimes is practically equivalent to proof.

       2. Confirms what is otherwise proved.

       3. Shows that the system of revelation is no more open to ridicule, than the system of nature.

       4. Answers almost all objections against religion.

       5. To a great extent answers objections against the proofs of religion.

       1. The divine government is considered, as containing in it,Chap. 1. Man’s future existence.” 2. In a state of reward or punishment.” 3. This according to our behavior.” 4. Our present life probationary.” 5. And also disciplinary.” 6. Notwithstanding the doctrine of necessity.” 7. Or any apparent want of wisdom or goodness.

       2. Revealed religion is considered,Chap. 1. As important.” 2. As proved by miracles.” 3. As containing strange things.” 4. As a scheme imperfectly comprehended.” 5. As carried on by a mediator.” 6. As having such an amount of evidence as God saw fit to give.” 7. As having sufficient and full evidence.

       1. It is a law of nature that creatures should exist in different stages, and in various degrees of perfection.—Worms turn into flies.—Eggs are hatched into birds.—Our own present state is as different from our state in the womb, as two states of the same being can be.—That we shall hereafter exist in a state as different from the present as the present is from our state in the womb, is according to analogy.

       2. We now have capacities for happiness, action, misery, &c., and there is always a probability that things will continue as they are, except when experience gives us reason to think they will be altered. This is a general law; and is our only natural reason for expecting the continuance of any thing.

       3. There is no reason to apprehend that death will destroy us. If there was, it would arise from the nature of death; or from the analogy of nature.1.) Not from the nature of death.—We know not what death is.—But only some of its effects.—These effects do not imply the destruction of the living agent.—We know little of what the exercise of our powers depends upon; and nothing of what the powers themselves depend on.—We may be unable to exercise our powers, and yet not lose them—e.g. sleep, swoon.2.) Not from analogy.—Reason shows no connection between death and our destruction.—We have no faculties by which to trace any being beyond it.—The possession of living powers, up to the very moment when our faculties cease to be able to trace them, is a probability of their continuing.—We have already survived wonderful changes.—To live after death is analogous to the course of nature.

       1. That death destroys us.Ans. 1. This is an assumption that we are compound and material beings, and hence discerptible; which is not true.1.) Consciousness is a single, indivisible power, and of course the subject of it must be.2.) The material body is not ourself.3.) We can easily conceive of our having more limbs, or of a different kind, or of having more or fewer senses, or of having no bodies at all, or of hereafter animating these same bodies, remodelled.4.) The dissolution of a succession of new and strange bodies, would have no tendency to destroy us.Ans. 2. Though the absolute simplicity of the living being cannot be proved by experiment, yet facts lead us so to conclude. We lose limbs, &c. Our bodies were once very small, but we might, then, have lost part of them. There is a constant destruction and renewal going on.1.) Thus we see that no certain bulk is necessary to our existence, and unless it were proved that there is, and that it is larger than an indissoluble atom, there is no reason to presume that death destroys us, even if we are discerptible.2.) The living agent is not an internal material organism, which dies with the body. Because —Our only ground for this presumption is our relation to other systems of matter. But we see these are not necessary to us.—It will not do to say that lost portions of the body were not essential—who is to determine?—The relation between the living agent, and the most essential parts of the body, is only one by which they mutually affect each other.3.) If we regard our body as made up of organs of sense, we come to the same result.—We see with the eyes,