The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature. Butler Joseph
Euclid.
2. The great antiquity of revelation.
3. That its chronology is not contradicted but confirmed by known facts.
4. That there is nothing in the history itself to awaken suspicion of its fidelity.1.) Every thing said to be done in any age or country, is conformable to the manners of that age and country.2.) The characters are all perfectly natural.3.) All the domestic and political incidents are credible. Some of these, taken alone, seem strange to some, in this day; but not more so than things now occurring.4.) Transcribers may have made errors, but these are not more numerous than in other ancient books; and none of them impair the narrative.
5. That profane authors confirm Scripture accounts.
6. That the credibility of the general history, confirms the accounts of the miracles, for they are all interwoven, and make but one statement.
7. That there certainly was and is such a people as the Jews; whose form of government was founded on these very books of Moses; and whose acknowledgment of the God of the Bible, kept them a distinct race.
8. That one Jesus, of Jewish extraction, arose at the time when the Jews expected a Messiah, was rejected by them, as was prophesied, and was received by the Gentiles, as was prophesied.
9. That the religion of this Jesus spread till it became the religion of the world, notwithstanding every sort of resistance; and has continued till now.
10. That the Jewish government was destroyed, and the people dispersed into all lands; and still for many centuries, continue to be a distinct race, professing the law of Moses. If this separateness be accounted for, in any way, it does not destroy the fact that it was predicted.
CONCLUSION.
1. Recapitulation of the preceding ten observations.
2. Add the fact that there are obvious appearances in the world, aside from the Jews, which correspond to prophetic history.
3. These appearances, compared with Bible history, and with each other, in a joint view, will appear to be of great weight, and would impress one who regarded them for the first time, more than they do us who have been familiar with them.
4. The preceding discussion, though not thorough, amounts to proof of something more than human in this matter.1.) The sufficiency of these proofs may be denied, but the existence of them cannot be.2.) The conformity of prophecies to events may be said to be accidental, but the conformity itself cannot be denied.3.) These collateral proofs may be pronounced fanciful, but it cannot be said they are nothing. Probabilities may not amount to demonstration, but they remain probabilities.
5. Those who will set down all seeming completions of prophecy, and judge of them by the common rules of evidence, will find that together they amount to strong proof. Because probable proofs, added together, not only increase evidence, but multiply it.
6. It is very well to observe objections; but it should be remembered that a mistake on one side is far more dangerous than a mistake on the other; and the safest conclusion is the best.
7. Religion, like other things, is to be judged by all the evidence taken together. Unless all its proofs be overthrown, it remains proved. If no proof singly were sufficient, the whole taken together might be.
8. It is much easier to start an objection, than to comprehend the united force of a whole argument.
9. Thus it appears that the positive evidence of revelation cannot be destroyed, though it should be lessened.
CHAPTER VIII.
OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT.
If all made up their minds with proper care and candor, there would be no need of this chapter. But some do not try to understand what they condemn; and our mode of argument is open to objections, especially in the minds of those who judge without thinking. The chief objections will therefore be considered. They are these:—it does not solve difficulties in revelation to say that there are as great in natural religion:—it will not make men religious to show them that it is as important as worldly prudence, for showing that, does not make them prudent:—the justice of God in the system of religion, is not proved by showing it is as apparent as in his natural providence:—no reasoning from analogy can carry full conviction:—mankind will not renounce present pleasures, for a religion which is not free from doubt. To each of which a reply will now be given.
I. As to requiring a solution of all difficulties.
1. This is but resolving to comprehend the nature of God, and the whole plan of his government throughout eternity.
2. It is always right to argue from what is known, to what is disputed. We are constantly so doing. The most eminent physician does not understand all diseases, yet we do not despise what he does know.
3. It is very important to find that objections against revelation are just as strong, not only against natural religion, but against the course of nature.
II. As to men’s having as little reason for worldly pursuits, as they have for being religious.
1. If men can be convinced that they have as much reason to be religious as they have to practise worldly prudence, then there is a reason for being religious.
2. If religion proposes greater than worldly interests, and has the same reasons for belief, then it has proportionally a greater claim.
3. If religion being left doubtful, proves it to be false, then doubts as to the success of any worldly pursuit show it to be wrong. Yet we constantly act, even in the most important affairs, without certainty of being right.
III. As to the justice and goodness of God in religion.
1. Our business is not to vindicate God, but to learn our duty, governed as we are; which is a very different thing. It has been shown that if we knew all things, present, past, and future, and the relations of each thing to all other things, we might see to be just and good what now do not seem so: and it is probable we should.
2. We do not say that objections against God’s justice and goodness are removed by showing the like objections against natural providence, but that they are not conclusive, because they apply equally to what we know to be facts.
3. The existence of objections does not destroy the evidence of facts. The fact for instance that God rewards and punishes, though men may think it unjust. Even necessity, plead for human acts, does no more to abolish justice than it does injustice.
4. Though the reasonableness of Christianity cannot be shown from analogy, the truth of it may. The truth of a fact may be proved without regard to its quality. The reasonableness of obeying Christianity is proved, if we barely prove Christianity itself to be possible.
5. Though analogy may not show Christian precepts to be good, it proves them to be credible.
IV. The analogical argument does not remove doubt.
1. What opinion does any man hold, about which there can be no doubt? Even the best way of preserving and enjoying this life, is not agreed upon. Whether our measures will accomplish our objects, is always uncertain; and still more whether the objects, if accomplished, will give us happiness. Yet men do not on this account refuse to make exertion.
2. This objection overlooks the very nature of religion. The embracing of it presupposes a certain degree of candor and integrity, to try which, and exercise, and improve it, is its intention.