The History of American Military. Richard W. Stewart

The History of American Military - Richard W. Stewart


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land-hungry frontiersmen had no doubt that their troubles with the Indians were the result of British intrigue. Stories circulated after every Indian raid of British Army muskets and equipment found on the field. By 1812 the westerners were convinced their problems could best be solved by forcing the British out of Canada and annexing it to the United States.

      While the western “war hawks” urged war in the hope of conquering Canada, the people of Georgia, Tennessee, and the Mississippi Territory entertained similar designs against Florida, a Spanish possession. The fact that Spain and England were allies against Napoleon presented the southern war hawks with an excuse for invading Florida. By this time, also, the balance of political power had shifted south and west; ambitious party leaders had no choice but to align themselves with the war hawks, and 1812 was a presidential election year.

      President James Madison’s use of economic pressure to force England to repeal its blockade almost succeeded. The revival of the Non- Intercourse Act against Britain, prohibiting all trade with England and its colonies, coincided with a poor grain harvest in England and with a growing need for American provisions to supply the British troops fighting the French in Spain. As a result, on June 16, 1812, the British Foreign Minister announced that the blockade on American shipping would be relaxed. Had there been fast trans-Atlantic communications of any kind, war might well have been averted. However, before the news of the British concessions reached him, Madison had sent a message to Congress on June 1 listing all the complaints against England and asking for a declaration of war. Dividing along sectional lines, the House had voted for war on June 4; but the Senate approved only on June 18 and then by only six votes.

       Table of Contents

      At the outbreak of the war, the United States had a total population of about 7.7 million people and was very unprepared for war. A series of border forts garrisoned by very small Regular Army detachments stretched along the Canadian boundary: Fort Mackinac, on the straits between Lake Michigan and Lake Huron; Fort Dearborn, on the site of what is now Chicago; Fort Detroit; and Fort Niagara, at the mouth of the Niagara River on Lake Ontario. (Map 15) The actual strength of the Regular Army in June 1812 totaled 11,744 officers and men, including an estimated 5,000 recruits enlisted for the additional force authorized the preceding January, in contrast to an overall authorized strength of 35,600. The U.S. Navy consisted of 20 vessels: the 3 large 44-gun frigates, 3 smaller frigates of the Constellation class rated at 38 guns, and 14 others.

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      Map 15

      Congress did not lack the will to prepare for war. In March 1812 it had tried to place the Army’s supply system on a more adequate footing by establishing a Quartermaster Department on the military staff in place of the inefficient and costly military agent system. At the same time Congress created the Office of the Commissary General of Purchases in the War Department, and for the first time since the Revolution the Army’s supply system was placed under the exclusive control of the Secretary of War. In May Congress had made provision for an Ordnance Department responsible for the inspection and testing of all ordnance, cannon balls, shells, and shot; the construction of gun carriages and ammunition wagons; and the preparation and inspection of the “public powder.” It enlarged the Corps of Engineers by adding a company of bombardiers, sappers, and miners and expanded and reorganized the Military Academy at West Point. In addition to increasing the Regular Army, Congress had authorized the President to accept volunteer forces and to call upon the states for militia. The difficulty was not planning for an army, but raising one.

      One of the world’s major powers was ranged against the United States; but on the basis of available resources, the two belligerents were rather evenly matched. Most of Britain’s forces were tied up in the war against Napoleon, and for the time being very little military and naval assistance could be spared for the defense of Canada. At the outbreak of the war, there were about 7,000 British and Canadian regulars in Upper and Lower Canada (now the provinces of Ontario and Quebec). With a total white population of only half a million, Canada itself had only a small reservoir of militia to draw upon. When the war began, Maj. Gen. Isaac Brock, the military commander and civil governor of Upper Canada, had 800 militiamen available in addition to his 1,600 regulars. In the course of the war, the two provinces put a total of about 10,000 militiamen in the field; whereas in the United States, probably 450,000 of the militiamen saw active service, though not more than half of them ever got near the front.

       Uncle Sam

      One of the enduring symbols of America is that of Uncle Sam. His origins are somewhat obscure, but the most convincing story is that he was originally a Troy, New York, meatpacker named Sam Wilson. Sam Wilson was given a contract in 1812 to supply meat for the troops in New York and New Jersey. His firm put the preserved meat in wooden barrels and stamped them “U.S.” When the barrels reached the troops, some of whom were apparently from the Troy area, the troops supposedly remarked that the “U.S.” must stand for Uncle Sam! Ostensibly from these humble beginnings grew a character in nineteenth century political cartoons of a tall, bearded man dressed in striped pants and wearing a vest and star-spangled hat. James Montgomery Flagg would render this American symbol most powerfully in his 1916–1917 recruiting poster of a stern Uncle Sam pointing a finger at the viewer and stating, “I want you for U.S. Army.”

       Tecumseh

      After Tecumseh’s death in battle while leading warriors of his own Shawnee and other tribes during the War of 1812, he became a revered symbol of the noble warrior dying in battle for a cause. Tecumseh had watched Indian lands in the Northwest Territory whittled away by a series of treaties with individual tribes and urged intertribal cooperation to halt the advance of white settlement. Yet his idea of a united Indian front against white expansion never came to pass. Instead, clan and local loyalties prevailed. Tecumseh did not enjoy unanimous backing even from his own tribe, the Shawnees. His program of unity and organization was attractive to the very white people he opposed, for it was just what they would have done; but it ran counter to the customs and traditions of the Indian people he meant to defend and failed to attract them in sufficient numbers.

      The support of Indian tribes gave Canada one source of manpower that the United States lacked. After the Battle of Tippecanoe, Tecumseh, the Shawnee chief, had led his warriors across the border into Canada. There, along with the Canadian Indians, they joined the forces opposing the Americans. Perhaps 3,500 Indians were serving in the Canadian forces during the Thames River campaign in the fall of 1813, probably the largest number that took the field at any one time during the war.

      The bulk of the British Navy was also fighting in the war against Napoleon. In September 1812, three months after the outbreak of war with the United States, Britain had no more than eleven ships of the line, thirty-four frigates, and about an equal number of smaller naval vessels in the western Atlantic. These were all that could be spared for operations in American waters, which involved the tremendous tasks of escorting British merchant shipping, protecting the St. Lawrence River, blockading American ports, and at the same time hunting down American frigates.

      A significant weakness in the American position was the disunity of the country. In the New England states, public opinion ranged from mere apathy to actively expressed opposition to the war. A good many Massachusetts and Connecticut ship owners outfitted privateers (privately owned and armed vessels that were commissioned to take enemy ships), but how much of this was a result of patriotism and how much was hope for profit remains a matter of conjecture. Many New Englanders went so far as to sell grain and provisions to the British. Throughout the war, there were serious problems in raising and sustaining the militia from New England. Nevertheless, several of those states spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on local defense even if they contributed little directly to the federal effort. And despite the regional disaffection with the war, New England was second only to the Mid-Atlantic States


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